the ethics(part iv)- 第4部分

of　good　and　evil；　in　so　far　as　such　knowledge　



regards　what　is　future；　may　be　more　easily　



controlled　or　quenched；　than　the　desire　for　



what　is　agreeable　at　the　present　moment。







Proof。…　Emotion　towards　a　thing；　which　we　conceive　as　future；　is　fainter　



than　emotion　towards　a　thing　that　is　present　（IV：ix。Coroll。）。　But　desire；　



which　arises　from　the　true　knowledge　of　good　and　evil；　though　it　be　



concerned　with　things　which　are　good　at　the　moment；　can　be　quenched　



or　controlled　by　any　headstrong　desire　（by　the　last　Prop。；　the　proof　



whereof　is　of　universal　application）。　Wherefore　desire　arising　from　



such　knowledge；　when　concerned　with　the　future；　can　be　more　easily　



controlled　or　quenched；　&c。　Q。E。D。















Prop。　XVII。　Desire　arising　from　the　true　



knowledge　of　good　and　evil；　in　so　far　as　



such　knowledge　is　concerned　with　what　is　



contingent；　can　be　controlled　far　more　



easily　still；　than　desire　for　things　



that　are　present。







Proof。…　This　Prop。　is　proved　in　the　same　way　as　the　last　Prop。　from　



IV：xii。Coroll。







Note。…　I　think　I　have　now　shown　the　reason；　why　men　are　moved　by　opinion　



more　readily　than　by　true　reason；　why　it　is　that　the　true　knowledge　of　good　



and　evil　stirs　up　conflicts　in　the　soul；　and　often　yields　to　every　kind　of　



passion。　This　state　of　things　gave　rise　to　the　exclamation　of　the　poet：　



（Ov。　Met。　vii。20；　〃Video　meliora　proboque；　Deteriora　sequor。〃）







　　　　The　better　path　I　gaze　at　and　approve；　







　　　The　worse　…　I　follow。〃



Ecclesiastes　seems　to　have　had　the　same　thought　in　his　mind；　when　he　says；　



〃He　who　increaseth　knowledge　increaseth　sorrow。〃　I　have　not　written　the　



above　with　the　object　of　drawing　the　conclusion；　that　ignorance　is　more　



excellent　than　knowledge；　or　that　a　wise　man　is　on　a　par　with　a　fool　in　



controlling　his　emotions；　but　because　it　is　necessary　to　know　the　power　



and　the　infirmity　of　our　nature；　before　we　can　determine　what　reason　can　



do　in　restraining　the　emotions；　and　what　is　beyond　her　power。　I　have　said；　



that　in　the　present　part　I　shall　merely　treat　of　human　infirmity。　The　



power　of　reason　over　the　emotions　I　have　settled　to　treat　separately。















Prop。　XVIII。　Desire　arising　from　pleasure　is；　



other　conditions　being　equal；　stronger　than　



desire　arising　from　pain。







Proof。…　Desire　is　the　essence　of　a　man　（Def。　of　the　Emotions；　i。）；　



that　is；　the　endeavour　whereby　a　man　endeavours　to　persist　in　his　own　



being。　Wherefore　desire　arising　from　pleasure　is；　by　the　fact　of　



pleasure　being　felt；　increased　or　helped；　on　the　contrary；　desire　



arising　from　pain　is；　by　the　fact　of　pain　being　felt；　diminished　or　



hindered；　hence　the　force　of　desire　arising　from　pleasure　must　be　



defined　by　human　power　together　with　the　power　of　an　external　cause；　



whereas　desire　arising　from　pain　must　be　defined　by　human　power　only。　



Thus　the　former　is　the　stronger　of　the　two。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　In　these　few　remarks　I　have　explained　the　causes　of　human　infirmity　



and　inconstancy；　and　shown　why　men　do　not　abide　by　the　precepts　of　reason。　



It　now　remains　for　me　to　show　what　course　is　marked　out　for　us　by　reason；　



which　of　the　emotions　are　in　harmony　with　the　rules　of　human　reason；　and　



which　of　them　are　contrary　thereto。







But；　before　I　begin　to　prove　my　Propositions　in　detailed　geometrical　



fashion；　it　is　advisable　to　sketch　them　briefly　in　advance；　so　that　



everyone　may　more　readily　grasp　my　meaning。







As　reason　makes　no　demands　contrary　to　nature；　it　demands；　that　every　



man　should　love　himself；　should　seek　that　which　is　useful　to　him　…　I　mean；　



that　which　is　really　useful　to　him；　should　desire　everything　which　really　



brings　man　to　greater　perfection；　and　should；　each　for　himself；　endeavour　



as　far　as　he　can　to　preserve　his　own　being。　This　is　as　necessarily　true；　



as　that　a　whole　is　greater　than　its　part。　（Cf。　III：iv。）







Again；　as　virtue　is　nothing　else　but　action　in　accordance　with　the　



laws　of　one's　own　nature　（IV：Def。viii。）；　and　as　no　one　endeavours　to　



preserve　his　own　being；　except　in　accordance　with　the　laws　of　his　own　



nature；　it　follows；　first；　that　the　foundation　of　virtue　is　the　endeavour　



to　preserve　one's　own　being；　and　that　happiness　consists　in　man's　power　



of　preserving；　his　own　being；　secondly；　that　virtue　is　to　be　desired　for　



its　own　sake；　and　that　there　is　nothing　more　excellent　or　more　useful　to　



us；　for　the　sake　of　which　we　should　desire　it；　thirdly　and　lastly　that　



suicides　are　weak…minded；　and　are　overcome　by　external　causes　repugnant　to　



their　nature。　Further；　it　follows　from　Postulate　iv。　Part。II。；　that　we　can　



never　arrive　at　doing　without　all　external　things　for　the　preservation　of　



our　being　or　living；　so　as　to　have　no　relations　with　things　



which　are　outside　ourselves。　Again；　if　we　consider　our　mind；　we　see　that　



our　intellect　would　be　more　imperfect；　if　mind　were　alone；　and　could　



understand　nothing　besides　itself。　There　are；　then；　many　things　outside　



ourselves；　which　are　useful　to　us；　and　are；　therefore；　to　be　desired。　



Of　such　none　can　be　discerned　more　excellent；　than　those　which　are　in　



entire　agreement　with　our　nature。　For　if；　for　example；　two　individuals　



of　entirely　the　same　nature　are　united；　they　form　a　combination　twice　



as　powerful　as　either　of　them　singly。







Therefore；　to　man　there　is　nothing　more　useful　than　man　…　nothing；　



I　repeat；　more　excellent　for　preserving　their　being　can　be　wished　for　



by　men；　than　that　all　should　so　in　all　points　agree；　that　the　minds　and　



bodies　of　all　should　form；　as　it　were；　one　single　mind　and　one　single　



body；　and　that　all　should；　with　one　consent；　as　far　as　they　are　able；　



endeavour　to　preserve　their　being；　and　all　with　one　consent　seek　what　is　



useful　to　them　all。　Hence；　men　who　are　governed　by　reason　…　that　is；　who　



seek　what　is　useful　to　them　in　accordance　with　reason；　desire　for　



themselves　nothing；　which　they　do　not　also　desire　for　the　rest　of　mankind；　



and；　consequently；　are　just；　faithful；　and　honourable　in　their　conduct。







Such　are　the　dictates　of　reason；　which　I　purposed　thus　briefly　to　



indicate；　before　beginning　to　prove　them　in　greater　detail。　I　have　taken　



this　course；　in　order；　if　possible；　to　gain　the　attention　of　those　who　



believe；　that　the　principle　that　every　man　is　bound　to　seek　what　is　useful　



for　himself　is　the　foundation　of　impiety；　rather　than　of　piety　and　virtue。　







Therefore；　after　briefly　showing　that　the　contrary　is　the　case；　I　go　



on　to　prove　it　by；　the　same　method；　as　that　whereby　I　have　hitherto　



proceeded。















Prop。　XIX。　Every　man；　by　the　laws　of　his　



nature；　necessarily　desires　or　shrinks　



from　that　which　he　deems　to　be　good　or　bad。







Proof。…　The　knowledge　of　good　and　evil　is　（IV：viii。）　the　emotion　of　



pleasure　or　pain；　in　so　far　as　we　are　conscious　thereof；　therefore；　



every　man　necessarily　desires　what　he　thinks　good；　and　shrinks　from　



what　he　thinks　bad。　Now　this　appetite　is　nothing　else　but　man's　nature　



or　essence　（Cf。　the　Definition　of　Appetite；　III。ix。note；　and　Def。　of　



the　Emotions；　i。）。　Therefore；　every　man；　solely　by　the　laws　of　his　



nature；　desires　the　one；　and　shrinks　from　the　other；　&c。　Q。E。D。　















Prop。　XX。　The　more　every　man　endeavours；　



and　is　able　to　seek　what　is　useful　to　him　…　



in　other　words；　to　preserve　his　own　being　…　



the　more　is　he　endowed　with　virtue；　on　the　



contrary；　in　proportion　as　a　man　neglects　



to　seek　what　is　useful　to　him；　that　is；　to　



preserve　his　own　being；　he　is　wanting　in　power。







Proof。…　Virtue　is　human　power；　which　is　defined　solely　by　man's　essence　



（IV：Def。viii。）；　that　is；　which　is　defined　solely　by　the　endeavour　made　by　



man　to　persist　in　his　own　being。　Wherefore；　the　more　a　man　endeavours；　



and　is　able　to　preserve　his　own　being；　the　more　is　he　endowed　with　virtue；　



and；　consequently　（III：iv。&；vi。）；　in　so　far　as　a　man　neglects　to　



preserve　his　own　being；　he　is　wanting　in　power。　Q。E。D。　







Note。…　No　one；　therefore；　neglects　seeking　his　own　good；　or　preserving　his　



own　being；　unless　he　be　overcome　by　causes　external　and　foreign　to　his　



nature。　No　one；　I　say；　from　the　necessity　of　his　own　nature；　or　otherwise　



than　under　compulsion　from　external　causes；　shrinks　from　food；　or　kills　



himself：　which　latter　may　be　done　in　a　variety　of　ways。　A　man；　for　



instance；　kills　himself　under　the　compulsion　of　another　man；　who　twists　



round　his　right　hand；　wherewith　he　happened　to　have　taken　up　a　sword；　and　



forces　him　to　turn　the　blade　against　his　own　heart；　or；　again；　he　may　be　



compelled；　like　Seneca；　by　a　tyrant's　command；　to　open　his　own　veins　…　



that　is；　to　escape　a　greater　evil　by　incurring；　a　lesser；　or；　lastly；　



latent　external　causes　may　so　disorder　his　imagination；　and　so　affect　his　



body；　that　it　may　assume　a　nature　contrary　to　its　former　one；　and　whereof　



the　idea　cannot　exist　in　the　mind　（III：x。）　But　that　a　man；　from　the　



necessity　of　his　own　nature；　should　endeavour　to　become　non…existent；　is　



as　impossible　as　that　something　should　be　made　out　of　nothing；　as　everyone　



will　see　for　himself；　after　a　little　reflection。















Prop。　XXI。　No　one　can　desire　to　be　blessed；　



to　act　rightly；　and　to　live　rightly；　without　



at　the　same　time　wishing　to　be；　act；　and　to　



live　…　in　other　words；　to　actually　exist。







Proof。…　The　proof　of　this　proposition；　or　rather　the　proposition　itself；　



is　self…evident；　and　is　also　plain　from　the　definition　of　desire。　For　the　



desire　of　living；　acting；　&C。；　blessedly　or　rightly；　is　（Def。　of　the　



Emotions；　i。）　the　essence　of　man　…　that　is　（III：vii。）；　the　endeavour　



made　by　everyone　to　preserve　his　own　being。　Therefore