lecture02- 第1部分

Lecture　II







CIRCUMSCRIPTION　OF　THE　TOPIC







Most　books　on　the　philosophy　of　religion　try　to　begin　with　a



precise　definition　of　what　its　essence　consists　of。　　Some　of



these　would…be　definitions　may　possibly　come　before　us　in　later



portions　of　this　course；　and　I　shall　not　be　pedantic　enough　to



enumerate　any　of　them　to　you　now。　Meanwhile　the　very　fact　that



they　are　so　many　and　so　different　from　one　another　is　enough　to



prove　that　the　word　〃religion〃　cannot　stand　for　any　single



principle　or　essence；　but　is　rather　a　collective　name。　　The



theorizing　mind　tends　always　to　the　oversimplification　of　its



materials。　　This　is　the　root　of　all　that　absolutism　and　one…sided



dogmatism　by　which　both　philosophy　and　religion　have　been



infested。　　Let　us　not　fall　immediately　into　a　one…sided　view　of



our　subject；　but　let　us　rather　admit　freely　at　the　outset　that　we



may　very　likely　find　no　one　essence；　but　many　characters　which



may　alternately　be　equally　important　to　religion。　　If　we　should



inquire　for　the　essence　of　〃government；〃　for　example；　one　man



might　tell　us　it　was　authority；　another　submission；　an　other



police；　another　an　army；　another　an　assembly；　an　other　a　system



of　laws；　yet　all　the　while　it　would　be　true　that　no　concrete



government　can　exist　without　all　these　things；　one　of　which　is



more　important　at　one　moment　and　others　at　another。　　The　man　who



knows　governments　most　completely　is　he　who　troubles　himself



least　about　a　definition　which　shall　give　their　essence。　



Enjoying　an　intimate　acquaintance　with　all　their　particularities



in　turn；　he　would　naturally　regard　an　abstract　conception　in



which　these　were　unified　as　a　thing　more　misleading　than



enlightening。　　And　why　may　not　religion　be　a　conception　equally



complex？＇9＇







＇9＇　　I　can　do　no　better　here　than　refer　my　readers　to　the



extended　and　admirable　remarks　on　the　futility　of　all　these



definitions　of　religion；　in　an　article　by　Professor　Leuba；



published　in　the　Monist　for　January；　1901；　after　my　own　text　was



written。















Consider　also　the　〃religious　sentiment〃　which　we　see　referred　to



in　so　many　books；　as　if　it　were　a　single　sort　of　mental　entity。　



In　the　psychologies　and　in　the　philosophies　of　religion；　we　find



the　authors　attempting　to　specify　just　what　entity　it　is。　　One



man　allies　it　to　the　feeling　of　dependence；　one　makes　it　a



derivative　from　fear；　others　connect　it　with　the　sexual　life；



others　still　identify　it　with　the　feeling　of　the　infinite；　and　so



on。　　Such　different　ways　of　conceiving　it　ought　of　themselves　to



arouse　doubt　as　to　whether　it　possibly　can　be　one　specific　thing；



and　the　moment　we　are　willing　to　treat　the　term　〃religious



sentiment〃　as　a　collective　name　for　the　many　sentiments　which



religious　objects　may　arouse　in　alternation；　we　see　that　it



probably　contains　nothing　whatever　of　a　psychologically　specific



nature。　There　is　religious　fear；　religious　love；　religious　awe；



religious　joy；　and　so　forth。　　But　religious　love　is　only　man's



natural　emotion　of　love　directed　to　a　religious　object；　religious



fear　is　only　the　ordinary　fear　of　commerce；　so　to　speak；　the



common　quaking　of　the　human　breast；　in　so　far　as　the　notion　of



divine　retribution　may　arouse　it；　religious　awe　is　the　same



organic　thrill　which　we　feel　in　a　forest　at　twilight；　or　in　a



mountain　gorge；　only　this　time　it　comes　over　us　at　the　thought　of



our　supernatural　relations；　and　similarly　of　all　the　various



sentiments　which　may　be　called　into　play　in　the　lives　of



religious　persons。　　As　concrete　states　of　mind；　made　up　of　a



feeling　PLUS　a　specific　sort　of　object；　religious　emotions　of



course　are　psychic　entities　distinguishable　from　other　concrete



emotions；　but　there　is　no　ground　for　assuming　a　simple　abstract



〃religious　emotion〃　to　exist　as　a　distinct　elementary　mental



affection　by　itself；　present　in　every　religious　experience



without　exception。







As　there　thus　seems　to　be　no　one　elementary　religious　emotion；



but　only　a　common　storehouse　of　emotions　upon　which　religious



objects　may　draw；　so　there　might　conceivably　also　prove　to　he　no



one　specific　and　essential　kind　of　religious　object；　and　no　one



specific　and　essential　kind　of　religious　act。







The　field　of　religion　being　as　wide　as　this；　it　is　manifestly



impossible　that　I　should　pretend　to　cover　it。　　My　lectures　must



be　limited　to　a　fraction　of　the　subject。　　And；　although　it　would



indeed　be　foolish　to　set　up　an　abstract　definition　of　religion's



essence；　and　then　proceed　to　defend　that　definition　against　all



comers；　yet　this　need　not　prevent　me　from　taking　my　own　narrow



view　of　what　religion　shall　consist　in　FOR　THE　PURPOSE　OF　THESE



LECTURES；　or；　out　of　the　many　meanings　of　the　word；　from　choosing



the　one　meaning　in　which　I　wish　to　interest　you　particularly；　and



proclaiming　arbitrarily　that　when　I　say　〃religion〃　I　mean　THAT。　



This；　in　fact；　is　what　I　must　do；　and　I　will　now　preliminarily



seek　to　mark　out　the　field　I　choose。







One　way　to　mark　it　out　easily　is　to　say　what　aspects　of　the



subject　we　leave　out。　　At　the　outset　we　are　struck　by　one　great



partition　which　divides　the　religious　field。　　On　the　one　side　of



it　lies　institutional；　on　the　other　personal　religion。　As　M。　P。



Sabatier　says；　one　branch　of　religion　keeps　the　divinity；　another



keeps　man　most　in　view。　　Worship　and　sacrifice；　procedures　for



working　on　the　dispositions　of　the　deity；　theology　and　ceremony



and　ecclesiastical　organization；　are　the　essentials　of　religion



in　the　institutional　branch。　Were　we　to　limit　our　view　to　it；　we



should　have　to　define　religion　as　an　external　art；　the　art　of



winning　the　favor　of　the　gods。　　In　the　more　personal　branch　of



religion　it　is　on　the　contrary　the　inner　dispositions　of　man



himself　which　form　the　center　of　interest；　his　conscience；　his



deserts；　his　helplessness；　his　incompleteness。　　And　although　the



favor　of　the　God；　as　forfeited　or　gained；　is　still　an　essential



feature　of　the　story；　and　theology　plays　a　vital　part　therein；



yet　the　acts　to　which　this　sort　of　religion　prompts　are　personal



not　ritual　acts；　the　individual　transacts　the　business　by　himself



alone；　and　the　ecclesiastical　organization；　with　its　priests　and



sacraments　and　other　go…betweens；　sinks　to　an　altogether



secondary　place。　　The　relation　goes　direct　from　heart　to　heart；



from　soul　to　soul；　between　man　and　his　maker。







Now　in　these　lectures　I　propose　to　ignore　the　institutional



branch　entirely；　to　say　nothing　of　the　ecclesiastical



organization；　to　consider　as　little　as　possible　the　systematic



theology　and　the　ideas　about　the　gods　themselves；　and　to　confine



myself　as　far　as　I　can　to　personal　religion　pure　and　simple。　　To



some　of　you　personal　religion；　thus　nakedly　considered；　will　no



doubt　seem　too　incomplete　a　thing　to　wear　the　general　name。　　〃It



is　a　part　of　religion；〃　you　will　say；　〃but　only　its　unorganized



rudiment；　if　we　are　to　name　it　by　itself；　we　had　better　call　it



man's　conscience　or　morality　than　his　religion。　　The　name



'religion'　should　be　reserved　for　the　fully　organized　system　of



feeling；　thought；　and　institution；　for　the　Church；　in　short；　of



which　this　personal　religion；　so　called；　is　but　a　fractional



element。〃







But　if　you　say　this；　it　will　only　show　the　more　plainly　how　much



the　question　of　definition　tends　to　become　a　dispute　about　names。







Rather　than　prolong　such　a　dispute；　I　am　willing　to　accept　almost



any　name　for　the　personal　religion　of　which　I　propose　to　treat。　



Call　it　conscience　or　morality；　if　you　yourselves　prefer；　and　not



religionunder　either　name　it　will　be　equally　worthy　of　our



study。　　As　for　myself；　I　think　it　will　prove　to　contain　some



elements　which　morality　pure　and　simple　does　not　contain；　and



these　elements　I　shall　soon　seek　to　point　out；　so　I　will　myself



continue　to　apply　the　word　〃religion〃　to　it；　and　in　the　last



lecture　of　all；　I　will　bring　in　the　theologies　and　the



ecclesiasticisms；　and　say　something　of　its　relation　to　them。







In　one　sense　at　least　the　personal　religion　will　prove　itself



more　fundamental　than　either　theology　or　ecclesiasticism。



Churches；　when　once　established；　live　at　second…hand　upon



tradition；　but　the　FOUNDERS　of　every　church　owed　their　power



originally　to　the　fact　of　their　direct　personal　communion　with



the　divine。　　Not　only　the　superhuman　founders；　the　Christ；　the



Buddha；　Mahomet；　but　all　the　originators　of　Christian　sects　have



been　in　this　case；so　personal　religion　should　still　seem　the



primordial　thing；　even　to　those　who　continue　to　esteem　it



incomplete。







There　are；　it　is　true；　other　things　in　religion　chronologically



more　primordial　than　personal　devoutness　in　the　moral　sense。　



Fetishism　and　magic　seem　to　have　preceded　inward　piety



historicallyat　least　our　records　of　inward　piety　do　not　reach



back　so　far。　　And　if　fetishism　and　magic　be　regarded　as　stages　of



religion；　one　may　say　that　personal　religion　in　the　inward　sense



and　the　genuinely　spiritual　ecclesiasticisms　which　it　founds　are



phenomena　of　secondary　or　even　tertiary　order。　　But；　quite　apart



from　the　fact　that　many　anthropologistsfor　instance；　Jevons　and



Frazer　expressly　oppose　〃religion〃　and　〃magic〃　to　each　other；



it　is　certain　that　the　whole　system　of　thought　which　leads　to



magic；　fetishism；　and　the　lower　superstitions　may　just　as　well　be



called　primiti