the common law- 第58部分

But　there　was　another　ancient　obligation　which　had　a　different　history。　I　refer　to　the　warranty　which　arose　upon　the　transfer　of　property。　We　should　call　it　a　contract；　but　it　probably　presented　itself　to　the　mind　of　Glanvill's　predecessors　simply　as　a　duty　or　obligation　attached　by　law　to　a　transaction　which　was　directed　to　a　different　point；　just　as　the　liability　of　a　bailee；　which　is　now　treated　as　arising　from　his　undertaking；　was　originally　raised　by　the　law　out　of　the　position　in　which　he　stood　toward　third　persons。

After　the　Conquest　we　do　not　hear　much　of　warranty；　except　in　connection　with　land；　and　this　fact　will　at　once　＇372＇　account　for　its　having　had　a　different　history　from　debt。　The　obligation　of　warranty　was　to　defend　the　title；　and；　if　the　defence　failed；　to　give　to　the　evicted　owner　other　land　of　equal　value。　If　an　ancestor　had　conveyed　lands　with　warranty；　this　obligation　could　not　be　fulfilled　by　his　executor；　but　only　by　his　heir；　to　whom　his　other　lands　had　descended。　Conversely　as　to　the　benefit　of　warranties　made　to　a　deceased　grantee；　his　heir　was　the　only　person　interested　to　enforce　such　warranties；　because　the　land　descended　to　him。　Thus　the　heir　continued　to　represent　his　ancestor　in　the　latter's　rights　and　obligations　by　way　of　warranty；　after　the　executor　had　relieved　him　of　the　debts；　just　as　before　that　time　he　had　represented　his　ancestor　in　all　respects。

If　a　man　was　sued　for　property　which　he　had　bought　from　another；　the　regular　course　of　litigation　was　for　the　defendant　to　summon　in　his　seller　to　take　charge　of　the　defence；　and　for　him；　in　turn；　to　summon　in　his；　if　he　had　one；　and　so　on　until　a　party　was　reached　in　the　chain　of　title　who　finally　took　the　burden　of　the　case　upon　himself。　A　contrast　which　was　early　stated　between　the　Lombard　and　the　Roman　law　existed　equally　between　the　Anglo…Saxon　and　the　Roman。　It　was　said　that　the　Lombard　presents　his　grantor；　the　Roman　stands　in　his　grantor's　shoes；Langobardus　dat　auctorem；　Romanus　stat　loco　auctoris。　/1/

Suppose；　now；　that　A　gave　land　to　B；　and　B　conveyed　over　to　C。　If　C　was　sued　by　D；　claiming　a　better　title；　C　practically　got　the　benefit　of　A's　warranty；　/2/　because；　when　he　summoned　B；　B　would　summon　A；　and　thus　A　＇373＇　would　defend　the　case　in　the　end。　But　it　might　happen　that　between　the　time　when　B　conveyed　to　C；　and　the　time　when　the　action　was　begun；　B　had　died。　If　he　left　an　heir；　C　might　still　be　protected。　But　supposing　B　left　no　heir；　C　got　no　help　from　A；　who　in　the　other　event　would　have　defended　his　suit。　This　no　doubt　was　the　law　in　the　Anglo…Saxon　period；　but　it　was　manifestly　unsatisfactory。　We　may　conjecture；　with　a　good　deal　of　confidence；　that　a　remedy　would　be　found　as　soon　as　there　was　machinery　to　make　it　possible。　This　was　furnished　by　the　Roman　law。　According　to　that　system；　the　buyer　stood　in　the　place　of　his　seller；　and　a　fusion　of　the　Roman　with　the　Anglo…Saxon　rule　was　all　that　was　needed。

Bracton；　who　modelled　his　book　upon　the　writings　of　the　mediaeval　civilians；　shows　how　this　thought　was　used。　He　first　puts　the　case　of　a　conveyance　with　the　usual　clause　binding　the　grantor　and　his　heirs　to　warrant　and　defend　the　grantee　and　his　heirs。　He　then　goes　on：　〃Again　one　may　make　his　gift　greater　and　make　other　persons　quasi　heirs　＇of　his　grantee＇；　although；　in　fact；　they　are　not　heirs；　as　when　he　says　in　the　gift；　to　have　and　to　hold　to　such　a　one　and　his　heirs；　or　to　whomsoever　he　shall　choose　to　give　or　assign　the　said　land；　and　I　and　my　heirs　will　warrant　to　the　said　so　and　so；　and　his　heirs；　or　to　whomsoever　he　shall　choose　to　give　or　assign　the　said　land；　and　their　heirs；　against　all　persons。　In　which　case　if　the　grantee　shall　have　given　or　assigned　the　land；　and　then　have　died　without　heirs；　the　＇first＇　grantor　and　his　heirs　begin　to　hold　the　place　of　the　first　grantee　and　his　heirs；　and　are　in　place　of　the　first　grantee's　heir　（pro　herede）　so　far　as　concerns　warranting　to　his　assigns　and　their　heirs　＇374＇　according　to　the　clause　contained　in　the　first　grantor's　charter；　which　would　not　be　but　for　the　mention　of　assigns　in　the　first　gift。　But　so　long　as　the　first　grantee　survives；　or　his　heirs；　they　are　held　to　warranty；　and　not　the　first　grantor。〃　/1/

Here　we　see　that；　in　order　to　entitle　the　assign　to　the　benefit　of　the　first　grantor's　warranty；　assigns　must　be　mentioned　in　the　original　grant　and　covenant。　The　scope　of　the　ancient　obligation　was　not　extended　without　the　warrantor's　assent。　But　when　it　was　extended；　it　was　not　by　a　contrivance　like　a　modern　letter　of　credit。　Such　a　conception　would　have　been　impossible　in　that　stage　of　the　law。　By　mentioning　assigns　the　first　grantor　did　not　offer　a　covenant　to　any　person　who　would　thereafter　purchase　the　land。　If　that　had　been　the　notion；　there　would　have　been　a　contract　directly　binding　the　first　grantor　to　the　assign；　as　soon　as　the　land　was　sold；　and　thus　there　would　have　been　two　warranties　arising　from　the　same　clause；one　to　the　first　grantee；　a　second　to　the　assign。　But　in　fact　the　assign　recovered　on　the　original　warranty　to　the　first　grantee。　/2/　He　could　only　come　on　the　first　grantor　after　a　failure　of　his　immediate　grantor's　heirs。　The　first　grantor　by　mentioning　assigns　simply　enlarged　the　limits　of　his　grantee's　succession。　The　assign　could　vouch　the　first　grantor　only　on　the　principles　of　succession。　That　is　to　say；　he　could　only　do　so　when；　by　the　failure　of　the　first　grantee's　blood；　the　first　grantee's　feudal　relation　to　the　first　grantor；　his　persona；　came　to　be　sustained　by　the　assign。　/3/

＇375＇　This　was　not　only　carrying　out　the　fiction　with　technical　consistency；　but　was　using　it　with　good　sense；　as　fictions　generally　have　been　used　in　the　English　law。　Practically　it　made　little　difference　whether　the　assign　got　the　benefit　of　the　first　grantor's　warranty　mediately　or　immediately；　if　he　got　it。　The　trouble　arose　where　he　could　not　summon　the　mesne　grantor；　and　the　new　right　was　given　him　for　that　case　alone。　Later；　the　assign　did　not　have　to　wait　for　the　failure　of　his　immediate　grantor's　blood；　but　could　take　advantage　of　the　first　grantor's　warranty　from　the　beginning。　/1/

If　it　should　be　suggested　that　what　has　been　said　goes　to　show　that　the　first　grantor's　duty　to　warrant　arose　from　the　assign's　becoming　his　man　and　owing　homage；　the　answer　is　that　he　was　not　bound　unless　he　had　mentioned　assigns　in　his　grant；　homage　or　no　homage。　In　this　Bracton　is　confirmed　by　all　the　later　authorities。　/2/

Another　rule　on　which　there　are　vast　stores　of　forgotten　learning　will　show　how　exactly　the　fiction　fell　in　with　the　earlier　law。　Only　those　who　were　privy　in　estate　with　the　person　to　whom　the　warranty　was　originally　given；　could　vouch　the　original　warrantor。　Looking　back　to　the　early　＇376＇　procedure；　it　will　be　seen　that　of　course　only　those　in　the　same　chain　of　title　could　even　mediately　get　the　benefit　of　a　former　owner's　warranty。　The　ground　on　which　a　man　was　bound　to　warrant　was　that　he　had　conveyed　the　property　to　the　person　who　summoned　him。　Hence　a　man　could　summon　no　one　but　his　grantor；　and　the　successive　vouchers　came　to　an　end　when　the　last　vouchee　could　not　call　on　another　from　whom　he　had　bought。　Now　when　the　process　was　abridged；　no　persons　were　made　liable　to　summons　who　would　not　have　been　liable　before。　The　present　owner　was　allowed　to　vouch　directly　those　who　otherwise　would　have　been　indirectly　bound　to　defend　his　title；　but　no　others。　Hence　he　could　only　summon　those　from　whom　his　grantor　derived　his　title。　But　this　was　equally　well　expressed　in　terms　of　the　fiction　employed。　In　order　to　vouch；　the　present　owner　must　have　the　estate　of　the　person　to　whom　the　warranty　was　made。　As　every　lawyer　knows；　the　estate　does　not　mean　the　land。　It　means　the　status　or　persona　in　regard　to　that　land　formerly　sustained　by　another。　The　same　word　was　used　in　alleging　a　right　by　prescription；　〃that　he　and　those　whose　estate　he　hath　have　for　time　whereof　memory　runneth　not　to　the　contrary；〃　&c。；　and　it　will　be　remembered　that　the　word　corresponds　to　the　same　requirement　of　succession　there。

To　return　to　Bracton；　it　must　be　understood　that　the　description　of　assigns　as　quasi　heredes　is　not　accidental。　He　describes　them　in　that　way　whenever　he　has　occasion　to　speak　of　them。　He　even　pushes　the　reasoning　drawn　from　the　analogy　of　inheritance　to　extremes；　and　refers　to　it　in　countless　passages。　For　instance：　〃It　should　be　noted　that　of　heirs　some　are　true　heirs　and　some　quasi　＇377＇　heirs；　in　place　of　heirs；　&c。；　true　heirs　by　way　of　succession　quasi　heirs；　&c。　by　the　form　of　the　gift；　such　as　assigns；〃　&c。　/1/

If　it　should　be　suggested　that　Bracton's　language　is　only　a　piece　of　mediaeval　scholasticism；　there　are　several　answers。　In　the　first　place　it　is　nearly　contemporaneous　with　the　first　appearance　of　the　right　in　question。　This　is　shown　by　his　citing　authority　for　it　as　for　something　which　might　be　disputed。　He　says；　〃And　that　warranty　must　be　made　to　assigns　according　to　the　form　of　the　gift　is　proved　＇by　a　case＇　in　the　circuit　of　W。　de　Ralegh；　about　the　end　of　the　roll；〃&c。　/2/　It　is　not　justifiable　to　assume　that　a　contemporary　explanation　of　a　new　rule　had　nothing　to　do　with　its　appearance。　Again；　the　fact　is　clear　that　the　assign　got　the　benefit　of　the　warranty　to　the　first　grantee；　not　of　a　new　one　to　himself；　as　has　been　shown；　and　Bracton's　explanation　of　how　this　was　worked　out　falls　in　with　what　has　been　seen　of　the　course　of　the　German　and　Anglo…Saxon　law；　and　with　the　pervading　thought　of　the　Roman　law。　Finally；　and　most　important；　the　requirement　that　the　assign　should　be　in　of　the　first　grantee's　estate　has　remained　a　requirement　from　that　day　to　this。　The　fact　that　the　same　thing　is　required　in　the　same　words　as　in　prescription　goes　far　to　show　that　the　same　technical　thought　has　governed　both。

I　have　said；　Glanvill's　predecessors　probably　regarded　warranty　as　an　obligation　incident　to　a　conveyance；　rather　than　as　a　contract。　But　when　it　became　usual　to　insert　the　undertaking　to　warrant　in　a　deed　or　charter　of　feoffment；　it　lost　something　of　its　former　isolation　as　a　duty　standing　by　itself；　and　admitted　of　being　＇378＇　generalized。　It　was　a　promise　by　deed；　and　a　promise　by　deed　was　a　covenant。　/1/　Thi