dangerous inconveniencies； and yet the quick turn of affairs might
be sometimes such as to need their present help； any delay of their
convening might endanger the public； and sometimes； too； their
business might be so great that the limited time of their sitting
might be too short for their work； and rob the public of that
benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation。
What； then； could be done in this case to prevent the community from
being exposed some time or other to imminent hazard on one side or the
other； by fixed intervals and periods set to the meeting and acting of
the legislative； but to entrust it to the prudence of some who；
being present and acquainted with the state of public affairs； might
make use of this prerogative for the public good？ And where else could
this be so well placed as in his hands who was entrusted with the
execution of the laws for the same end？ Thus； supposing the regulation
of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative not settled
by the original constitution； it naturally fell into the hands of
the executive； not as an arbitrary power depending on his good
pleasure； but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the
public weal； as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might
require。 Whether settled periods of their convening； or a liberty left
to the prince for convoking the legislative； or perhaps a mixture of
both； hath the least inconvenience attending it； it is not my business
here to inquire； but only to show that； though the executive power may
have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of
the legislative； yet it is not thereby superior to it。
157。 Things of this world are in so constant a flux that nothing
remains long in the same state。 Thus people； riches； trade； power；
change their stations； flourishing mighty cities come to ruin； and
prove in time neglected desolate corners； whilst other unfrequented
places grow into populous countries filled with wealth and
inhabitants。 But things not always changing equally； and private
interest often keeping up customs and privileges when the reasons of
them are ceased； it often comes to pass that in governments where part
of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people；
that in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and
disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon。 To
what gross absurdities the following of custom when reason has left it
may lead； we may be satisfied when we see the bare name of a town；
of which there remains not so much as the ruins； where scarce so
much housing as a sheepcote； or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to
be found； send as many representatives to the grand assembly of
law…makers as a whole county numerous in people and powerful in
riches。 This strangers stand amazed at； and every one must confess
needs a remedy； though most think it hard to find one； because the
constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act
of the society； antecedent to all positive laws in it； and depending
wholly on the people； no inferior power can alter it。 And；
therefore； the people when the legislative is once constituted； having
in such a government as we have been speaking of no power to act as
long as the government stands； this inconvenience is thought incapable
of a remedy。
158。 Salus populi suprema lex is certainly so just and fundamental a
rule； that he who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously err。 If；
therefore； the executive who has the power of convoking the
legislative； observing rather the true proportion than fashion of
representation； regulates not by old custom； but true reason； the
number of members in all places； that have a right to be distinctly
represented； which no part of the people； however incorporated； can
pretend to； but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to
the public； it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative；
but to have restored the old and true one； and to have rectified the
disorders which succession of time had insensibly as well as
inevitably introduced； for it being the interest as well as
intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative；
whoever brings it nearest to that is an undoubted friend to and
establisher of the government； and cannot miss the consent and
approbation of the community； prerogative being nothing but a power in
the hands of the prince to provide for the public good in such cases
which； depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences； certain
and unalterable laws could not safely direct。 Whatsoever shall be done
manifestly for the good of the people； and establishing the government
upon its true foundations is； and always will be； just prerogative。
The power of erecting new corporations； and therewith new
representatives； carries with it a supposition that in time the
measures of representation might vary； and those have a just right
to be represented which before had none； and by the same reason； those
cease to have a right； and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege；
which before had it。 It is not a change from the present state
which； perhaps； corruption or decay has introduced； that makes an
inroad upon the government； but the tendency of it to injure or
oppress the people； and to set up one part or party with a distinction
from and an unequal subjection of the rest。 Whatsoever cannot but be
acknowledged to be of advantage to the society and people in
general； upon just and lasting measures； will always； when done；
justify itself； and whenever the people shall choose their
representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures； suitable to
the original frame of the government； it cannot be doubted to be the
will and act of the society； whoever permitted or proposed to them
so to do。
Chapter XIV
Of Prerogative
159。 WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct
hands； as they are in all moderated monarchies and well…framed
governments； there the good of the society requires that several
things should be left to the discretion of him that has the
executive power。 For the legislators not being able to foresee and
provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community； the
executor of the laws； having the power in his hands； has by the common
law of Nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society；
in many cases where the municipal law has given no direction； till the
legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it； nay； many
things there are which the law can by no means provide for； and
those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the
executive power in his hands； to be ordered by him as the public
good and advantage shall require； nay； it is fit that the laws
themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power； or
rather to this fundamental law of Nature and government… viz。； that as
much as may be all the members of the society are to be preserved。 For
since many accidents may happen wherein a strict and rigid observation
of the laws may do harm； as not to pull down an innocent man's house
to stop the fire when the next to it is burning； and a man may come
sometimes within the reach of the law； which makes no distinction of
persons； by an action that may deserve reward and pardon； it is fit
the ruler should have a power in many cases to mitigate the severity
of the law； and pardon some offenders； since the end of government
being the preservation of all as much as may be； even the guilty are
to be spared where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent。
160。 This power to act according to discretion for the public
good； without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against
it； is that which is called prerogative； for since in some governments
the law…making power is not always in being and is usually too
numerous； and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execution； and
because； also； it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide
for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public； or make
such laws as will do no harm； if they are executed with an
inflexible rigour on all occasions and upon all persons that may
come in their way； therefore there is a latitude left to the executive
power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe。
161。 This power； whilst employed for the benefit of the community
and suitably to the trust and ends of the government； is undoubted
prerogative； and never is questioned。 For the people are very seldom
or never scrupulous or nice in the point or questioning of prerogative
whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was
meant… that is； the good of the people； and not manifestly against it。
But if there comes to be a question between the executive power and
the people about a thing claimed as a prerogative； the tendency of the
exercise of such prerogative； to the good or hurt of the people；
will easily decide that question。
162。 It is easy to conceive that in the infancy of governments； when
commonwealths differed little from families in number of people；
they differed from them too but little in number of laws； and the
governors being as the fathers of them； watching over them for their
good； the government was almost all prerogative。 A few established
laws served the turn； and the discretion and care of the ruler suppled
the rest。 But when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes； to
make use of this power for private ends of their own and not for the
public good； the people were fain； by express laws； to get prerogative
determined in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it；
and declared limitations of prerogative in those cases which they
and their ancestors had left in the utmost latitude to the wisdom of
those princes who made no other but a right use of it… that is； for
the good of their people。
163。 And therefore they have a very wrong notio