philebus- 第2部分

but　when　the　assertion　is　made　that　man　is　one；　or　ox　is　one；　or



beauty　one；　or　the　good　one；　then　the　interest　which　attaches　to　these



and　similar　unities　and　the　attempt　which　is　made　to　divide　them　gives



birth　to　a　controversy。



　　Pro。　Of　what　nature？



　　Soc。　In　the　first　place；　as　to　whether　these　unities　have　a　real



existence；　and　then　how　each　individual　unity；　being　always　the



same；　and　incapable　either　of　generation　of　destruction；　but　retaining



a　permanent　individuality；　can　be　conceived　either　as　dispersed　and



multiplied　in　the　infinity　of　the　world　of　generation；　or　as　still



entire　and　yet　divided　from　itself；　which　latter　would　seem　to　be



the　greatest　impossibility　of　all；　for　how　can　one　and　the　same



thing　be　at　the　same　time　in　one　and　in　many　things？　These；



Protarchus；　are　the　real　difficulties；　and　this　is　the　one　and　many　to



which　they　relate；　they　are　the　source　of　great　perplexity　if　ill



decided；　and　the　right　determination　of　them　is　very　helpful。



　　Pro。　Then；　Socrates；　let　us　begin　by　clearing　up　these　questions。



　　Soc。　That　is　what　I　should　wish。



　　Pro。　And　I　am　sure　that　all　my　other　friends　will　be　glad　to　hear



them　discussed；　Philebus；　fortunately　for　us；　is　not　disposed　to　move；



and　we　had　better　not　stir　him　up　with　questions。



　　Soc。　Good；　and　where　shall　we　begin　this　great　and　multifarious



battle；　in　which　such　various　points　are　at　issue？　Shall　begin　thus？



　　Pro。　How？



　　Soc。　We　say　that　the　one　and　many　become　identified　by　thought；



and　that　now；　as　in　time　past；　they　run　about　together；　in　and　out



of　every　word　which　is　uttered；　and　that　this　union　of　them　will　never



cease；　and　is　not　now　beginning；　but　is；　as　I　believe；　an



everlasting　quality　of　thought　itself；　which　never　grows　old。　Any



young　man；　when　he　first　tastes　these　subtleties；　is　delighted；　and



fancies　that　he　has　found　a　treasure　of　wisdom；　in　the　first



enthusiasm　of　his　joy　he　leaves　no　stone；　or　rather　no　thought



unturned；　now　rolling　up　the　many　into　the　one；　and　kneading　them



together；　now　unfolding　and　dividing　them；　he　puzzles　himself　first



and　above　all；　and　then　he　proceeds　to　puzzle　his　neighbours；



whether　they　are　older　or　younger；　or　of　his　own　age…that　makes　no



difference；　neither　father　nor　mother　does　he　spare；　no　human　being



who　has　ears　is　safe　from　him；　hardly　even　his　dog；　and　a　barbarian



would　have　no　chance　of　escaping　him；　if　an　interpreter　could　only



be　found。



　　Pro。　Considering；　Socrates；　how　many　we　are；　and　that　all　of　us



are　young　men；　is　there　not　a　danger　that　we　and　Philebus　may　all



set　upon　you；　if　you　abuse　us？　We　understand　what　you　mean；　but　is



there　no　charm　by　which　we　may　dispel　all　this　confusion；　no　more



excellent　way　of　arriving　at　the　truth？　If　there　is；　we　hope　that



you　will　guide　us　into　that　way；　and　we　will　do　our　best　to　follow；



for　the　enquiry　in　which　we　are　engaged；　Socrates；　is　not　unimportant。



　　Soc。　The　reverse　of　unimportant；　my　boys；　as　Philebus　calls　you；　and



there　neither　is　nor　ever　will　be　a　better　than　my　own　favourite



way；　which　has　nevertheless　already　often　deserted　me　and　left　me



helpless　in　the　hour　of　need。



　　Pro。　Tell　us　what　that　is。



　　Soc。　One　which　may　be　easily　pointed　out；　but　is　by　no　means　easy　of



application；　it　is　the　parent　of　all　the　discoveries　in　the　arts。



　　Pro。　Tell　us　what　it　is。



　　Soc。　A　gift　of　heaven；　which；　as　I　conceive；　the　gods　tossed　among



men　by　the　hands　of　a　new　Prometheus；　and　therewith　a　blaze　of



light；　and　the　ancients；　who　were　our　betters　and　nearer　the　gods　than



we　are；　handed　down　the　tradition；　that　whatever　things　are　said　to　be



are　composed　of　one　and　many；　and　have　the　finite；　and　infinite



implanted　in　them：　seeing；　then；　that　such　is　the　order　of　the



world；　we　too　ought　in　every　enquiry　to　begin　by　laying　down　one



idea　of　that　which　is　the　subject　of　enquiry；　this　unity　we　shall　find



in　everything。　Having　found　it；　we　may　next　proceed　to　look　for　two；



if　there　be　two；　or；　if　not；　then　for　three　or　some　other　number；



subdividing　each　of　these　units；　until　at　last　the　unity　with　which　we



began　is　seen　not　only　to　be　one　and　many　and　infinite；　but　also　a



definite　number；　the　infinite　must　not　be　suffered　to　approach　the



many　until　the　entire　number　of　the　species　intermediate　between　unity



and　infinity　has　been　discovered…then；　and　not　till　then；　we　may；　rest



from　division；　and　without　further　troubling　ourselves　about　the



endless　individuals　may　allow　them　to　drop　into　infinity。　This；　as　I



was　saying；　is　the　way　of　considering　and　learning　and　teaching　one



another；　which　the　gods　have　handed　down　to　us。　But　the　wise　men　of



our　time　are　either　too　quick　or　too　slow；　in　conceiving　plurality



in　unity。　Having　no　method；　they　make　their　one　and　many　anyhow；　and



from　unity　pass　at　once　to　infinity；　the　intermediate　steps　never



occur　to　them。　And　this；　I　repeat；　is　what　makes　the　difference



between　the　mere　art　of　disputation　and　true　dialectic。



　　Pro。　I　think　that　I　partly　understand　you　Socrates；　but　I　should



like　to　have　a　clearer　notion　of　what　you　are　saying。



　　Soc。　I　may　illustrate　my　meaning　by　the　letters　of　the　alphabet；



Protarchus；　which　you　were　made　to　learn　as　a　child。



　　Pro。　How　do　they　afford　an　illustration？



　　Soc。　The　sound　which　passes　through　the　lips　whether　of　an



individual　or　of　all　men　is　one　and　yet　infinite。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　yet　not　by　knowing　either　that　sound　is　one　or　that　sound



is　infinite　are　we　perfect　in　the　art　of　speech；　but　the　knowledge



of　the　number　and　nature　of　sounds　is　what　makes　a　man　a　grammarian。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　And　the　knowledge　which　makes　a　man　a　musician　is　of　the　same



kind。



　　Pro。　How　so？



　　Soc。　Sound　is　one　in　music　as　well　as　in　grammar？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　there　is　a　higher　note　and　a　lower　note；　and　a　note　of



equal　pitch：…may　we　affirm　so　much？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　But　you　would　not　be　a　real　musician　if　this　was　all　that　you



knew；　though　if　you　did　not　know　this　you　would　know　almost　nothing　of



music。



　　Pro。　Nothing。



　　Soc。　But　when　you　have　learned　what　sounds　are　high　and　what　low；



and　the　number　and　nature　of　the　intervals　and　their　limits　or



proportions；　and　the　systems　compounded　out　of　them；　which　our　fathers



discovered；　and　have　handed　down　to　us　who　are　their　descendants　under



the　name　of　harmonies；　and　the　affections　corresponding　to　them　in　the



movements　of　the　human　body；　which　when　measured　by　numbers　ought；



as　they　say；　to　be　called　rhythms　and　measures；　and　they　tell　us



that　the　same　principle　should　be　applied　to　every　one　and　many；…when；



I　say；　you　have　learned　all　this；　then；　my　dear　friend；　you　are



perfect；　and　you　may　be　said　to　understand　any　other　subject；　when　you



have　a　similar　grasp　of　it。　But　the；　infinity　of　kinds　and　the



infinity　of　individuals　which　there　is　in　each　of　them；　when　not



classified；　creates　in　every　one　of　us　a　state　of　infinite



ignorance；　and　he　who　never　looks　for　number　in　anything；　will　not



himself　be　looked　for　in　the　number　of　famous　men。



　　Pro。　I　think　that　what　Socrates　is　now　saying　is　excellent；



Philebus。



　　Phi。　I　think　so　too；　but　how　do　his　words　bear　upon　us　and　upon



the　argument？



　　Soc。　Philebus　is　right　in　asking　that　question　of　us；　Protarchus。



　　Pro。　Indeed　he　is；　and　you　must　answer　him。



　　Soc。　I　will；　but　you　must　let　me　make　one　little　remark　first



about　these　matters；　I　was　saying；　that　he　who　begins　with　any



individual　unity；　should　proceed　from　that；　not　to　infinity；　but　to



a　definite　number；　and　now　I　say　conversely；　that　he　who　has　to



begin　with　infinity　should　not　jump　to　unity；　but　he　should　look　about



for　some　number；　representing　a　certain　quantity；　and　thus　out　of



all　end　in　one。　And　now　let　us　return　for　an　illustration　of　our



principle　to　the　case　of　letters。



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Some　god　or　divine　man；　who　in　the　Egyptian　legend　is　said　to



have　been　Theuth；　observing　that　the　human　voice　was　infinite；　first



distinguished　in　this　infinity　a　certain　number　of　vowels；　and　then



other　letters　which　had　sound；　but　were　not　pure　vowels　（i。e。；　the



semivowels）；　these　too　exist　in　a　definite　number；　and　lastly；　he



distinguished　a　third　class　of　letters　which　we　now　call　mutes；



without　voice　and　without　sound；　and　divided　these；　and　likewise　the



two　other　classes　of　vowels　and　semivowels；　into　the　individual



sounds；　told　the　number　of　them；　and　gave　to　each　and　all　of　them



the　name　of　letters；　and　observing　that　none　of　us　could　learn　any　one



of　them　and　not　learn　them　all；　and　in　consideration　of　this　common



bond　which　in　a　manner　united　them；　he　assigned　to　them　all　a　single



art；　and　this　he　called　the　art　of　grammar　or　letters。



　　Phi。　The　illustration；　Protarchus；　has　assisted　me　in



understanding　the　original　statement；　but　I　still　feel　the　defect　of



which　I　just　now　complained。



　　Soc。　Are　you　going　to　ask；　Philebus；　what　this　has　to　do　with　the



argument？



　　Phi。　Yes；　that　is　a　question　which　Protarchus　and　I　have　been　long



asking。



　　Soc。　Assuredly　you　have　already　arrived　at　the　answer　to　the



question　which；　as　you　say；　you　have　been　so　long　asking？



　　Phi。　How　so？



　　Soc。　Did　we　not　begin　by　enquiring　into　the　comparative



eligibility　of　pleasure　and　wisdom？



　　Phi。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　we　maintain　that　they　are　each　of　them　one？



　　Phi。　True。



　　Soc。　And　the　precise　question　to　which　the　previous　discussion



desires　an　answer　is；　how　they　are　one　and　also　many　＇i。e。；　how　they



have　one　genus　and　many　species＇；　and　are　not　at　once　infinite；　and



what　number　of　species　is　to　be　assigned　to　either　of　them