posterior analytics- 第21部分

species；　universally　and　commensurately　to　those　species…i。e。　either



to　all　species　of　plant　or　to　a　single　species。　So　in　these



universal　and　commensurate　connexions　the　'middle'　and　its　effect　must



reciprocate；　i。e。　be　convertible。　Supposing；　for　example；　that　the



reason　why　trees　are　deciduous　is　the　coagulation　of　sap；　then　if　a



tree　is　deciduous；　coagulation　must　be　present；　and　if　coagulation



is　present…not　in　any　subject　but　in　a　tree…then　that　tree　must　be



deciduous。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　17







　　Can　the　cause　of　an　identical　effect　be　not　identical　in　every



instance　of　the　effect　but　different？　Or　is　that　impossible？　Perhaps



it　is　impossible　if　the　effect　is　demonstrated　as　essential　and　not　as



inhering　in　virtue　of　a　symptom　or　an　accident…because　the　middle　is



then　the　definition　of　the　major　term…though　possible　if　the



demonstration　is　not　essential。　Now　it　is　possible　to　consider　the



effect　and　its　subject　as　an　accidental　conjunction；　though　such



conjunctions　would　not　be　regarded　as　connexions　demanding



scientific　proof。　But　if　they　are　accepted　as　such；　the　middle　will



correspond　to　the　extremes；　and　be　equivocal　if　they　are　equivocal；



generically　one　if　they　are　generically　one。　Take　the　question　why



proportionals　alternate。　The　cause　when　they　are　lines；　and　when



they　are　numbers；　is　both　different　and　identical；　different　in　so　far



as　lines　are　lines　and　not　numbers；　identical　as　involving　a　given



determinate　increment。　In　all　proportionals　this　is　so。　Again；　the



cause　of　likeness　between　colour　and　colour　is　other　than　that　between



figure　and　figure；　for　likeness　here　is　equivocal；　meaning　perhaps



in　the　latter　case　equality　of　the　ratios　of　the　sides　and　equality　of



the　angles；　in　the　case　of　colours　identity　of　the　act　of　perceiving



them；　or　something　else　of　the　sort。　Again；　connexions　requiring　proof



which　are　identical　by　analogy　middles　also　analogous。



　　The　truth　is　that　cause；　effect；　and　subject　are　reciprocally



predicable　in　the　following　way。　If　the　species　are　taken　severally；



the　effect　is　wider　than　the　subject　（e。g。　the　possession　of



external　angles　equal　to　four　right　angles　is　an　attribute　wider



than　triangle　or　are）；　but　it　is　coextensive　with　the　species　taken



collectively　（in　this　instance　with　all　figures　whose　external



angles　are　equal　to　four　right　angles）。　And　the　middle　likewise



reciprocates；　for　the　middle　is　a　definition　of　the　major；　which　is



incidentally　the　reason　why　all　the　sciences　are　built　up　through



definition。



　　We　may　illustrate　as　follows。　Deciduous　is　a　universal　attribute



of　vine；　and　is　at　the　same　time　of　wider　extent　than　vine；　and　of



fig；　and　is　of　wider　extent　than　fig：　but　it　is　not　wider　than　but



coextensive　with　the　totality　of　the　species。　Then　if　you　take　the



middle　which　is　proximate；　it　is　a　definition　of　deciduous。　I　say



that；　because　you　will　first　reach　a　middle　next　the　subject；　and　a



premiss　asserting　it　of　the　whole　subject；　and　after　that　a　middle…the



coagulation　of　sap　or　something　of　the　sort…proving　the　connexion　of



the　first　middle　with　the　major：　but　it　is　the　coagulation　of　sap　at



the　junction　of　leaf…stalk　and　stem　which　defines　deciduous。



　　If　an　explanation　in　formal　terms　of　the　inter…relation　of　cause　and



effect　is　demanded；　we　shall　offer　the　following。　Let　A　be　an



attribute　of　all　B；　and　B　of　every　species　of　D；　but　so　that　both　A



and　B　are　wider　than　their　respective　subjects。　Then　B　will　be　a



universal　attribute　of　each　species　of　D　（since　I　call　such　an



attribute　universal　even　if　it　is　not　commensurate；　and　I　call　an



attribute　primary　universal　if　it　is　commensurate；　not　with　each



species　severally　but　with　their　totality）；　and　it　extends　beyond　each



of　them　taken　separately。



　　Thus；　B　is　the　cause　of　A's　inherence　in　the　species　of　D：



consequently　A　must　be　of　wider　extent　than　B；　otherwise　why　should



B　be　the　cause　of　A's　inherence　in　D　any　more　than　A　the　cause　of



B's　inherence　in　D？　Now　if　A　is　an　attribute　of　all　the　species　of



E；　all　the　species　of　E　will　be　united　by　possessing　some　common　cause



other　than　B：　otherwise　how　shall　we　be　able　to　say　that　A　is



predicable　of　all　of　which　E　is　predicable；　while　E　is　not



predicable　of　all　of　which　A　can　be　predicated？　I　mean　how　can　there



fail　to　be　some　special　cause　of　A's　inherence　in　E；　as　there　was　of



A's　inherence　in　all　the　species　of　D？　Then　are　the　species　of　E；　too；



united　by　possessing　some　common　cause？　This　cause　we　must　look　for。



Let　us　call　it　C。



　　We　conclude；　then；　that　the　same　effect　may　have　more　than　one



cause；　but　not　in　subjects　specifically　identical。　For　instance；　the



cause　of　longevity　in　quadrupeds　is　lack　of　bile；　in　birds　a　dry



constitution…or　certainly　something　different。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　18







　　If　immediate　premisses　are　not　reached　at　once；　and　there　is　not



merely　one　middle　but　several　middles；　i。e。　several　causes；　is　the



cause　of　the　property's　inherence　in　the　several　species　the　middle



which　is　proximate　to　the　primary　universal；　or　the　middle　which　is



proximate　to　the　species？　Clearly　the　cause　is　that　nearest　to　each



species　severally　in　which　it　is　manifested；　for　that　is　the　cause



of　the　subject's　falling　under　the　universal。　To　illustrate



formally：　C　is　the　cause　of　B's　inherence　in　D；　hence　C　is　the　cause



of　A's　inherence　in　D；　B　of　A's　inherence　in　C；　while　the　cause　of　A's



inherence　in　B　is　B　itself。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　19







　　As　regards　syllogism　and　demonstration；　the　definition　of；　and　the



conditions　required　to　produce　each　of　them；　are　now　clear；　and　with



that　also　the　definition　of；　and　the　conditions　required　to　produce；



demonstrative　knowledge；　since　it　is　the　same　as　demonstration。　As



to　the　basic　premisses；　how　they　become　known　and　what　is　the



developed　state　of　knowledge　of　them　is　made　clear　by　raising　some



preliminary　problems。



　　We　have　already　said　that　scientific　knowledge　through　demonstration



is　impossible　unless　a　man　knows　the　primary　immediate　premisses。



But　there　are　questions　which　might　be　raised　in　respect　of　the



apprehension　of　these　immediate　premisses：　one　might　not　only　ask



whether　it　is　of　the　same　kind　as　the　apprehension　of　the　conclusions；



but　also　whether　there　is　or　is　not　scientific　knowledge　of　both；　or



scientific　knowledge　of　the　latter；　and　of　the　former　a　different　kind



of　knowledge；　and；　further；　whether　the　developed　states　of



knowledge　are　not　innate　but　come　to　be　in　us；　or　are　innate　but　at



first　unnoticed。　Now　it　is　strange　if　we　possess　them　from　birth；



for　it　means　that　we　possess　apprehensions　more　accurate　than



demonstration　and　fail　to　notice　them。　If　on　the　other　hand　we　acquire



them　and　do　not　previously　possess　them；　how　could　we　apprehend　and



learn　without　a　basis　of　pre…existent　knowledge？　For　that　is



impossible；　as　we　used　to　find　in　the　case　of　demonstration。　So　it



emerges　that　neither　can　we　possess　them　from　birth；　nor　can　they　come



to　be　in　us　if　we　are　without　knowledge　of　them　to　the　extent　of



having　no　such　developed　state　at　all。　Therefore　we　must　possess　a



capacity　of　some　sort；　but　not　such　as　to　rank　higher　in　accuracy　than



these　developed　states。　And　this　at　least　is　an　obvious　characteristic



of　all　animals；　for　they　possess　a　congenital　discriminative



capacity　which　is　called　sense…perception。　But　though　sense…perception



is　innate　in　all　animals；　in　some　the　sense…impression　comes　to



persist；　in　others　it　does　not。　So　animals　in　which　this　persistence



does　not　come　to　be　have　either　no　knowledge　at　all　outside　the　act　of



perceiving；　or　no　knowledge　of　objects　of　which　no　impression



persists；　animals　in　which　it　does　come　into　being　have　perception　and



can　continue　to　retain　the　sense…impression　in　the　soul：　and　when　such



persistence　is　frequently　repeated　a　further　distinction　at　once



arises　between　those　which　out　of　the　persistence　of　such



sense…impressions　develop　a　power　of　systematizing　them　and　those



which　do　not。　So　out　of　sense…perception　comes　to　be　what　we　call



memory；　and　out　of　frequently　repeated　memories　of　the　same　thing



develops　experience；　for　a　number　of　memories　constitute　a　single



experience。　From　experience　again…i。e。　from　the　universal　now



stabilized　in　its　entirety　within　the　soul；　the　one　beside　the　many



which　is　a　single　identity　within　them　all…originate　the　skill　of



the　craftsman　and　the　knowledge　of　the　man　of　science；　skill　in　the



sphere　of　coming　to　be　and　science　in　the　sphere　of　being。



　　We　conclude　that　these　states　of　knowledge　are　neither　innate　in　a



determinate　form；　nor　developed　from　other　higher　states　of　knowledge；



but　from　sense…perception。　It　is　like　a　rout　in　battle　stopped　by



first　one　man　making　a　stand　and　then　another；　until　the　original



formation　has　been　restored。　The　soul　is　so　constituted　as　to　be



capable　of　this　process。



　　Let　us　now　restate　the　account　given　already；　though　with



insufficient　clearness。　When　one　of　a　number　of　logically



indiscriminable　particulars　has　made　a　stand；　the　earliest　universal



is　present　in　the　soul：　for　though　the　act　of　sense…perception　is　of



the　particular；　its　content　is　universal…is　man；　for　example；　not



the　man　Callias。　A　fresh　stand　is　made　among　these　rudimentary



universals；　and　the　process　does　not　cease　until　the　indi