ich he was ordered to move； which was a road on the mountain into the head of McLemore's Cove； through Dougherty's Gap。
The battle for Chattanooga would never have been fought at Chickamauga had not the safety of McCook's corps demanded it。 Could the Army of the Cumberland have been withdrawn in safety to Chattanooga and there concentrated behind earthworks； as it was later； while Bragg doubtless would have made his attack there； yet the surroundings would have been far more favorable for our army； especially as the troops afterward sent might have reached Rosecrans in time to have defeated Bragg； as he was later at the battle of Missionary Ridge。 But the reinforcements that were hurried from all points AFTER the disaster； by the officials at Washington were not to benefit Rosecrans。
While the battle of the 19th was severe at times； and some slight advantages were gained by the enemy； still nothing had been accomplished to mark that day's fighting as a great； distinctive battle。 The delay on the part of Negley in reporting as ordered； to Thomas on the left； placed that position in extreme peril； had Polk made his attack as ordered at day…dawn on the 20th。 Fortunately； Polk slept outside of his lines that nightnot as he was accustomed toand was not awakened as early as he would have been had he remained in camp。 For this reason the attack； was not made until after Beatty's brigade had reached Baird's left。 While this was too weak to successfully resist the attack； still with this command rallied after it was driven back and aided by the troops sent to its support； Thomas was able to repulse Breckinridge's first charge of the morning。 The delay from six o'clock until after nine was of great service to the Army of the Cumberland。 Negley's delay in reporting at an early hour with his entire division was owing to Wood's failure to relieve him。 Sheridan had at an earlier hour been ordered to Negley's position on his front； but Thomas representing the urgency of the movement； Crittenden was ordered to send Wood； who was only a short distance from Negley。 Wood； on receiving his orders to relieve Negley； simply moved forward and occupied the position that had been vacated by Negley's reserve brigade； already started for Thomas's left。 On Rosecrans's return from the extreme right； he found that Negley had not yet reported to Thomas； although more than an hour had elapsed since he was so ordered and then discovered that Wood had failed to relieve him on the front。 Repeating his orders in such plain English that there could be no further misapprehension of them； Rosecrans moved Wood's division into position； relieved Negley at once； and started him in all haste to Thomas。 Negley did not reach the left until after ten o'clock。 Rosecrans； impatient at the delay that occurred in the execution of his order； expressed himself very forcibly to Wood； much to the dissatisfaction of the latter。 After seeing Negley was at last en route to Thomas； Rosecrans then went to the right and was watching the movements of the troops when the word reached him of the supposed gap to the right of Reynolds； on the left of Wood。 Rosecrans's plan of battle being to keep his line well closed up on the left； he directed an aid to send Wood an order to close up on Reynolds； which he did as follows。
Headquarters of the Army of the Cumberland。
Brigadier…General Wood； Commanding Division：
The General Commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as possible； and support him；
Respectfully； etc。；
FRANK S。 BOND； Major and Aid…de…Camp。
This order was written by an officer who had no military experience prior to the war； and； as the order shows on its face； embraced much more than the General Commanding intended it should。 The orderly who carried this order to Wood reported on his return that 〃General Wood on receipt of the order remarked that he 'was glad the order was in writing； as it was a good thing to have for future reference。' That he carefully took out his note…book； safely deposited the order in it； and then proceeded to execute it。〃 Wood's official report contains the order written out in full。 He says that it was eleven o'clock when it reached him。 〃General McCook was with me when I received it。 I informed him that I would immediately carry it into execution； and suggested to him that he should close up his command rapidly on my right； to prevent the occurrence of a gap in the line。 He said he would do so； and immediately rode away。〃
McCook says； in reference to the movement of Sheridan to the aid of Thomas； which he had just ordered； 〃Simultaneously with this movement； and much to my surprise； Wood's division left the position it had in line of battle on Davis's left； marching by the left flank； leaving a wide gap in the line。〃 Wood also says in his official report that when he started to execute the order he met Thomas； and told him of his order。 He says； 〃I exhibited my order to him； and asked him whether he would take the responsibility of changing it。 He replied he would； and I then informed him that I would move my command to the support of General Baird。〃 The first mention Thomas makes in his official report of seeing Wood is when in riding 〃toward the crest of the hill；〃 coming from the left； he met Wood on the way； and directed him to take position on Brannan's right。 Later； he says； 〃About the time that Wood took up his position； General Gordon Granger appeared；〃 etc。 This was over three hours after what General Wood styles 〃the disastrous event of the right〃 occurred。 It seems strange； if Wood was properly executing an order from the Commanding General； that he should try so hard to shield his action by the authority of these two corps commanders； especially when he was under the direct command of neither of them。
General Wood was a graduate of West Point； had been in the army all his life； and knew the full meaning of all technical terms used to describe military movements。 The order bore on its face a direction to him to make a movement with his front in line of battle； and at the same time to occupy a position in the rear of the division； on which he was ordered to join his left in line on the immediate battle…front。 He knew he could not execute the order literally as given； and from the wording of it must have known that there was some mistake about it。 Instead of sending a short distance to the rear； or going himself to Rosecrans and finding out just what was meant by the order； he chose to give it a meaning that it was never intended to convey； and moved to the rear from the front of battle； when he knew； as he says in his report； 〃although I had not been seriously engaged at any time during the morning； I was well satisfied the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front。〃 Wood says in his official report； 〃Reynolds's division was posted on the left of Brannan's division； which in turn was on the left of the position I was just quitting； I had consequently to pass my command in the rear of Brannan's division to close up on and go into the support of Reynolds。〃 If 〃Reynolds's； division was posted on the left of Brannan's division；〃 then there was no gap； and no place for Wood to place his division as ordered； and he knew it。 He could support Reynolds； but to do this he was compelled to disobey the first part of his order； which IN ITS SPIRIT AND INTENT WAS TO KEEP HIM ON THE LINE OF BATTLE； simply moving his division to the left。 This space by his own official report he shows was occupied by Brannan's division； and with this knowledge he undertook to execute an order that directed him to make an impossible movement rather than ask an explanation of it from his commanding officer。 No wonder he wanted to keep his order safe where he could produce it if occasion required。 Wood； irritated at the reprimand of Rosecrans earlier in the day； intent on maintaining his dignity； chose rather to undertake to carry out an order in the execution of which he felt safe； so long as he had it in writing and where he could produce it if occasion demanded it； than to suspend its execution long enough to ride a short distance to the rear； and find out just what the order meant； AND TO THIS EXTENT HE IS RESPONSIBLE for the great disaster which swept the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland from the field of battle on the 20th。 That Wood must have known that there was a mistake in regard to the order is plain； from the fact that he himself says that his troops had not been seriously engaged that morning。 It was hardly possible that Reynolds's division； which was only a division front from his； could be so hardly pressed as to need supports； and that his division should 〃not be seriously engaged。〃 In fact； when Wood undertook to carry out this order； he says he met Thomas and was told by him that Reynolds did not need supports； and that he； Wood； 〃had better move to the support of General Baird； posted on the extreme left； who needed assistance；〃 showing that the conflict had as yet not reached down the line to Reynolds。 The spirit in which General Wood fought the battle of Chickamauga is shown by the following extract from his official report； where； in speaking of Garfield's arrival on the battlefield later in the afternoon of the 20th； he says； 〃After the disastrous event of the right； General Garfield made his way back to the battlefield； showing thereby that the road was open to all who might choose to follow it where duty called。〃 After Wood reported to Thomas there was no more splendid fighting done on that field of terrific conflict on the 20th than was done by Thomas J。 Wood and his division。 To the last he aided Thomas in holding Horseshoe Ridge； and was one of the last divisions to retire。
In the tide that swept down the Dry Valley road； Rosecrans was caught with the members of his staff。 He breasted this for a while； and endeavored to join his left and centre under Thomas by a direct route。 After riding along a short distance； under the heavy fire of the rebels with both artillery and musketry； he discovered that the road was effectually closed by the enemy in strong force。 He then started over the ridge to the Dry Valley road； and made his way as rapidly as possible throu