crito- 第3部分

CRITO：　　Yes；　it　does。



SOCRATES：　　From　these　premisses　I　proceed　to　argue　the　question　whether　I

ought　or　ought　not　to　try　and　escape　without　the　consent　of　the　Athenians：　

and　if　I　am　clearly　right　in　escaping；　then　I　will　make　the　attempt；　but　if

not；　I　will　abstain。　　The　other　considerations　which　you　mention；　of　money

and　loss　of　character　and　the　duty　of　educating　one's　children；　are；　I

fear；　only　the　doctrines　of　the　multitude；　who　would　be　as　ready　to　restore

people　to　life；　if　they　were　able；　as　they　are　to　put　them　to　deathand

with　as　little　reason。　　But　now；　since　the　argument　has　thus　far　prevailed；

the　only　question　which　remains　to　be　considered　is；　whether　we　shall　do

rightly　either　in　escaping　or　in　suffering　others　to　aid　in　our　escape　and

paying　them　in　money　and　thanks；　or　whether　in　reality　we　shall　not　do

rightly；　and　if　the　latter；　then　death　or　any　other　calamity　which　may

ensue　on　my　remaining　here　must　not　be　allowed　to　enter　into　the

calculation。



CRITO：　　I　think　that　you　are　right；　Socrates；　how　then　shall　we　proceed？



SOCRATES：　　Let　us　consider　the　matter　together；　and　do　you　either　refute　me

if　you　can；　and　I　will　be　convinced；　or　else　cease；　my　dear　friend；　from

repeating　to　me　that　I　ought　to　escape　against　the　wishes　of　the　Athenians：　

for　I　highly　value　your　attempts　to　persuade　me　to　do　so；　but　I　may　not　be

persuaded　against　my　own　better　judgment。　　And　now　please　to　consider　my

first　position；　and　try　how　you　can　best　answer　me。



CRITO：　　I　will。



SOCRATES：　　Are　we　to　say　that　we　are　never　intentionally　to　do　wrong；　or

that　in　one　way　we　ought　and　in　another　way　we　ought　not　to　do　wrong；　or　is

doing　wrong　always　evil　and　dishonorable；　as　I　was　just　now　saying；　and　as

has　been　already　acknowledged　by　us？　　Are　all　our　former　admissions　which

were　made　within　a　few　days　to　be　thrown　away？　　And　have　we；　at　our　age；

been　earnestly　discoursing　with　one　another　all　our　life　long　only　to

discover　that　we　are　no　better　than　children？　　Or；　in　spite　of　the　opinion

of　the　many；　and　in　spite　of　consequences　whether　better　or　worse；　shall　we

insist　on　the　truth　of　what　was　then　said；　that　injustice　is　always　an　evil

and　dishonour　to　him　who　acts　unjustly？　　Shall　we　say　so　or　not？



CRITO：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　Then　we　must　do　no　wrong？



CRITO：　　Certainly　not。



SOCRATES：　　Nor　when　injured　injure　in　return；　as　the　many　imagine；　for　we

must　injure　no　one　at　all？　　（E。g。　compare　Rep。）



CRITO：　　Clearly　not。



SOCRATES：　　Again；　Crito；　may　we　do　evil？



CRITO：　　Surely　not；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　And　what　of　doing　evil　in　return　for　evil；　which　is　the　morality

of　the　manyis　that　just　or　not？



CRITO：　　Not　just。



SOCRATES：　　For　doing　evil　to　another　is　the　same　as　injuring　him？



CRITO：　　Very　true。



SOCRATES：　　Then　we　ought　not　to　retaliate　or　render　evil　for　evil　to　any

one；　whatever　evil　we　may　have　suffered　from　him。　　But　I　would　have　you

consider；　Crito；　whether　you　really　mean　what　you　are　saying。　　For　this

opinion　has　never　been　held；　and　never　will　be　held；　by　any　considerable

number　of　persons；　and　those　who　are　agreed　and　those　who　are　not　agreed

upon　this　point　have　no　common　ground；　and　can　only　despise　one　another

when　they　see　how　widely　they　differ。　　Tell　me；　then；　whether　you　agree

with　and　assent　to　my　first　principle；　that　neither　injury　nor　retaliation

nor　warding　off　evil　by　evil　is　ever　right。　　And　shall　that　be　the　premiss

of　our　argument？　　Or　do　you　decline　and　dissent　from　this？　　For　so　I　have

ever　thought；　and　continue　to　think；　but；　if　you　are　of　another　opinion；

let　me　hear　what　you　have　to　say。　　If；　however；　you　remain　of　the　same　mind

as　formerly；　I　will　proceed　to　the　next　step。



CRITO：　　You　may　proceed；　for　I　have　not　changed　my　mind。



SOCRATES：　　Then　I　will　go　on　to　the　next　point；　which　may　be　put　in　the

form　of　a　question：Ought　a　man　to　do　what　he　admits　to　be　right；　or　ought

he　to　betray　the　right？



CRITO：　　He　ought　to　do　what　he　thinks　right。



SOCRATES：　　But　if　this　is　true；　what　is　the　application？　　In　leaving　the

prison　against　the　will　of　the　Athenians；　do　I　wrong　any？　or　rather　do　I

not　wrong　those　whom　I　ought　least　to　wrong？　　Do　I　not　desert　the

principles　which　were　acknowledged　by　us　to　be　justwhat　do　you　say？



CRITO：　　I　cannot　tell；　Socrates；　for　I　do　not　know。



SOCRATES：　　Then　consider　the　matter　in　this　way：Imagine　that　I　am　about

to　play　truant　（you　may　call　the　proceeding　by　any　name　which　you　like）；

and　the　laws　and　the　government　come　and　interrogate　me：　　'Tell　us；

Socrates；'　they　say；　'what　are　you　about？　are　you　not　going　by　an　act　of

yours　to　overturn　usthe　laws；　and　the　whole　state；　as　far　as　in　you　lies？　

Do　you　imagine　that　a　state　can　subsist　and　not　be　overthrown；　in　which　the

decisions　of　law　have　no　power；　but　are　set　aside　and　trampled　upon　by

individuals？'　　What　will　be　our　answer；　Crito；　to　these　and　the　like　words？　

Any　one；　and　especially　a　rhetorician；　will　have　a　good　deal　to　say　on

behalf　of　the　law　which　requires　a　sentence　to　be　carried　out。　　He　will

argue　that　this　law　should　not　be　set　aside；　and　shall　we　reply；　'Yes；　but

the　state　has　injured　us　and　given　an　unjust　sentence。'　　Suppose　I　say

that？



CRITO：　　Very　good；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　'And　was　that　our　agreement　with　you？'　the　law　would　answer；　'or

were　you　to　abide　by　the　sentence　of　the　state？'　　And　if　I　were　to　express

my　astonishment　at　their　words；　the　law　would　probably　add：　　'Answer；

Socrates；　instead　of　opening　your　eyesyou　are　in　the　habit　of　asking　and

answering　questions。　　Tell　us；What　complaint　have　you　to　make　against　us

which　justifies　you　in　attempting　to　destroy　us　and　the　state？　　In　the

first　place　did　we　not　bring　you　into　existence？　　Your　father　married　your

mother　by　our　aid　and　begat　you。　　Say　whether　you　have　any　objection　to

urge　against　those　of　us　who　regulate　marriage？'　　None；　I　should　reply。　

'Or　against　those　of　us　who　after　birth　regulate　the　nurture　and　education

of　children；　in　which　you　also　were　trained？　　Were　not　the　laws；　which　have

the　charge　of　education；　right　in　commanding　your　father　to　train　you　in

music　and　gymnastic？'　　Right；　I　should　reply。　　'Well　then；　since　you　were

brought　into　the　world　and　nurtured　and　educated　by　us；　can　you　deny　in　the

first　place　that　you　are　our　child　and　slave；　as　your　fathers　were　before

you？　　And　if　this　is　true　you　are　not　on　equal　terms　with　us；　nor　can　you

think　that　you　have　a　right　to　do　to　us　what　we　are　doing　to　you。　　Would

you　have　any　right　to　strike　or　revile　or　do　any　other　evil　to　your　father

or　your　master；　if　you　had　one；　because　you　have　been　struck　or　reviled　by

him；　or　received　some　other　evil　at　his　hands？you　would　not　say　this？　

And　because　we　think　right　to　destroy　you；　do　you　think　that　you　have　any

right　to　destroy　us　in　return；　and　your　country　as　far　as　in　you　lies？　

Will　you；　O　professor　of　true　virtue；　pretend　that　you　are　justified　in

this？　　Has　a　philosopher　like　you　failed　to　discover　that　our　country　is

more　to　be　valued　and　higher　and　holier　far　than　mother　or　father　or　any

ancestor；　and　more　to　be　regarded　in　the　eyes　of　the　gods　and　of　men　of

understanding？　also　to　be　soothed；　and　gently　and　reverently　entreated　when

angry；　even　more　than　a　father；　and　either　to　be　persuaded；　or　if　not

persuaded；　to　be　obeyed？　　And　when　we　are　punished　by　her；　whether　with

imprisonment　or　stripes；　the　punishment　is　to　be　endured　in　silence；　and　if

she　lead　us　to　wounds　or　death　in　battle；　thither　we　follow　as　is　right；

neither　may　any　one　yield　or　retreat　or　leave　his　rank；　but　whether　in

battle　or　in　a　court　of　law；　or　in　any　other　place；　he　must　do　what　his

city　and　his　country　order　him；　or　he　must　change　their　view　of　what　is

just：　　and　if　he　may　do　no　violence　to　his　father　or　mother；　much　less　may

he　do　violence　to　his　country。'　　What　answer　shall　we　make　to　this；　Crito？　

Do　the　laws　speak　truly；　or　do　they　not？



CRITO：　　I　think　that　they　do。



SOCRATES：　　Then　the　laws　will　say：　　'Consider；　Socrates；　if　we　are　speaking

truly　that　in　your　present　attempt　you　are　going　to　do　us　an　injury。　　For；

having　brought　you　into　the　world；　and　nurtured　and　educated　you；　and　given

you　and　every　other　citizen　a　share　in　every　good　which　we　had　to　give；　we

further　proclaim　to　any　Athenian　by　the　liberty　which　we　allow　him；　that　if

he　does　not　like　us　when　he　has　become　of　age　and　has　seen　the　ways　of　the

city；　and　made　our　acquaintance；　he　may　go　where　he　pleases　and　take　his

goods　with　him。　　None　of　us　laws　will　forbid　him　or　interfere　with　him。　

Any　one　who　does　not　like　us　and　the　city；　and　who　wants　to　emigrate　to　a

colony　or　to　any　other　city；　may　go　where　he　likes；　retaining　his　property。　

But　he　who　has　experience　of　the　manner　in　which　we　order　justice　and

administer　the　state；　and　still　remains；　has　entered　into　an　implied

contract　that　he　will　do　as　we　command　him。　　And　he　who　disobeys　us　is；　as

we　maintain；　thrice　wrong：　　first；　because　in　disobeying　us　he　is

disobeying　his　parents；　secondly；　because　we　are　the　authors　of　his

education；　thirdly；　because　he　has　made　an　agreement　with　us　that　he　will

duly　obey　our　commands；　and　he　neither　obeys　them　nor　convinces　us　that　our

commands　are　unjust；　and　we　do　not　rudely　impose　them；　but　give　him　the

alternative　of　obeying　or　convincing　us；that　is　what　we　offer；　and　he

does　neither。



'These　are　the　sort　of　accusations　to　which；　as　we　were　saying；　you；

Socrates；　will　be　exposed　if　you　accomplish　your　intentions；　you；　above　all

other　Athenians。'　　Suppose　now　I　ask；　why　I　rather　than　anybody　else？　they

will　justly　retort　upon　me　that　I　above　all　other　men　have　acknowledged　the

agreement。　　'There　is　clear　proof；'　they　will　say；　'Socrates；　that　we　and

the　city　were　not　displeasing　to　you。　　Of　all　Athenians　you　have　been　the

most　constant　resident　in　the　city；　which；　as　you