's knowledge； not to his intent。 It means the absence of probable cause in the facts known to the defendant when he instituted the suit。 But the standard applied to the defendant's consciousness is external to it。 The question is not whether he thought the ＇141＇ facts to constitute probable cause； but whether the court thinks they did。
Then as to malice。 The conduct of the defendant consists in instituting proceedings on a charge which is in fact false； and which has not prevailed。 That is the root of the whole matter。 If the charge was true； or if the plaintiff has been convicted； even though he may be able now to prove that he was wrongly convicted； the defendant is safe； however great his malice； and however little ground he had for his charge。
Suppose； however； that the charge is false； and does not prevail。 It may readily be admitted that malice did originally mean a malevolent motive； an actual intent to harm the plaintiff by making a false charge。 The legal remedy here； again； started from the moral basis； the occasion for it； no doubt； being similar to that which gave rise to the old law of conspiracy； that a man's enemies would sometimes seek his destruction by setting the criminal law in motion against him。 As it was punishable to combine for such a purpose； it was concluded； with some hesitation； that； when a single individual wickedly attempted the same thing； he should be liable on similar grounds。 /1/ I must fully admit that there is weighty authority to the effect that malice in its ordinary sense is to this day a distinct fact to be proved and to be found by the jury。
But this view cannot be accepted without hesitation。 It is admitted that； on the one side； the existence of probable cause； believed in； is a justification notwithstanding malice； /2/ that； on the other； 〃it is not enough to show ＇142＇ that the case appeared sufficient to this particular party； but it must be sufficient to induce a sober； sensible and discreet person to act upon it； or it must fail as a justification for the proceeding upon general grounds。〃 /1/ On the one side； malice alone will not make a man liable for instituting a groundless prosecution； on the other； his justification will depend； not on his opinion of the facts； but on that of the court。 When his actual moral condition is disregarded to this extent； it is a little hard to believe that the existence of an improper motive should be material。 Yet that is what malice must mean in this case； if it means anything。 /2/ For the evil effects of a successful indictment are of course intended by one who procures all other to be indicted。 I cannot but think that a jury would be told that knowledge or belief that the charge was false at the time of making it was conclusive evidence of malice。 And if so； on grounds which need not be repeated； malice is not the important thing； but the facts known to the defendant。
Nevertheless； as it is obviously treading on delicate ground to make it actionable to set the regular processes of the law in motion； it is； of course； entirely possible to say that the action shall be limited to those cases where the charge was preferred from improper motives； at least if the defendant thought that there was probable cause。 Such a limitation would stand almost alone in the law of civil liability。 But the nature of the wrong is peculiar； and； moreover； it is quite consistent with the theory of liability here advanced that it should be confined in any given instance to actual wrong…doing in a moral sense。
The only other cause of action in which the moral condition ＇143＇ of the defendant's consciousness might seem to be important is conspiracy。 The old action going by that name was much like malicious prosecution； and no doubt was originally confined to cases where several persons had conspired to indict another from malevolent motives。 But in the modern action on the case； where conspiracy is charged； the allegation as a rule only means that two or more persons were so far co…operating in their acts that the act of any one was the act of all。 Generally speaking； the liability depends not on the co…operation or conspiring； but on the character of the acts done； supposing them all to be done by one man； or irrespective of the question whether they were done by one or several。 There may be cases； to be sure； in which the result could not be accomplished； or the offence could not ordinarily be proved； without a combination of several； as； for instance； the removal of a teacher by a school board。 The conspiracy would not affect the case except in a practical way； but the question would be raised whether； notwithstanding the right of the board to remove； proof that they were actuated by malevolence would not make a removal actionable。 Policy； it might be said； forbids going behind their judgment； but actual evil motives coupled with the absence of grounds withdraw this protection； because policy； although it does not require them to take the risk of being right； does require that they should judge honestly on the merits。 /1/
Other isolated instances like the last might； perhaps； be found in different parts of the law； in which actual malevolence would affect a man's liability for his conduct。 Again； in trover for the conversion of another's chattel； where the dominion exercised over it was of a slight and ambiguous ＇144＇ nature； it has been said that the taking must be 〃with the intent of exercising an ownership over the chattel inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession。〃 /l / But this seems to be no more than a faint shadow of the doctrine explained with regard to larceny； and does not require any further or special discussion。 Trover is commonly understood to go； like larceny； on the plaintiff's being deprived of his property； although in practice every possessor has the action； and； generally speaking； the shortest wrongful withholding of possession is a conversion。
Be the exceptions more or less numerous； the general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm to person； reputation； or estate； at the hands of his neighbors； not because they are wrong； but because they are harms。 The true explanation of the reference of liability to a moral standard； in the sense which has been explained； is not that it is for the purpose of improving men's hearts； but that it is to give a man a fair chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held responsible for it。 It is intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents lie where they fall； and the reasonable freedom of others with the protection of the individual from injury。
But the law does not even seek to indemnify a man from all harms。 An unrestricted enjoyment of all his possibilities would interfere with other equally important enjoyments on the part of his neighbors。 There are certain things which the law allows a man to do； notwithstanding the fact that he foresees that harm to another will follow from them。 He may charge a man with crime if the charge is true。 He may establish himself in business where he foresees that ＇145＇ of his competition will be to diminish the custom of another shopkeeper； perhaps to ruin him。 He may a building which cuts another off from a beautiful prospect； or he may drain subterranean waters and thereby drain another's well； and many other cases might be put。
As any of these things may be done with foresight of their evil consequences； it would seem that they might be done with intent； and even with malevolent intent； to produce them。 The whole argument of this Lecture and the preceding tends to this conclusion。 If the aim of liability is simply to prevent or indemnify from harm so far as is consistent with avoiding the extreme of making a man answer for accident； when the law permits the harm to be knowingly inflicted it would be a strong thing if the presence of malice made any difference in its decisions。 That might happen； to be sure； without affecting the general views maintained here； but it is not to be expected； and the weight of authority is against it。
As the law； on the one hand； allows certain harms to be inflicted irrespective of the moral condition of him who inflicts them； so； at the other extreme； it may on grounds of policy throw the absolute risk of certain transactions on the person engaging in them； irrespective of blameworthiness in any sense。 Instances of this sort have been mentioned in the last Lecture； /1/ and will be referred to again。
Most liabilities in tort lie between these two extremes； and are founded on the infliction of harm which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to avoid at the time of the acts or omissions which were its proximate cause。 Rut as fast as specific rules are worked out in place of the ＇146＇ vague reference to the conduct of the average man； they range themselves alongside of other specific rules based on public policy； and the grounds from which they spring cease to be manifest。 So that； as will be seen directly； rules which seem to lie outside of culpability in any sense have sometimes been referred to remote fault； while others which started from the general notion of negligence may with equal ease be referred to some extrinsic ground of policy。
Apart from the extremes just mentioned； it is now easy to see how the point at which a man's conduct begins to be at his own peril is generally fixed。 When the principle is understood on which that point is determined by the law of torts； we possess a common ground of classification； and a key to the whole subject； so far as tradition has not swerved the law from a consistent theory。 It has been made pretty clear from what precedes； that I find that ground in knowledge of circumstances accompanying an act or conduct indifferent but for those circumstances。
But it is worth remarking； before that criterion is discussed； that a possible common ground is reached at the preceding step in the descent from malice through intent and foresight。 Foresight is a possible common denominator of wrongs at the two extremes of malice and negligence。 The purpose of the law is to prevent or secure a man indemnity from harm at the hands of his neighbors； so far as consistent with other considerations which have been mentioned；