comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth； and the others are
farther distant。
The same applies to straight as well as to circular form； to
colours； to the good； the； beautiful； the just； to all bodies
whether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature；
to fire； water； and all such things； to every living being； to
character in souls； and to all things done and suffered。 For in the
case of all these； no one； if he has not some how or other got hold of
the four things first mentioned； can ever be completely a partaker
of knowledge of the fifth。 Further； on account of the weakness of
language； these （i。e。； the four） attempt to show what each thing is
like； not less than what each thing is。 For this reason no man of
intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in
language； especially not in language that is unchangeable； which is
true of that which is set down in written characters。
Again you must learn the point which comes next。 Every circle； of
those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe；
is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing。 For everywhere
it has contact with the straight。 But the circle itself； we say； has
nothing in either smaller or greater； of that which is its opposite。
We say also that the name is not a thing of permanence for any of
them； and that nothing prevents the things now called round from being
called straight； and the straight things round； for those who make
changes and call things by opposite names； nothing will be less
permanent （than a name）。 Again with regard to the definition； if it is
made up of names and verbal forms； the same remark holds that there is
no sufficiently durable permanence in it。 And there is no end to the
instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers； but
the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier；
that； whereas there are two things； that which has real being； and
that which is only a quality； when the soul is seeking to know； not
the quality； but the essence； each of the four； presenting to the soul
by word and in act that which it is not seeking （i。e。； the quality）； a
thing open to refutation by the senses； being merely the thing
presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement
or the act of showing； fills； one may say； every man with puzzlement
and perplexity。
Now in subjects in which； by reason of our defective education； we
have not been accustomed even to search for the truth； but are
satisfied with whatever images are presented to us； we are not held up
to ridicule by one another； the questioned by questioners； who can
pull to pieces and criticise the four things。 But in subjects where we
try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth； any one of
those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of
us； and makes the man； who gives an exposition in speech or writing or
in replies to questions； appear to most of his hearers to know nothing
of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak； for they
are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or
speaker which is proved to be at fault； but the defective nature of
each of the four instruments。 The process however of dealing with
all of these； as the mind moves up and down to each in turn； does
after much effort give birth in a well…constituted mind to knowledge
of that which is well constituted。 But if a man is ill…constituted
by nature （as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority
both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral
character）…or it may have become so by deterioration…not even
Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight。
In one word； the man who has no natural kinship with this matter
cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory； for it
cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it。
Therefore； if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and
all other things that are honourable； though they may be good at
learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds…or if they
have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory…none of
all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice。
For both must be learnt together； and together also must be learnt； by
complete and long continued study； as I said at the beginning； the
true and the false about all that has real being。 After much effort；
as names； definitions； sights； and other data of sense； are brought
into contact and friction one with another； in the course of
scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and
answer without ill will； with a sudden flash there shines forth
understanding about every problem； and an intelligence whose efforts
reach the furthest limits of human powers。 Therefore every man of
worth； when dealing with matters of worth； will be far from exposing
them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing
them to writing。 In one word； then； it may be known from this that； if
one sees written treatises composed by anyone； either the laws of a
lawgiver； or in any other form whatever； these are not for that man
the things of most worth； if he is a man of worth； but that his
treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses。 But if
these things were worked at by him as things of real worth； and
committed to writing； then surely； not gods； but men 〃have
themselves bereft him of his wits。〃
Anyone who has followed this discourse and digression will know well
that； if Dionysios or anyone else； great or small； has written a
treatise on the highest matters and the first principles of things； he
has； so I say； neither heard nor learnt any sound teaching about the
subject of his treatise； otherwise； he would have had the same
reverence for it； which I have； and would have shrunk from putting
it forth into a world of discord and uncomeliness。 For he wrote it；
not as an aid to memory…since there is no risk of forgetting it； if
a man's soul has once laid hold of it； for it is expressed in the
shortest of statements…but if he wrote it at all； it was from a mean
craving for honour； either putting it forth as his own invention； or
to figure as a man possessed of culture； of which he was not worthy；
if his heart was set on the credit of possessing it。 If then Dionysios
gained this culture from the one lesson which he had from me； we may
perhaps grant him the possession of it； though how he acquired
it…God wot； as the Theban says； for I gave him the teaching； which I
have described； on that one occasion and never again。
The next point which requires to be made clear to anyone who
wishes to discover how things really happened； is the reason why it
came about that I did not continue my teaching in a second and third
lesson and yet oftener。 Does Dionysios； after a single lesson； believe
himself to know the matter； and has he an adequate knowledge of it；
either as having discovered it for himself or learnt it before from
others； or does he believe my teaching to be worthless； or； thirdly；
to be beyond his range and too great for him； and himself to be really
unable to live as one who gives his mind to wisdom and virtue？ For
if he thinks it worthless； he will have to contend with many who say
the opposite； and who would be held in far higher repute as judges
than Dionysios； if on the other hand； he thinks he has discovered or
learnt the things and that they are worth having as part of a
liberal education； how could he； unless he is an extraordinary person；
have so recklessly dishonoured the master who has led the way in these
subjects？ How he dishonoured him； I will now state。
Up to this time he had allowed Dion to remain in possession of his
property and to receive the income from it。 But not long after the
foregoing events； as if he had entirely forgotten his letter to that
effect； he no longer allowed Dion's trustees to send him remittances
to the Peloponnese； on the pretence that the owner of the property was
not Dion but Dion's son； his own nephew； of whom he himself was
legally the trustee。 These were the actual facts which occurred up
to the point which we have reached。 They had opened my eyes as to
the value of Dionysios' desire for philosophy； and I had every right
to complain； whether I wished to do so or not。 Now by this time it was
summer and the season for sea voyages； therefore I decided that I must
not be vexed with Dionysios rather than with myself and those who
had forced me to come for the third time into the strait of Scylla；
that once again I might
To fell Charybdis measure back my course；
but must tell Dionysios that it was impossible for me to remain
after this outrage had been put upon Dion。 He tried to soothe me and
begged me to remain； not thinking it desirable for himself that I
should arrive post haste in person as the bearer of such tidings。 When
his entreaties produced no effect； he promised that he himself would
provide me with transport。 For my intention was to embark on one of
the trading ships and sail away； being indignant and thinking it my
duty to face all dangers； in case I was prevented from going…since
plainly and obviously I was doing no wrong； but was the party wronged。
Seeing me not at all inclined to stay； he devised the following
scheme to make me stay during that sading season。 On the next day he
came to me and made a plausible proposal： 〃Let us put an end；〃 he
said； 〃to these constant quarrels between you and me about Dion and
his affairs。 For your sake I will do this for Dion。 I require him to
take his own property and reside in the Peloponnese； not as an
exile； but on the understanding that it is open for him to migrate
here； when this step has the joint approval of himself； me； and you
his friends； and this shall be open to him on the underst