parmenides- 第2部分

　　Yes；　he　said；　I　should。



　　And　would　you　make　an　idea　of　man　apart　from　us　and　from　all　other



human　creatures；　or　of　fire　and　water？



　　I　am　often　undecided；　Parmenides；　as　to　whether　I　ought　to　include



them　or　not。



　　And　would　you　feel　equally　undecided；　Socrates；　about　things　of



which　the　mention　may　provoke　a　smile？…I　mean　such　things　as　hair；



mud；　dirt；　or　anything　else　which　is　vile　and　paltry；　would　you



suppose　that　each　of　these　has　an　idea　distinct　from　the　actual



objects　with　which　we　come　into　contact；　or　not？



　　Certainly　not；　said　Socrates；　visible　things　like　these　are　such



as　they　appear　to　us；　and　I　am　afraid　that　there　would　be　an　absurdity



in　assuming　any　idea　of　them；　although　I　sometimes　get　disturbed；



and　begin　to　think　that　there　is　nothing　without　an　idea；　but　then



again；　when　I　have　taken　up　this　position；　I　run　away；　because　I　am



afraid　that　I　may　fall　into　a　bottomless　pit　of　nonsense；　and



perish；　and　so　I　return　to　the　ideas　of　which　I　was　just　now　speaking；



and　occupy　myself　with　them。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　said　Parmenides；　that　is　because　you　are　still　young；



the　time　will　come；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；　when　philosophy　will　have



a　firmer　grasp　of　you；　and　then　you　will　not　despise　even　the



meanest　things；　at　your　age；　you　are　too　much　disposed　to　regard



opinions　of　men。　But　I　should　like　to　know　whether　you　mean　that　there



are　certain　ideas　of　which　all　other　things　partake；　and　from　which



they　derive　their　names；　that　similars；　for　example；　become　similar；



because　they　partake　of　similarity；　and　great　things　become　great；



because　they　partake　of　greatness；　and　that　just　and　beautiful



things　become　just　and　beautiful；　because　they　partake　of　justice



and　beauty？



　　Yes；　certainly；　said　Socrates　that　is　my　meaning。



　　Then　each　individual　partakes　either　of　the　whole　of　the　idea　or



else　of　a　part　of　the　idea？　Can　there　be　any　other　mode　of



participation？



　　There　cannot　be；　he　said。



　　Then　do　you　think　that　the　whole　idea　is　one；　and　yet；　being　one；　is



in　each　one　of　the　many？



　　Why　not；　Parmenides？　said　Socrates。



　　Because　one　and　the　same　thing　will　exist　as　a　whole　at　the　same



time　in　many　separate　individuals；　and　will　therefore　be　in　a　state　of



separation　from　itself。



　　Nay；　but　the　idea　may　be　like　the　day　which　is　one　and　the　same　in



many　places　at　once；　and　yet　continuous　with　itself；　in　this　way



each　idea　may　be　one；　and　the　same　in　all　at　the　same　time。



　　I　like　your　way；　Socrates；　of　making　one　in　many　places　at　once。　You



mean　to　say；　that　if　I　were　to　spread　out　a　sail　and　cover　a　number　of



men；　there　would　be　one　whole　including　many…is　not　that　your　meaning？



　　I　think　so。



　　And　would　you　say　that　the　whole　sail　includes　each　man；　or　a　part



of　it　only；　and　different　parts　different　men？



　　The　latter。



　　Then；　Socrates；　the　ideas　themselves　will　be　divisible；　and　things



which　participate　in　them　will　have　a　part　of　them　only　and　not　the



whole　idea　existing　in　each　of　them？



　　That　seems　to　follow。



　　Then　would　you　like　to　say；　Socrates；　that　the　one　idea　is　really



divisible　and　yet　remains　one？



　　Certainly　not；　he　said。



　　Suppose　that　you　divide　absolute　greatness；　and　that　of　the　many



great　things；　each　one　is　great　in　virtue　of　a　portion　of　greatness



less　than　absolute　greatness…is　that　conceivable？



　　No。



　　Or　will　each　equal　thing；　if　possessing　some　small　portion　of



equality　less　than　absolute　equality；　be　equal　to　some　other　thing



by　virtue　of　that　portion　only？



　　Impossible。



　　Or　suppose　one　of　us　to　have　a　portion　of　smallness；　this　is　but　a



part　of　the　small；　and　therefore　the　absolutely　small　is　greater；　if



the　absolutely　small　be　greater；　that　to　which　the　part　of　the　small



is　added　will　be　smaller　and　not　greater　than　before。



　　How　absurd！



　　Then　in　what　way；　Socrates；　will　all　things　participate　in　the



ideas；　if　they　are　unable　to　participate　in　them　either　as　parts　or



wholes？



　　Indeed；　he　said；　you　have　asked　a　question　which　is　not　easily



answered。



　　Well；　said　Parmenides；　and　what　do　you　say　of　another　question？



　　What　question？



　　I　imagine　that　the　way　in　which　you　are　led　to　assume　one　idea　of



each　kind　is　as　follows：　…You　see　a　number　of　great　objects；　and



when　you　look　at　them　there　seems　to　you　to　be　one　and　the　same　idea



（or　nature）　in　them　all；　hence　you　conceive　of　greatness　as　one。



　　Very　true；　said　Socrates。



　　And　if　you　go　on　and　allow　your　mind　in　like　manner　to　embrace　in



one　view　the　idea　of　greatness　and　of　great　things　which　are　not　the



idea；　and　…to　compare　them；　will　not　another　greatness　arise；　which



will　appear　to　be　the　source　of　all　these？



　　It　would　seem　so。



　　Then　another　idea　of　greatness　now　comes　into　view　over　and　above



absolute　greatness；　and　the　individuals　which　partake　of　it；　and



then　another；　over　and　above　all　these；　by　virtue　of　which　they　will



all　be　great；　and　so　each　idea　instead　of　being　one　will　be　infinitely



multiplied。



　　But　may　not　the　ideas；　asked　Socrates；　be　thoughts　only；　and　have　no



proper　existence　except　in　our　minds；　Parmenides？　For　in　that　case



each　idea　may　still　be　one；　and　not　experience　this　infinite



multiplication。



　　And　can　there　be　individual　thoughts　which　are　thoughts　of　nothing？



　　Impossible；　he　said。



　　The　thought　must　be　of　something？



　　Yes。



　　Of　something　which　is　or　which　is　not？



　　Of　something　which　is。



　　Must　it　not　be　of　a　single　something；　which　the　thought　recognizes



as　attaching　to　all；　being　a　single　form　or　nature？



　　Yes。



　　And　will　not　the　something　which　is　apprehended　as　one　and　the



same　in　all；　be　an　idea？



　　From　that；　again；　there　is　no　escape。



　　Then；　said　Parmenides；　if　you　say　that　everything　else



participates　in　the　ideas；　must　you　not　say　either　that　everything



is　made　up　of　thoughts；　and　that　all　things　think；　or　that　they　are



thoughts　but　have　no　thought？



　　The　latter　view；　Parmenides；　is　no　more　rational　than　the　previous



one。　In　my　opinion；　the　ideas　are；　as　it　were；　patterns　fixed　in



nature；　and　other　things　are　like　them；　and　resemblances　of



them…what　is　meant　by　the　participation　of　other　things　in　the



ideas；　is　really　assimilation　to　them。



　　But　if；　said　he；　the　individual　is　like　the　idea；　must　not　the



idea　also　be　like　the　individual；　in　so　far　as　the　individual　is　a



resemblance　of　the　idea？　That　which　is　like；　cannot　be　conceived　of　as



other　than　the　like　of　like。



　　Impossible。



　　And　when　two　things　are　alike；　must　they　not　partake　of　the　same



idea？



　　They　must。



　　And　will　not　that　of　which　the　two　partake；　and　which　makes　them



alike；　be　the　idea　itself？



　　Certainly。



　　Then　the　idea　cannot　be　like　the　individual；　or　the　individual



like　the　idea；　for　if　they　are　alike；　some　further　idea　of　likeness



will　always　be　coming　to　light；　and　if　that　be　like　anything　else；



another；　and　new　ideas　will　be　always　arising；　if　the　idea　resembles



that　which　partakes　of　it？



　　Quite　true。



　　The　theory；　then　that　other　things　participate　in　the　ideas　by



resemblance；　has　to　be　given　up；　and　some　other　mode　of



participation　devised？



　　It　would　seem　so。



　　Do　you　see　then；　Socrates；　how　great　is　the　difficulty　of



affirming　the　ideas　to　be　absolute？



　　Yes；　indeed。



　　And；　further；　let　me　say　that　as　yet　you　only　understand　a　small



part　of　the　difficulty　which　is　involved　if　you　make　of　each　thing　a



single　idea；　parting　it　off　from　other　things。



　　What　difficulty？　he　said。



　　There　are　many；　but　the　greatest　of　all　is　this：…If　an　opponent



argues　that　these　ideas；　being　such　as　we　say　they　ought　to　be；　must



remain　unknown；　no　one　can　prove　to　him　that　he　is　wrong；　unless　he



who　denies　their　existence　be　a　man　of　great　ability　and　knowledge；



and　is　willing　to　follow　a　long　and　laborious　demonstration；　he　will



remain　unconvinced；　and　still　insist　that　they　cannot　be　known。



　　What　do　you　mean；　Parmenides？　said　Socrates。



　　In　the　first　place；　I　think；　Socrates；　that　you；　or　any　one　who



maintains　the　existence　of　absolute　essences；　will　admit　that　they



cannot　exist　in　us。



　　No；　said　Socrates；　for　then　they　would　be　no　longer　absolute。



　　True；　he　said；　and　therefore　when　ideas　are　what　they　are　in



relation　to　one　another；　their　essence　is　determined　by　a　relation



among　themselves；　and　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　resemblances；　or



whatever　they　are　to　be　termed；　which　are　in　our　sphere；　and　from



which　we　receive　this　or　that　name　when　we　partake　of　them。　And　the



things　which　are　within　our　sphere　and　have　the　same　names　with



them；　are　likewise　only　relative　to　one　another；　and　not　to　the



ideas　which　have　the　same　names　with　them；　but　belong　to　themselves



and　not　to　them。



　　What　do　you　mean？　said　Socrates。



　　I　may　illustrate　my　meaning　in　this　way；　said　Parmenides：…A　master



has　a　slave；　now　there　is　nothing　absolute　in　the　relation　between



them；　which　is　simply　a　relation　of　one　man　to　another。　But　there　is



also　an　idea　of　mastership　in　the　abstract；　which　is　relative　to　the



idea　of　slavery　in　the　abstract。　These　natures　have　nothing　to　do　with



us；　nor　we　with　them；　they　are　concerned　with　themselves　only；　and



we　with　ourselves。　Do　you　see　my　meaning？



　　Yes；　said　Socrates；　I　quite　see　your　meaning。



　　And　will　not　knowledge…I　mean　absolute　knowledge…answer　to



absolute　truth？



　　Certainly。



　　And　each　kind　of　absolute　knowledge　will　answer　to　each　kind　of



absolute　being？



　　Yes。



　　But　the　knowledge　which　we　have；　will　answer　to　the　truth　which　we



have；　and　again；　each　kind　of　knowledge　which　we　have；　will　be　a



knowledge　of　each　kind　of　being　which　we　have？