the writings-6- 第21部分

glorious　cause；　and　I　say　this　with　no　malice　in　my　heart　towards

those　who　have　done　otherwise。　　May　our　children　and　children's

children；　for　a　thousand　generations；　continue　to　enjoy　the　benefits

conferred　upon　us　by　a　united　country；　and　have　cause　yet　to　rejoice

under　these　glorious　institutions；　bequeathed　to　us　by　WASHINGTON　and

his　compeers。　　Now；　my　friends；　soldiers　and　citizens；　I　can　only　say

once　more…farewell。









TELEGRAM　FROM　GENERAL　HALLECK



TO　GENERAL　G。　B。　McCLELLAN。；

WASHINGTON；　D。　C。；　October　6；　1862。



MAJOR…GENERAL　McCLELLAN：



I　am　instructed　to　telegraph　you　as　follows：　The　President　directs

that　you　cross　the　Potomac　and　give　battle　to　the　enemy；　or　drive　him

south。　　Your　army　must　move　now；　while　the　roads　are　good。　　If　you

cross　the　river　between　the　enemy　and　Washington；　and　cover　the

latter　by　your　operation；　you　can　be　reinforced　by　thirty　thousand

men。　　If　you　move　up　the　valley　of　the　Shenandoah；　not　more　than

twelve　or　fifteen　thousand　can　be　sent　you。　　The　President　advises

the　interior　line　between　Washington　and　the　enemy；　but　does　not

order　it。　　He　is　very　desirous　that　your　army　move　as　soon　as

possible。　　You　will　immediately　report　what　line　you　adopt；　and　when

you　intend　to　cross　the　river；　also　to　what　point　the　reinforcements

are　to　be　sent。　　It　is　necessary　that　the　plan　of　your　operations　be

positively　determined　on；　before　orders　are　given　for　building

bridges　and　repairing　railroads。　　I　am　directed　to　add　that　the

Secretary　of　War　and　the　General…in…chief　fully　concur　with　the

President　in　these　directions。



H。　W。　HALLECK；　　General…in…Chief。









TELEGRAM　TO　GENERAL　McCLELLAN。



EXECUTIVE　MANSION；　WASHINGTON；　October　7；　1862。



MAJOR…GENERAL　McCLELLAN；　Hdqs。　Army　of　the　Potomac：



You　wish　to　see　your　family　and　I　wish　to　oblige　you。　　It　might　be

left　to　your　own　discretion；　certainly　so；　if　Mrs。　M。　could　meet　you

here　at　Washington。



A。　LINCOLN。









TO　T。　H。　CLAY。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　October　8；　1862。



THOMAS　H。　CLAY；　Cincinnati；　Ohio：



You　cannot　have　reflected　seriously　when　you　ask　that　I　shall　order

General　Morgan's　command　to　Kentucky　as　a　favor　because　they　have

marched　from　Cumberland　Gap。　　The　precedent　established　by　it　would

evidently　break　up　the　whole　army。　　Buell's　old　troops；　now　in

pursuit　of　Bragg；　have　done　more　hard　marching　recently；　and；　in

fact；　if　you　include　marching　and　fighting；　there　are　scarcely　any

old　troops　east　or　west　of　the　mountains　that　have　not　done　as　hard

service。　　I　sincerely　wish　war　was　an　easier　and　pleasanter　business

than　it　is；　but　it　does　not　admit　of　holidays。　　On　Morgan's　command；

where　it　is　now　sent；　as　I　understand；　depends　the　question　whether

the　enemy　will　get　to　the　Ohio　River　in　another　place。



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　GENERAL　U。　S。　GRANT。



WASHINGTON；　D。C。；　October　8；　1862



MAJOR…GENERAL　GRANT：



I　congratulate　you　and　all　concerned　in　your　recent　battles　and

victories。　　How　does　it　all　sum　up？　　I　especially　regret　the　death　of

General　Hackleman；　and　am　very　anxious　to　know　the　condition　of

General　Oglesby；　who　is　an　intimate　personal　friend。



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　GENERAL　J。　T。　BOYLE。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　October　11；1862。　　　4　P。M。



GENERAL　BOYLE；　Louisville；　Kentucky：



Please　send　any　news　you　have　from　General　Buell　to…day。



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　GENERAL　J。　T。　BOYLE。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　October　12；　1862。　　　4。10　P。M。



GENERAL　BOYLE；　Louisville；　Kentucky：



We　are　anxious　to　hear　from　General　Buell's　army。　　We　have　heard

nothing　since　day　before　yesterday。　　Have　you　anything？



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　GENERAL　CURTIS。



WASHINGTON；　D。　C。；　October　12；　1862。



MAJOR…GENERAL　CURTIS；　Saint　Louis；　Missouri：



Would　the　completion　of　the　railroad　some　distance　further　in　the

direction　of　Springfield；　Mo。；　be　of　any　military　advantage　to　you？

Please　answer。



A。　LINCOLN。









TO　GENERAL　G。　B。　McCLELLAN。



EXECUTIVE　MANSION；　WASHINGTON；

October　13；　1862。



MY　DEAR　SIR　…You　remember　my　speaking　to　you　of　what　I　called　your

over…cautiousness。　　　Are　you　not　over…cautious　when　you　assume　that

you　cannot　do　what　the　enemy　is　constantly　doing？　　Should　you　not

claim　to　be　at　least　his　equal　in　prowess；　and　act　upon　the　claim？



As　I　understand；　you　telegraphed　General　Halleck　that　you　cannot

subsist　your　army　at　Winchester　unless　the　railroad　from　Harper's

Ferry　to　that　point　be　put　in　working　order。　　But　the　enemy　does　now

subsist　his　army　at　Winchester；　at　a　distance　nearly　twice　as　great

from　railroad　transportation　as　you　would　have　to　do；　without　the

railroad　last　named。　　He　now　wagons　from　Culpepper　Court…House；　which

is　just　about　twice　as　far　as　you　would　have　to　do　from　Harper's

Ferry。　　He　is　certainly　not　more　than　half　as　well　provided　with

wagons　as　you　are。　　I　certainly　should　be　pleased　for　you　to　have　the

advantage　of　the　railroad　from　Harper's　Perry　to　Winchester；　but　it

wastes　an　the　remainder　of　autumn　to　give　it　to　you；　and；　in　fact；

ignores　the　question　of　time；　which　cannot　and　must　not　be　ignored。



Again；　one　of　the　standard　maxims　of　war；　as　you　know；　is　〃to　operate

upon　the　enemy's　communications　as　much　as　possible；　without　exposing

your　own。〃　　You　seem　to　act　as　if　this　applies　against　you；　but

cannot　apply　in　your　favor。　　Change　positions　with　the　enemy；　and

think　you　not　he　would　break　your　communication　with　Richmond　within

the　next　twenty…four　hours？　　You　dread　his　going　into　Pennsylvania。

But　if　he　does　so　in　full　force；　he　gives　up　his　communications　to

you　absolutely；　and　you　have　nothing　to　do　but　to　follow　and　ruin

him；　if　he　does　so　with　less　than　full　force；　fall　upon　and　beat　what

is　left　behind　all　the　easier。





Exclusive　of　the　water　line；　you　are　now　nearer　to　Richmond　than　the

enemy　is；　by　the　route　that　you　can　and　he　must　take。　　Why　can　you

not　reach　there　before　him；　unless　you　admit　that　he　is　more　than

your　equal　on　a　march？　　His　route　is　the　arc　of　a　circle；　while　yours

is　the　chord。　　The　roads　are　as　good　on　yours　as　on　his。



You　know　I　desired；　but　did　not　order；　you　to　cross　the　Potomac　below

instead　of　above　the　Shenandoah　and　Blue　Ridge。　　My　idea　was；　that

this　would　at　once　menace　the　enemy's　communications；　which　I　would

seize　if　he　would　permit。　　If　he　should　move　northward；　I　would

follow　him　closely；　holding　his　communications。　　If　he　should　prevent

our　seizing　his　communications；　and　move　toward　Richmond；　I　would

press　closely　to　him；　fight　him　if　a　favorable　opportunity　should

present；　and　at　least　try　to　beat　him　to　Richmond　on　the　inside

track。　　I　say　try；〃　if　we　never　try；　we　shall　never　succeed。　　If　he

makes　a　stand　at　Winchester；　moving　neither　north　or　south；　I　would

fight　him　there；　on　the　idea　that　if　we　cannot　beat　him　when　he　bears

the　wastage　of　coming　to　us；　we　never　can　when　we　bear　the　wastage　of

going　to　him。　　This　proposition　is　a　simple　truth；　and　is　too

important　to　be　lost　sight　of　for　a　moment。　　In　coming　to　us　he

tenders　us　an　advantage　which　we　should　not　waive。　　We　should　not　so

operate　as　to　merely　drive　him　away。　　As　we　must　beat　him　somewhere

or　fail　finally；　we　can　do　it；　if　at　all；　easier　near　to　us　than　far

away。　　If　we　cannot　beat　the　enemy　where　he　now　is；　we　never　can；　he

again　being　within　the　entrenchments　of　Richmond。



＇And；　indeed；　the　enemy　was　let　back　into　Richmond　and　it　took

another　two　years　and　thousands　of　dead　for　McClelland　cowardiceif

that　was　all　that　it　was。　　　I　still　suspect；　and　I　think　the　evidence

is　overwhelming　that　he　was；　either　secretly　a　supporter　of　the

South；　or；　what　is　more　likely；　a　politician　readying　for　a　different

campaign：　　that　of　the　Presidency　of　the　United　States。＇



Recurring　to　the　idea　of　going　to　Richmond　on　the　inside　track；　the

facility　of　supplying　from　the　side　away　from　the　enemy　is

remarkable；　as　it　were；　by　the　different　spokes　of　a　wheel　extending

from　the　hub　toward　the　rim；　and　this　whether　you　move　directly　by

the　chord　or　on　the　inside　arc；　hugging　the　Blue　Ridge　more　closely。

The　chord　line；　as　you　see；　carries　you　by　Aldie；　Hay　Market；　and

Fredericksburg；　and　you　see　how　turnpikes；　railroads；　and　finally　the

Potomac；　by　Aquia　Creek；　meet　you　at　all　points　from　WASHINGTON；　the

same；　only　the　lines　lengthened　a　little；　if　you　press　closer　to　the

Blue　Ridge　part　of　the　way。



The　gaps　through　the　Blue　Ridge　I　understand　to　be　about　the

following　distances　from　Harper's　Ferry；　to　wit：　Vestal's；　5　miles；

Gregory's；　13；　Snicker's；　18；　Ashby's；　28；　Manassas；　38；　Chester；　45；

and　Thornton's；　53。　　I　should　think　it　preferable　to　take　the　route

nearest　the　enemy；　disabling　him　to　make　an　important　move　without

your　knowledge；　and　compelling　him　to　keep　his　forces　together　for

dread　of　you。　　The　gaps　would　enable　you　to　attack　if　you　should

wish。　　For　a　great　part　of　the　way　you　would　be　practically　between

the　enemy　and　both　WASHINGTON　and　Richmond；　enabling　us　to　spare　you

the　greatest　number　of　troops　from　here。　　When　at　length　running　for

Richmond　ahead　of　him　enables　him　to　move　this　way；　if　he　does　so；

turn　and　attack　him　in　rear。　　But　I　think　he　should　be　engaged　long

before　such　a　point　is　reached。　　It　is　all　easy　if　our　troops　march

as　well　as　the　enemy；　and　it　is　unmanly　to　say　they　cannot　do　it。

This　letter　is　in　no　sense　an　order。



Yours　truly；



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　GOVERNOR　PIERPOINT。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　WASHINGTON　CITY；　D。　C。；

October　16；　1862。



GOVERNOR　PIERPOINT；　Wheeling；　Virginia：



Your　despatch　of　to…day　received。　　I　am　very　sorry　to　have　offended

you。　　I　appointed　the　collector；　as　I　thought；　on　your　written

recommendation；　and　the　assessor　also　with　your　testimony　of

worth