the spirit of laws- 第121部分

A　vassal　could　not　challenge　the　court　of　his　lord　of　false　judgment；　without　demanding　a　judicial　combat　against　the　judges　who　pronounced　sentence。　But　St。　Louis　introduced　the　practice　of　challenging　of　false　judgment　without　fighting；　a　change　that　may　be　reckoned　a　kind　of　revolution。＇222＇

He　declared＇223＇　that　there　should　be　no　challenge　of　false　judgment　in　the　lordships　of　his　demesnes；　because　it　was　a　crime　of　felony。　In　reality；　if　it　was　a　kind　of　felony　against　the　lord；　by　a　much　stronger　reason　it　was　felony　against　the　king。　But　he　consented　that　they　might　demand　an　amendment＇224＇　of　the　judgments　passed　in　his　courts；　not　because　they　were　false　or　iniquitous；　but　because　they　did　some　prejudice。＇225＇　On　the　contrary；　he　ordained　that　they　should　be　obliged　to　make　a　challenge　of　false　judgment　against　the　courts　of　the　barons；＇226＇　in　case　of　any　complaint。

It　was　not　allowed　by　the　Institutions；　as　we　have　already　observed；　to　bring　a　challenge　of　false　judgment　against　the　courts　in　the　king's　demesnes。　They　were　obliged　to　demand　an　amendment　before　the　same　court；　and　in　case　the　bailiff　refused　the　amendment　demanded；　the　king　gave　leave　to　make　an　appeal　to　his　court；＇227＇　or　rather；　interpreting　the　Institutions　by　themselves；　to　present　him　a　request　or　petition。＇228＇

With　regard　to　the　courts　of　the　lords；　St。　Louis；　by　permitting　them　to　be　challenged　of　false　judgment；　would　have　the　cause　brought　before　the　royal　tribunal；＇229＇　or　that　of　the　lord　paramount；　not　to　be　decided　by　duel＇230＇　but　by　witnesses；　pursuant　to　a　certain　form　of　proceeding；　the　rules　of　which　he　laid　down　in　the　Institutions。＇231＇

Thus；　whether　they　could　falsify　the　judgment；　as　in　the　court　of　the　barons；　or　whether　they　could　not　falsify；　as　in　the　court　of　his　demesnes；　he　ordained　that　they　might　appeal　without　the　hazard　of　a　duel。

Défontaines＇232＇　gives　us　the　first　two　examples　he　ever　saw；　in　which　they　proceeded　thus　without　a　legal　duel：　one；　in　a　cause　tried　at　the　court　of　St。　Quentin；　which　belonged　to　the　king's　demesne；　and　the　other；　in　the　court　of　Ponthieu；　where　the　count；　who　was　present；　opposed　the　ancient　jurisprudence：　but　these　two　causes　were　decided　by　law。

Here；　perhaps；　it　will　be　asked　why　St。　Louis　ordained　for　the　courts　of　his　barons　a　different　form　of　proceeding　from　that　which　he　had　established　in　the　courts　of　his　demesne？　The　reason　is　this：　when　St。　Louis　made　the　regulation　for　the　courts　of　his　demesnes；　he　was　not　checked　or　limited　in　his　views：　but　he　had　measures　to　keep　with　the　lords　who　enjoyed　this　ancient　prerogative；　that　causes　should　not　be　removed　from　their　courts；　unless　the　party　was　willing　to　expose　himself　to　the　dangers　of　an　appeal　of　false　judgment。　St。　Louis　preserved　the　usage　of　this　appeal；　but　he　ordained　that　it　should　be　made　without　a　judicial　combat；　that　is；　in　order　to　make　the　change　less　felt；　he　suppressed　the　thing；　and　continued　the　terms。

This　regulation　was　not　universally　received　in　the　courts　of　the　lords。　Beaumanoir　says＇233＇　that　in　his　time　there　were　two　ways　of　trying　causes；　one　according　to　the　king's　establishment；　and　the　other　pursuant　to　the　ancient　practice；　that　the　lords　were　at　liberty　to　follow　which　way　they　pleased；　but　when　they　had　pitched　upon　one　in　any　cause；　they　could　not　afterwards　have　recourse　to　the　other。　He　adds；＇234＇　that　the　Count　of　Clermont　followed　the　new　practice；　while　his　vassals　kept　to　the　old　one；　but　that　it　was　in　his　power　to　reestablish　the　ancient　practice　whenever　he　pleased；　otherwise　he　would　have　less　authority　than　his　vassals。

It　is　proper　here　to　observe　that　France　was　at　that　time　divided　into　the　country　of　the　king's　demesne；　and　that　which　was　called　the　country　of　the　barons；　or　the　baronies；　and；　to　make　use　of　the　terms　of　St。　Louis'　Institutions；　into　the　country　under　obedience　to　the　king；　and　the　country　out　of　his　obedience。＇235＇　When　the　king　made　ordinances　for　the　country　of　his　demesne；　he　employed　his　own　single　authority。　But　when　he　published　any　ordinances　that　concerned　also　the　country　of　his　barons；　these　were　made　in　concert　with　them；＇236＇　or　sealed　and　subscribed　by　them：　otherwise　the　barons　received　or　refused　them；　according　as　they　seemed　conducive　to　the　good　of　their　baronies。　The　rear…vassals　were　upon　the　same　terms　with　the　great…vassals。　Now　the　Institutions　were　not　made　with　the　consent　of　the　lords；　though　they　regulated　matters　which　to　them　were　of　great　importance：　but　they　were　received　only　by　those　who　believed　they　would　redound　to　their　advantage。　Robert；　son　of　St。　Louis；　received　them　in　his　county　of　Clermont；　yet　his　vassals　did　not　think　proper　to　conform　to　this　practice。

30。　Observation　on　Appeals。　I　apprehend　that　appeals；　which　were　challenges　to　a　combat；　must　have　been　made　immediately　on　the　spot。　〃If　the　party　leaves　the　court　without　appealing；〃　says　Beaumanoir；＇237＇　〃he　loses　his　appeal；　and　the　judgment　stands　good。〃　This　continued　still　in　force；　even　after　all　the　restrictions　of　judicial　combat。＇238＇

31。　The　same　Subject　continued。　The　villain　could　not　bring　a　challenge　of　false　judgment　against　the　court　of　his　lord。　This　we　learn　from　Défontaines；＇239＇　and　he　is　confirmed　moreover　by　the　Institutions。＇240＇　Hence　Défontaines　says；＇241＇　〃between　the　lord　and　his　villain　there　is　no　other　judge　but　God。〃

It　was　the　custom　of　judicial　combats　that　deprived　the　villains　of　the　privilege　of　challenging　their　lord's　court　of　false　judgment。　And　so　true　is　this；　that　those　villains＇242＇　who　by　charter　or　custom　had　a　right　to　fight　had　also　the　privilege　of　challenging　their　lord's　court　of　false　judgment；　even　though　the　peers　who　tried　them　were　gentlemen；＇243＇　and　Défontaines　proposes　expedients　to　gentlemen　in　order　to　avoid　the　scandal　of　fighting　with　a　villain　by　whom　they　had　been　challenged　of　false　judgment。＇244＇

As　the　practice　of　judicial　combats　began　to　decline；　and　the　usage　of　new　appeals　to　be　introduced；　it　was　reckoned　unfair　that　freemen　should　have　a　remedy　against　the　injustice　of　the　courts　of　their　lords；　and　the　villains　should　not；　hence　the　parliament　received　their　appeals　all　the　same　as　those　of　freemen。

32。　The　same　Subject　continued。　When　a　challenge　of　false　judgment　was　brought　against　the　lord's　court；　the　lord　appeared　in　person　before　his　paramount　to　defend　the　judgment　of　his　court。　In　like　manner；　in　the　appeal　of　default　of　justice；　the　party　summoned　before　the　lord　paramount　brought　his　lord　along　with　him；　to　the　end　that　if　the　default　was　not　proved；　he　might　recover　his　jurisdiction。＇245＇

In　process　of　time　as　the　practice　observed　in　these　two　particular　cases　became　general；　by　the　introduction　of　all　sorts　of　appeals；　it　seemed　very　extraordinary　that　the　lord　should　be　obliged　to　spend　his　whole　life　in　strange　tribunals；　and　for　other　people's　affairs。　Philip　of　Valois　ordained＇246＇　that　none　but　the　bailiffs　should　be　summoned；　and　when　the　usage　of　appeals　became　still　more　frequent；　the　parties　were　obliged　to　defend　the　appeal：　the　deed　of　the　judge　became　that　of　the　party。＇247＇

I　took　notice　that　in　the　appeal　of　default　of　justice；＇248＇　the　lord　lost　only　the　privilege　of　having　the　cause　tried　in　his　own　court。　But　if　the　lord　himself　was　sued　as　party；＇249＇　which　became　a　very　common　practice；＇250＇　he　paid　a　fine　of　sixty　livres　to　the　king；　or　to　the　paramount；　before　whom　the　appeal　was　brought。　Thence　arose　the　usage；　after　appeals　had　been　generally　received；　of　making　the　fine　payable　to　the　lord　upon　the　reversal　of　the　sentence　of　his　judge；　a　usage　which　lasted　a　long　time；　and　was　confirmed　by　the　ordinance　of　Rousillon；　but　fell；　at　length；　to　the　ground　through　its　own　absurdity。

33。　The　same　Subject　continued。　In　the　practice　of　judicial　combats；　the　person　who　had　challenged　one　of　the　judges　of　false　judgment　might　lose　his　cause　by　the　combat；　but　could　not　possibly　gain　it。＇251＇　And；　indeed；　the　party　who　had　a　judgment　in　his　favour　ought　not　to　have　been　deprived　of　it　by　another　man's　act。　The　appellant；　therefore；　who　had　gained　the　battle　was　obliged　to　fight　likewise　against　the　adverse　party：　not　in　order　to　know　whether　the　judgment　was　good　or　bad　（for　this　judgment　was　out　of　the　case；　being　reversed　by　the　combat）；　but　to　determine　whether　the　demand　was　just　or　not；　and　it　was　on　this　new　point　they　fought。　Thence　proceeds　our　manner　of　pronouncing　decrees；　〃The　court　annuls　the　appeal；　the　court　annuls　the　appeal　and　the　judgment　against　which　the　appeal　was　brought。〃　In　effect；　when　the　person　who　had　made　the　challenge　of　false　judgment　happened　to　be　overcome；　the　appeal　was　reversed：　when　he　proved　victorious；　both　the　judgment　and　the　appeal　were　reversed；　then　they　were　obliged　to　proceed　to　a　new　judgment。

This　is　so　far　true　that；　when　the　cause　was　tried　by　inquests；　this　manner　of　pronouncing　did　not　take　place：　witness　what　M。　de　la　Roche　Flavin　says；＇252＇　namely；　that　the　chamber　of　inquiry　could　not　use　this　form　at　the　beginning　of　its　existence。

34。　In　what　Manner　the　Proceedings　at　Law　became　secret。　Duels　had　introduced　a　public　form　of　proceeding；　so　that　both　the　attack　and　the　defence　were　equally　known。　〃The　witnesses；〃　says　Beaumanoir；＇253＇　〃ought　to　give　their　testimony　in　open　court。〃

Boutillier's　commentator　says　he　had　learned　of　ancient　practitioners；　and　from　some　old　manuscript　law　books；　that　criminal　processes　were　anciently　carried　on　in　public；　and　in　a　form　not　very　different　from　the　public　judgments　of　the　Romans。　This　was　owing　to　their　not　knowing　how　to　write；　a　thing　in　those　days　very　common。　The　usage　of　writing　fixes　the　ideas；　and　keeps　the　secret；　but　when　this　usage　is　laid　aside；　nothing　but　the　notoriety　of　the　proceeding　is　capable　of　fixing　those　ideas。

And　as　uncertainty　might　easily　arise　in　respect　to　what　had　been　adjudicated　by　vassals；　or　pleaded　before　them；　they　could；　therefore；　refresh　their　memory＇254＇　every　time　they　held　a　court　by　what　were　called　proceedings　on　record。＇255＇　In　that　case；　it　was　not　allowed　to　challenge　the　witnesses　to　combat；　for　then　there　would　be　no　end　of　disputes。

In　process　of　time　a　private　for