t not less conditional on good faith in one case than in the other。
To illustrate； we may take a somewhat extreme case。 A says to B； I have not opened these barrels myself； but they contain No。 1 mackerel： I paid so much for them to so and so； naming a well…known dealer。 Afterwards A writes B； I will sell the barrels which you saw； and their ＇324＇ contents； for so much； and B accepts。 The barrels turn out to contain salt。 I suppose the contract would be binding if the statements touching the contents were honest； and voidable if they were fraudulent。
Fraudulent representations outside a contract can never； it would seem； go to anything except the motives for making it。 If outside the contract； they cannot often affect its interpretation。 A promise in certain words has a definite meaning； which the promisor is presumed to understand。 If A says to B； I promise you to buy this barrel and its contents； his words designate a person and thing identified by the senses； and they signify nothing more。 There is no repugnancy； and if that person is ready to deliver that thing； the purchaser cannot say that any term in the contract itself is not complied with。 He may have been fraudulently induced to believe that B was another B； and that the barrel contained mackerel； but however much his belief on those points may have affected his willingness to make the promise； it would be somewhat extravagant to give his words a different meaning on that account。 〃You〃 means the person before the speaker； whatever his name； and 〃contents〃 applies to salt； as well as to mackerel。
It is no doubt only by reason of a condition construed into the contract that fraud is a ground of rescission。 Parties could agree； if they chose； that a contract should be binding without regard to truth or falsehood outside of it on either part。
But； as has been said before in these Lectures； although the law starts from the distinctions and uses the language of morality； it necessarily ends in external standards not dependent on the actual consciousness of the individual。 ＇325＇ So it has happened with fraud。 If a man makes a representation； knowing facts which by the average standard of the community are sufficient to give him warning that it is probably untrue； and it is untrue； he is guilty of fraud in theory of law whether he believes his statement or not。 The courts of Massachusetts； at least； go much further。 They seem to hold that any material statement made by a man as of his own knowledge； or in such a way as fairly to be understood as made of his own knowledge； is fraudulent if untrue； irrespective of the reasons he may have had for believing it and for believing that he knew it。 /1/ It is clear； therefore； that a representation may be morally innocent； and yet fraudulent in theory of law。 Indeed； the Massachusetts rule seems to stop little short of the principle laid down by the English courts of equity； which has been criticised in an earlier Lecture； /2/ since most positive affirmations of facts would at least warrant a jury in finding that they were reasonably understood to be made as of the party's own knowledge； and might therefore warrant a rescission if they turned out to be untrue。 The moral phraseology has ceased to be apposite； and an external standard of responsibility has been reached。 But the starting… point is nevertheless fraud； and except on the ground of fraud； as defined by law； I do not think that misrepresentations before the contract affect its validity； although they lead directly to its making。 But neither the contract nor the implied condition calls for the existence of the facts as to which the false representations were made。 They call only for the absence of certain false representations。 The condition is not that the promisee shall be a certain other B； or that the contents of the barrel shall be mackerel； ＇326＇ but that the promisee has not lied to him about material facts。
Then the question arises； How do you determine what facts are material？ As the facts are not required by the contract； the only way in which they can be material is that a belief in their being true is likely to have led to the making of the contract。
It is not then true； as it is sometimes said； that the law does not concern itself with the motives for making contracts。 On the contrary； the whole scope of fraud outside the contract is the creation of false motives and the removal of true ones。 And this consideration will afford a reasonable test of the cases in which fraud will warrant rescission。 It is said that a fraudulent representation must be material to have that effect。 But how are we to decide whether it is material or not？ If the above argument is correct； it must be by an appeal to ordinary experience to decide whether a belief that the fact was as represented would naturally have led to； or a contrary belief would naturally have prevented； the making of the contract。
If the belief would not naturally have had such an effect； either in general or under the known circumstances of the particular case； the fraud is immaterial。 If a man is induced to contract with another by a fraudulent representation of the latter that he is a great…grandson of Thomas Jefferson； I do not suppose that the contract would be voidable unless the contractee knew that； for special reasons； his lie would tend to bring the contract about。
The conditions or grounds for avoiding a contract which have been dealt with thus far are conditions concerning the conduct of the parties outside of the itself。 ＇327＇ Still confining myself to conditions arising by construction of law；that is to say； not directly and in terms attached to a promise by the literal meaning of the words in which it is expressed；I now come to those which concern facts to which the contract does in some way refer。
Such conditions may be found in contracts where the promise is only on one side。 It has been said that where the contract is unilateral； and its language therefore is all that of the promisor； clauses in his favor will be construed as conditions more readily than the same words in a bilateral contract； indeed； that they must be so construed； because； if they do not create a condition； they do him no good； since ex hypothesi they are not promises by the other party。 /1/ How far this ingenious suggestion has had a practical effect on doctrine may perhaps be doubted。
But it will be enough for the purposes of this general survey to deal with bilateral contracts； where there are undertakings on both sides； and where the condition implied in favor of one party is that the other shall make good what he on his part has undertaken。
The undertakings of a contract may be for the existence of a fact in the present or in the future。 They can be promises only in the latter case； but in the former； they be equally essential terms in the bargain。
Here again we come on the law of representations； but in a new phase。 Being a part of the contract； it is always possible that their truth should make a condition of the contract wholly irrespective of any question of fraud。 And it often is so in fact。 It is not； however； every representation embodied in the words used on one side which will ＇328＇ make a condition in favor of the other party。 Suppose A agrees to sell； and B agrees to buy； 〃A's seven…year…old sorrel horse Eclipse； now in the possession of B on trial；〃 and in fact the horse is chestnut…colored； not sorrel。 I do not suppose that B could refuse to pay for the horse on that ground。 If the law were so foolish as to aim at merely formal consistency； it might indeed be said that there was as absolute a repugnancy between the different terms of this contract as in the ease of an agreement to sell certain barrels of mackerel； where the barrels turned out to contain salt。 If this view were adopted； there would not be a contract subject to a condition； there would be no contract at all。 But in truth there is a contract； and there is not even a condition。 As has been said already； it is not every repugnancy that makes a contract void； and it is not every failure in the terms of the counter undertaking that makes it voidable。 Here it plainly appears that the buyer knows exactly what he is going to get； and therefore that the mistake of color has no bearing on the bargain。 /1/
If； on the other hand； a contract contained a representation which was fraudulent； and which misled the party to whom it was made； the contract would be voidable on the same principles as if the representation had been made beforehand。 But words of description in a contract are very frequently held to amount to what is sometimes called a warranty； irrespective of fraud。 Whether they do so or not is a question to be determined by the court on grounds of common sense； looking to the meaning of the words； the importance in the transaction of the facts ＇329＇ which the words convey； and so forth。 But when words of description are determined to be a warranty； the meaning of the decision is not merely that the party using them binds himself to answer for their truth； but that their truth is a condition of the contract。
For instance； in a leading case /1/ the agreement was that the plaintiff's ship； then in the port of Amsterdam； should； with all possible despatch； proceed direct to Newport； England； and there load a cargo of coals for Hong Kong。 At the date of the charter…party the vessel was not in Amsterdam； but she arrived there four days later。 The plaintiff had notice that the defendant considered time important。 It was held that the presence of the vessel in the port of Amsterdam at the date of the contract was a condition； the breach of which entitled the defendant to refuse to load； and to rescind the contract。 If the view were adopted that a condition must be a future event； and that a promise purporting to be conditional on a past or present event is either absolute or no promise at all； it would follow that in this case the defendant had never made a promise。 /2/ He had only promised if circumstances existed which did not exist。 I have already stated my objections to this way of looking at such cases； /2/ and will only add that the courts； so far as I am aware； do not sanction it； and certainly did not in this instance。
Th