on liberty- 第14部分

blink　the　fact；　known　to　all　who　have　the　most　ordinary　acquaintance



with　literary　history；　that　a　large　portion　of　the　noblest　and　most



valuable　moral　teaching　has　been　the　work；　not　only　of　men　who　did　not



know；　but　of　men　who　knew　and　rejected；　the　Christian　faith。



　　I　do　not　pretend　that　the　most　unlimited　use　of　the　freedom　of



enunciating　all　possible　opinions　would　put　an　end　to　the　evils　of



religious　or　philosophical　sectarianism。　Every　truth　which　men　of



narrow　capacity　are　in　earnest　about；　is　sure　to　be　asserted；



inculcated；　and　in　many　ways　even　acted　on；　as　if　no　other　truth



existed　in　the　world；　or　at　all　events　none　that　could　limit　or



qualify　the　first。　I　acknowledge　that　the　tendency　of　all　opinions



to　become　sectarian　is　not　cured　by　the　freest　discussion；　but　is



often　heightened　and　exacerbated　thereby；　the　truth　which　ought　to



have　been；　but　was　not；　seen；　being　rejected　all　the　more　violently



because　proclaimed　by　persons　regarded　as　opponents。　But　it　is　not



on　the　impassioned　partisan；　it　is　on　the　calmer　and　more



disinterested　bystander；　that　this　collision　of　opinions　works　its



salutary　effect。　Not　the　violent　conflict　between　parts　of　the



truth；　but　the　quiet　suppression　of　half　of　it；　is　the　formidable



evil；　there　is　always　hope　when　people　are　forced　to　listen　to　both



sides；　it　is　when　they　attend　only　to　one　that　errors　harden　into



prejudices；　and　truth　itself　ceases　to　have　the　effect　of　truth；　by



being　exaggerated　into　falsehood。　And　since　there　are　few　mental



attributes　more　rare　than　that　judicial　faculty　which　can　sit　in



intelligent　judgment　between　two　sides　of　a　question；　of　which　only



one　is　represented　by　an　advocate　before　it；　truth　has　no　chance　but



in　proportion　as　every　side　of　it；　every　opinion　which　embodies　any



fraction　of　the　truth；　not　only　finds　advocates；　but　is　so　advocated



as　to　be　listened　to。







　　We　have　now　recognised　the　necessity　to　the　mental　well…being　of



mankind　（on　which　all　their　other　well…being　depends）　of　freedom　of



opinion；　and　freedom　of　the　expression　of　opinion；　on　four　distinct



grounds；　which　we　will　now　briefly　recapitulate。



　　First；　if　any　opinion　is　compelled　to　silence；　that　opinion　may；　for



aught　we　can　certainly　know；　be　true。　To　deny　this　is　to　assume　our



own　infallibility。



　　Secondly；　though　the　silenced　opinion　be　an　error；　it　may；　and



very　commonly　does；　contain　a　portion　of　truth；　and　since　the



general　or　prevailing　opinion　on　any　subject　is　rarely　or　never　the



whole　truth；　it　is　only　by　the　collision　of　adverse　opinions　that



the　remainder　of　the　truth　has　any　chance　of　being　supplied。



　　Thirdly；　even　if　the　received　opinion　be　not　only　true；　but　the



whole　truth；　unless　it　is　suffered　to　be；　and　actually　is；



vigorously　and　earnestly　contested；　it　will；　by　most　of　those　who



receive　it；　be　held　in　the　manner　of　a　prejudice；　with　little



comprehension　or　feeling　of　its　rational　grounds。　And　not　only　this；



but；　fourthly；　the　meaning　of　the　doctrine　itself　will　be　in　danger　of



being　lost；　or　enfeebled；　and　deprived　of　its　vital　effect　on　the



character　and　conduct：　the　dogma　becoming　a　mere　formal　profession；



inefficacious　for　good；　but　cumbering　the　ground；　and　preventing　the



growth　of　any　real　and　heartfelt　conviction；　from　reason　or　personal



experience。



　　Before　quitting　the　subject　of　freedom　of　opinion；　it　is　fit　to　take



some　notice　of　those　who　say　that　the　free　expression　of　all



opinions　should　be　permitted；　on　condition　that　the　manner　be



temperate；　and　do　not　pass　the　bounds　of　fair　discussion。　Much　might



be　said　on　the　impossibility　of　fixing　where　these　supposed　bounds　are



to　be　placed；　for　if　the　test　be　offence　to　those　whose　opinions　are



attacked；　I　think　experience　testifies　that　this　offence　is　given



whenever　the　attack　is　telling　and　powerful；　and　that　every　opponent



who　pushes　them　hard；　and　whom　they　find　it　difficult　to　answer；



appears　to　them；　if　he　shows　any　strong　feeling　on　the　subject；　an



intemperate　opponent。



　　But　this；　though　an　important　consideration　in　a　practical　point



of　view；　merges　in　a　more　fundamental　objection。　Undoubtedly　the



manner　of　asserting　an　opinion；　even　though　it　be　a　true　one；　may　be



very　objectionable；　and　may　justly　incur　severe　censure。　But　the



principal　offences　of　the　kind　are　such　as　it　is　mostly　impossible；



unless　by　accidental　self…betrayal；　to　bring　home　to　conviction。　The



gravest　of　them　is；　to　argue　sophistically；　to　suppress　facts　or



arguments；　to　misstate　the　elements　of　the　case；　or　misrepresent　the



opposite　opinion。　But　all　this；　even　to　the　most　aggravated　degree；　is



so　continually　done　in　perfect　good　faith；　by　persons　who　are　not



considered；　and　in　many　other　respects　may　not　deserve　to　be



considered；　ignorant　or　incompetent；　that　it　is　rarely　possible；　on



adequate　grounds；　conscientiously　to　stamp　the　misrepresentation　as



morally　culpable；　and　still　less　could　law　presume　to　interfere　with



this　kind　of　controversial　misconduct。　With　regard　to　what　is　commonly



meant　by　intemperate　discussion；　namely　invective；　sarcasm；



personality；　and　the　like；　the　denunciation　of　these　weapons　would



deserve　more　sympathy　if　it　were　ever　proposed　to　interdict　them



equally　to　both　sides；　but　it　is　only　desired　to　restrain　the



employment　of　them　against　the　prevailing　opinion：　against　the



unprevailing　they　may　not　only　be　used　without　general　disapproval；



but　will　be　likely　to　obtain　for　him　who　uses　them　the　praise　of



honest　zeal　and　righteous　indignation。　Yet　whatever　mischief　arises



from　their　use　is　greatest　when　they　are　employed　against　the



comparatively　defenceless；　and　whatever　unfair　advantage　can　be



derived　by　any　opinion　from　this　mode　of　asserting　it；　accrues



almost　exclusively　to　received　opinions。　The　worst　offence　of　this



kind　which　can　be　committed　by　a　polemic　is　to　stigmatise　those　who



hold　the　contrary　opinion　as　bad　and　immoral　men。　To　calumny　of　this



sort；　those　who　hold　any　unpopular　opinion　are　peculiarly　exposed；



because　they　are　in　general　few　and　uninfluential；　and　nobody　but



themselves　feels　much　interested　in　seeing　justice　done　them；　but　this



weapon　is；　from　the　nature　of　the　case；　denied　to　those　who　attack　a



prevailing　opinion：　they　can　neither　use　it　with　safety　to　themselves；



nor；　if　they　could；　would　it　do　anything　but　recoil　on　their　own



cause。　In　general；　opinions　contrary　to　those　commonly　received　can



only　obtain　a　hearing　by　studied　moderation　of　language；　and　the



most　cautious　avoidance　of　unnecessary　offence；　from　which　they　hardly



ever　deviate　even　in　a　slight　degree　without　losing　ground：　while



unmeasured　vituperation　employed　on　the　side　of　the　prevailing　opinion



really　does　deter　people　from　professing　contrary　opinions；　and　from



listening　to　those　who　profess　them。



　　For　the　interest；　therefore；　of　truth　and　justice；　it　is　far　more



important　to　restrain　this　employment　of　vituperative　language　than



the　other；　and；　for　example；　if　it　were　necessary　to　choose；　there



would　be　much　more　need　to　discourage　offensive　attacks　on



infidelity　than　on　religion。　It　is；　however；　obvious　that　law　and



authority　have　no　business　with　restraining　either；　while　opinion



ought；　in　every　instance；　to　determine　its　verdict　by　the



circumstances　of　the　individual　case；　condemning　every　one；　on



whichever　side　of　the　argument　he　places　himself；　in　whose　mode　of



advocacy　either　want　of　candour；　or　malignity；　bigotry；　or　intolerance



of　feeling　manifest　themselves；　but　not　inferring　these　vices　from　the



side　which　a　person　takes；　though　it　be　the　contrary　side　of　the



question　to　our　own；　and　giving　merited　honour　to　every　one；



whatever　opinion　he　may　hold；　who　has　calmness　to　see　and　honesty　to



state　what　his　opponents　and　their　opinions　really　are；　exaggerating



nothing　to　their　discredit；　keeping　nothing　back　which　tells；　or　can



be　supposed　to　tell；　in　their　favour。　This　is　the　real　morality　of



public　discussion：　and　if　often　violated；　I　am　happy　to　think　that



there　are　many　controversialists　who　to　a　great　extent　observe　it；　and



a　still　greater　number　who　conscientiously　strive　towards　it。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　3。



　　　　　　　　Of　Individuality；　as　one　of　the　Elements　of　Well…being。







　　SUCH　BEING　the　reasons　which　make　it　imperative　that　human　beings



should　be　free　to　form　opinions；　and　to　express　their　opinions　without



reserve；　and　such　the　baneful　consequences　to　the　intellectual；　and



through　that　to　the　moral　nature　of　man；　unless　this　liberty　is　either



conceded；　or　asserted　in　spite　of　prohibition；　let　us　next　examine



whether　the　same　reasons　do　not　require　that　men　should　be　free　to　act



upon　their　opinions…　to　carry　these　out　in　their　lives；　without



hindrance；　either　physical　or　moral；　from　their　fellow…men；　so　long　as



it　is　at　their　own　risk　and　peril。



　　This　last　proviso　is　of　course　indispensable。　No　one　pretends　that



actions　should　be　as　free　as　opinions。　On　the　contrary；　even



opinions　lose　their　immunity　when　the　circumstances　in　which　they



are　expressed　are　such　as　to　constitute　their　expression　a　positive



instigation　to　some　mischievous　act。　An　opinion　that　corn…dealers



are　starvers　of　the　poor；　or　that　private　property　is　robbery；　ought



to　be　unmolested　when　simply　circulated　through　the　press；　but　may



justly　incur　punishment　when　delivered　orally　to　an　excited　mob



assembled　before　the　house　of　a　corn…dealer；　or　when　handed　about



among　the　same　mob　in　the　form　of　a　placard。　Acts；　of　whatever　kind；



which；　without　justifiable　cause；　do　harm　to　others；　may　be；　and　in



the　more　important　cases　absolutely　require　to　be；　controlled　by　the



unfavourable