on liberty- 第2部分

which　society　requires　to　be　on　its　guard。



　　Like　other　tyrannies；　the　tyranny　of　the　majority　was　at　first；



and　is　still　vulgarly；　held　in　dread；　chiefly　as　operating　through　the



acts　of　the　public　authorities。　But　reflecting　persons　perceived



that　when　society　is　itself　the　tyrant…　society　collectively　over　the



separate　individuals　who　compose　it…　its　means　of　tyrannising　are　not



restricted　to　the　acts　which　it　may　do　by　the　hands　of　its　political



functionaries。　Society　can　and　does　execute　its　own　mandates：　and　if



it　issues　wrong　mandates　instead　of　right；　or　any　mandates　at　all　in



things　with　which　it　ought　not　to　meddle；　it　practises　a　social



tyranny　more　formidable　than　many　kinds　of　political　oppression；



since；　though　not　usually　upheld　by　such　extreme　penalties；　it



leaves　fewer　means　of　escape；　penetrating　much　more　deeply　into　the



details　of　life；　and　enslaving　the　soul　itself。　Protection；　therefore；



against　the　tyranny　of　the　magistrate　is　not　enough：　there　needs



protection　also　against　the　tyranny　of　the　prevailing　opinion　and



feeling；　against　the　tendency　of　society　to　impose；　by　other　means



than　civil　penalties；　its　own　ideas　and　practices　as　rules　of



conduct　on　those　who　dissent　from　them；　to　fetter　the　development；



and；　if　possible；　prevent　the　formation；　of　any　individuality　not　in



harmony　with　its　ways；　and　compels　all　characters　to　fashion



themselves　upon　the　model　of　its　own。　There　is　a　limit　to　the



legitimate　interference　of　collective　opinion　with　individual



independence：　and　to　find　that　limit；　and　maintain　it　against



encroachment；　is　as　indispensable　to　a　good　condition　of　human



affairs；　as　protection　against　political　despotism。



　　But　though　this　proposition　is　not　likely　to　be　contested　in　general



terms；　the　practical　question；　where　to　place　the　limit…　how　to　make



the　fitting　adjustment　between　individual　independence　and　social



control…　is　a　subject　on　which　nearly　everything　remains　to　be　done。



All　that　makes　existence　valuable　to　any　one；　depends　on　the



enforcement　of　restraints　upon　the　actions　of　other　people。　Some　rules



of　conduct；　therefore；　must　be　imposed；　by　law　in　the　first　place；　and



by　opinion　on　many　things　which　are　not　fit　subjects　for　the　operation



of　law。　What　these　rules　should　be　is　the　principal　question　in



human　affairs；　but　if　we　except　a　few　of　the　most　obvious　cases；　it　is



one　of　those　which　least　progress　has　been　made　in　resolving。　No　two



ages；　and　scarcely　any　two　countries；　have　decided　it　alike；　and　the



decision　of　one　age　or　country　is　a　wonder　to　another。　Yet　the



people　of　any　given　age　and　country　no　more　suspect　any　difficulty



in　it；　than　if　it　were　a　subject　on　which　mankind　had　always　been



agreed。　The　rules　which　obtain　among　themselves　appear　to　them



self…evident　and　self…justifying。



　　This　all　but　universal　illusion　is　one　of　the　examples　of　the



magical　influence　of　custom；　which　is　not　only；　as　the　proverb　says；　a



second　nature；　but　is　continually　mistaken　for　the　first。　The　effect



of　custom；　in　preventing　any　misgiving　respecting　the　rules　of　conduct



which　mankind　impose　on　one　another；　is　all　the　more　complete



because　the　subject　is　one　on　which　it　is　not　generally　considered



necessary　that　reasons　should　be　given；　either　by　one　person　to　others



or　by　each　to　himself。　People　are　accustomed　to　believe；　and　have　been



encouraged　in　the　belief　by　some　who　aspire　to　the　character　of



philosophers；　that　their　feelings；　on　subjects　of　this　nature；　are



better　than　reasons；　and　render　reasons　unnecessary。　The　practical



principle　which　guides　them　to　their　opinions　on　the　regulation　of



human　conduct；　is　the　feeling　in　each　person's　mind　that　everybody



should　be　required　to　act　as　he；　and　those　with　whom　he　sympathises；



would　like　them　to　act。　No　one；　indeed；　acknowledges　to　himself　that



his　standard　of　judgment　is　his　own　liking；　but　an　opinion　on　a



point　of　conduct；　not　supported　by　reasons；　can　only　count　as　one



person's　preference；　and　if　the　reasons；　when　given；　are　a　mere　appeal



to　a　similar　preference　felt　by　other　people；　it　is　still　only　many



people's　liking　instead　of　one。　To　an　ordinary　man；　however；　his　own



preference；　thus　supported；　is　not　only　a　perfectly　satisfactory



reason；　but　the　only　one　he　generally　has　for　any　of　his　notions　of



morality；　taste；　or　propriety；　which　are　not　expressly　written　in



his　religious　creed；　and　his　chief　guide　in　the　interpretation　even　of



that。　Men's　opinions；　accordingly；　on　what　is　laudable　or　blamable；



are　affected　by　all　the　multifarious　causes　which　influence　their



wishes　in　regard　to　the　conduct　of　others；　and　which　are　as　numerous



as　those　which　determine　their　wishes　on　any　other　subject。



Sometimes　their　reason…　at　other　times　their　prejudices　or



superstitions：　often　their　social　affections；　not　seldom　their



antisocial　ones；　their　envy　or　jealousy；　their　arrogance　or



contemptuousness：　but　most　commonly　their　desires　or　fears　for



themselves…　their　legitimate　or　illegitimate　self…interest。



　　Wherever　there　is　an　ascendant　class；　a　large　portion　of　the



morality　of　the　country　emanates　from　its　class　interests；　and　its



feelings　of　class　superiority。　The　morality　between　Spartans　and



Helots；　between　planters　and　negroes；　between　princes　and　subjects；



between　nobles　and　roturiers；　between　men　and　women；　has　been　for



the　most　part　the　creation　of　these　class　interests　and　feelings：



and　the　sentiments　thus　generated　react　in　turn　upon　the　moral



feelings　of　the　members　of　the　ascendant　class；　in　their　relations



among　themselves。　Where；　on　the　other　hand；　a　class；　formerly



ascendant；　has　lost　its　ascendancy；　or　where　its　ascendancy　is



unpopular；　the　prevailing　moral　sentiments　frequently　bear　the　impress



of　an　impatient　dislike　of　superiority。　Another　grand　determining



principle　of　the　rules　of　conduct；　both　in　act　and　forbearance；



which　have　been　enforced　by　law　or　opinion；　has　been　the　servility



of　mankind　towards　the　supposed　preferences　or　aversions　of　their



temporal　masters　or　of　their　gods。　This　servility；　though



essentially　selfish；　is　not　hypocrisy；　it　gives　rise　to　perfectly



genuine　sentiments　of　abhorrence；　it　made　men　burn　magicians　and



heretics。　Among　so　many　baser　influences；　the　general　and　obvious



interests　of　society　have　of　course　had　a　share；　and　a　large　one；　in



the　direction　of　the　moral　sentiments：　less；　however；　as　a　matter　of



reason；　and　on　their　own　account；　than　as　a　consequence　of　the



sympathies　and　antipathies　which　grew　out　of　them：　and　sympathies



and　antipathies　which　had　little　or　nothing　to　do　with　the　interests



of　society；　have　made　themselves　felt　in　the　establishment　of



moralities　with　quite　as　great　force。



　　The　likings　and　dislikings　of　society；　or　of　some　powerful　portion



of　it；　are　thus　the　main　thing　which　has　practically　determined　the



rules　laid　down　for　general　observance；　under　the　penalties　of　law



or　opinion。　And　in　general；　those　who　have　been　in　advance　of



society　in　thought　and　feeling；　have　left　this　condition　of　things



unassailed　in　principle；　however　they　may　have　come　into　conflict　with



it　in　some　of　its　details。　They　have　occupied　themselves　rather　in



inquiring　what　things　society　ought　to　like　or　dislike；　than　in



questioning　whether　its　likings　or　dislikings　should　be　a　law　to



individuals。　They　preferred　endeavouring　to　alter　the　feelings　of



mankind　on　the　particular　points　on　which　they　were　themselves



heretical；　rather　than　make　common　cause　in　defence　of　freedom；　with



heretics　generally。　The　only　case　in　which　the　higher　ground　has



been　taken　on　principle　and　maintained　with　consistency；　by　any　but　an



individual　here　and　there；　is　that　of　religious　belief：　a　case



instructive　in　many　ways；　and　not　least　so　as　forming　a　most



striking　instance　of　the　fallibility　of　what　is　called　the　moral



sense：　for　the　odium　theologicum；　in　a　sincere　bigot；　is　one　of　the



most　unequivocal　cases　of　moral　feeling。　Those　who　first　broke　the



yoke　of　what　called　itself　the　Universal　Church；　were　in　general　as



little　willing　to　permit　difference　of　religious　opinion　as　that



church　itself。　But　when　the　heat　of　the　conflict　was　over；　without



giving　a　complete　victory　to　any　party；　and　each　church　or　sect　was



reduced　to　limit　its　hopes　to　retaining　possession　of　the　ground　it



already　occupied；　minorities；　seeing　that　they　had　no　chance　of



becoming　majorities；　were　under　the　necessity　of　pleading　to　those



whom　they　could　not　convert；　for　permission　to　differ。　It　is



accordingly　on　this　battle　field；　almost　solely；　that　the　rights　of



the　individual　against　society　have　been　asserted　on　broad　grounds



of　principle；　and　the　claim　of　society　to　exercise　authority　over



dissentients　openly　controverted。　The　great　writers　to　whom　the



world　owes　what　religious　liberty　it　possesses；　have　mostly　asserted



freedom　of　conscience　as　an　indefeasible　right；　and　denied



absolutely　that　a　human　being　is　accountable　to　others　for　his



religious　belief。　Yet　so　natural　to　mankind　is　intolerance　in　whatever



they　really　care　about；　that　religious　freedom　has　hardly　anywhere



been　practically　realised；　except　where　religious　indifference；



which　dislikes　to　have　its　peace　disturbed　by　theological　quarrels；



has　added　its　weight　to　the　scale。　In　the　minds　of　almost　all



religious　persons；　even　in　the　most　tolerant　countries；　the　duty　of



toleration　is　admitted　with　tacit　reserves。　One　person　will　bear



with　dissent　in　matters　of　church　government；　but　not　of　dogma；



another　can　tolerate　everybody；　short　of　a　Papist　or　a　Unitarian；



another　every　one　who　believes　in　revealed　religion；　a　few　extend



their　charity　a　little　further；　but　stop