the ethics(part iv)- 第7部分

each　follower　of　virtue　seeks　for　himself；　he　will　desire　also　for　others。　



Again；　desire；　in　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　the　mind；　is　the　very　



essence　of　the　mind　（Def。　of　the　Emotions；　i。）；　now　the　essence　of　the　



mind　consists　in　knowledge　（III：xi。）；　which　involves　the　knowledge　of　God　



（II：xlvii。）；　and　without　it　（I：xv。）；　can　neither　be；　nor　be　conceived；　



therefore；　in　proportion　as　the　mind's　essence　involves　a　greater　knowledge　



of　God；　so　also　will　be　greater　the　desire　of　the　follower　of　virtue；　that　



other　men　should　possess　that　which　he　seeks　as　good　for　himself。　Q。E。D。







Another　Proof。…　The　good；　which　a　man　desires　for　himself　and　loves；　he　



will　love　more　constantly；　if　he　sees　that　others　love　it　also　（III：xxxi。）；　



he　will　therefore　endeavour　that　others　should　love　it　also；　and　as　the　



good　in　question　is　common　to　all；　and　therefore　all　can　rejoice　therein；　



he　will　endeavour；　for　the　same　reason；　to　bring　about　that　all　should　



rejoice　therein；　and　this　he　will　do　the　more　（III：xxxvii。）；　in　proportion　



as　his　own　enjoyment　of　the　good　is　greater。







Note　1…　He　who；　guided　by　emotion　only；　endeavours　to　cause　others　to　love　



what　he　loves　himself；　and　to　make　the　rest　of　the　world　live　according　to　



his　own　fancy；　acts　solely　by　impulse；　and　is；　therefore；　hateful；　



especially；　to　those　who　take　delight　in　something　different；　and　



accordingly　study　and；　by　similar　impulse；　endeavour；　to　make　men　live　in　



accordance　with　what　pleases　themselves。　Again；　as　the　highest　good　sought　



by　men　under　the　guidance　of　emotion　is　often　such；　that　it　can　only　be　



possessed　by　a　single　individual；　it　follows　that　those　who　love　it　are　not　



consistent　in　their　intentions；　but；　while　they　delight　to　sing　its　praises；　



fear　to　be　believed。　But　he；　who　endeavours　to　lead　men　by　reason；　does　not　



act　by　impulse　but　courteously　and　kindly；　and　his　intention　is　always　



consistent。　Again；　whatsoever　we　desire　and　do；　whereof　we　are　the　cause　



in　so　far　as　we　possess　the　idea　of　God；　or　know　God；　I　set　down　to　



Religion。　The　desire　of　well…doing；　which　is　engendered　by　a　life　



according　to　reason；　I　call　piety。　Further；　the　desire；　whereby　a　



man　living　according　to　reason　is　bound　to　associate　others　with　



himself　in　friendship；　I　call　honour　（Honestas）；　by　honourable　I　mean　



that　which　is　praised　by　men　living　according　to　reason；　and　by　base　



I　mean　that　which　is　repugnant　to　the　gaining　of　friendship。　I　have　also　



shown　in　addition　what　are　the　foundations　of　a　state；　and　the　difference　



between　true　；virtue　and　infirmity　may　be　readily　gathered　from　what　I　



have　said；　namely；　that　true　virtue　is　nothing　else　but　living　in　



accordance　with　reason；　while　infirmity　is　nothing　else　but　man's　



allowing　himself　to　be　led　by　things　which　are　external　to　himself；　



and　to　be　by　them　determined　to　act　in　a　manner　demanded　by　the　general　



disposition　of　things　rather　than　by　his　own　nature　considered　solely　



in　itself。







Such　are　the　matters　which　I　engaged　to　prove　in　IV：xviii。；　whereby　it　



is　plain　that　the　law　against　the　slaughtering　of　animals　is　founded　rather　



on　vain　superstition　and　womanish　pity　than　on　sound　reason。　The　rational　



quest　of　what　is　useful　to　us　further　teaches　us　the　necessity　of　



associating　ourselves　with　our　fellow　men；　but　…　not　with　beasts；　or　things；　



whose　nature　is　different　from　our　own；　we　have　the　same　rights　in　respect　



to　them　as　they　have　in　respect　to　us。　Nay；　as　everyone's　right　is　defined　



by　his　virtue；　or　power；　men　have　far　greater　rights　over　beasts　than　



beasts　have　over　men。　Still　I　do　not　deny　that　beasts　feel：　what　I　deny　is；　



that　we　may　not　consult　our　own　advantage　and　use　them　as　we　please；　



treating　them　in　the　way　which　best　suits　us；　for　their　nature　is　not　like　



ours；　and　their　emotions　are　naturally　different　from　human　emotions　



（III：Ivii。Note）。　It　remains　for　me　to　explain　what　I　mean　by；　just　and　



unjust；　sin　and　merit。　On　these　points　see　the　following　note。







Note　II。…　In　the　Appendix　to　Part　I。　I　undertook　to　explain　praise　and　



blame；　merit　and　sin；　justice　and　injustice。







Concerning　praise　and　blame　I　have　spoken　in　III：xxix。Note：　the　time　



has　now　come　to　treat　of　the　remaining　terms。　But　I　must　first　say　a　few　



words　concerning　man　in　the　state　of　nature　and　in　society。







Every　man　exists　by　sovereign　natural　right；　and；　consequently；　by　



sovereign　natural　right　performs　those　actions　which　follow　from　the　



necessity　of　his　own　nature；　therefore　by　sovereign　natural　right　every　man　



judges　what　is　good　and　what　is　bad；　takes　care　of　his　own　advantage　



according　to　his　own　disposition　（IV：xix。　and　IV：xx。）；　avenges　the　wrongs　



done　to　him　（III：xl。Coroll。　ii。）；　and　endeavours　to　preserve　that　which　he　



loves　and　to　destroy　…　that　which　he　hates　（III：xxviii。）。　Now；　if　men　lived　



under　the　guidance　of　reason；　everyone　would　remain　in　possession　of　this　



his　right；　without　any　injury　being　done　to　his　neighbour　V：xxxv。Coroll。i。）。　



But　seeing　that　they　are　a　prey　to　their　emotions；　which　far　surpass　human　



power　or　virtue　（IV：vi。）；　they　are　often　drawn　in　different　directions；　and　



being　at　variance　one　with　another　（IV：xxxiii。；　xxxiv。）；　stand　in　need　of　



mutual　help　（IV：xxxv。Note）。　Wherefore；　in　order　that　men　may　live　together　



in　harmony；　and　may　aid　one　another；　it　is　necessary　that　they　should　



forego　their　natural　right；　and；　for　the　sake　of　security；　refrain　from　



all　actions　which　can　injure　their　fellow…men。　The　way　in　which　this　end　



can　be　obtained；　so　that　men　who　are　necessarily　a　prey　to　their　emotions　



（IV：iv。Coroll。）；　inconstant；　and　diverse；　should　be　able　to　render　each　



other　mutually　secure；　and　feel　mutual　trust；　is　evident　from　IV：vii。　and　



III：xxxix。　It　is　there　shown；　that　an　emotion　can　only　be　restrained　by　an　



emotion　stronger　than；　and　contrary　to　itself；　and　that　men　avoid　inflicting　



injury　through　fear　of　incurring　a　greater　injury　themselves。







On　this　law　society　can　be　established；　so　long　as　it　keeps　in　its　own　



hand　the　right；　possessed　by　everyone；　of　avenging　injury；　and　pronouncing　



on　good　and　evil；　and　provided　it　also　possesses　the　power　to　lay　down　a　



general　rule　of　conduct；　and　to　pass　laws　sanctioned；　not　by　reason；　which　



is　powerless　in　restraining　emotion；　but　by　threats　（IV：xvii。Note）。　Such　a　



society　established　with　laws　and　the　power　of　preserving　itself　is　called　



a　State；　while　those　who　live　under　its　protection　are　called　citizens。　We　



may　readily　understand　that　there　is　in　the　state　of　nature　nothing；　which　



by　universal　consent　is　pronounced　good　or　bad；　for　in　the　state　of　nature　



everyone　thinks　solely　of　his　own　advantage；　and　according　to　his　



disposition；　with　reference　only　to　his　individual　advantage；　decides　



what　is　good　or　bad；　being　bound　by　no　law　to　anyone　besides　himself。







In　the　state　of　nature；　therefore；　sin　is　inconceivable；　it　can　only　



exist　in　a　state；　where　good　and　evil　are　pronounced　on　by　common　consent；　



and　where　everyone　is　bound　to　obey　the　State　authority。　Sin；　then；　



is　nothing　else　but　disobedience；　which　is　therefore　punished　by　the　right　



of　the　State　only。　Obedience；　on　the　other　hand；　is　set　down　as　merit；　



inasmuch　as　a　man　is　thought　worthy　of　merit；　if　he　takes　delight　in　the　



advantages　which　a　State　provides。







Again；　in　the　state　of　nature；　no　one　is　by　common　consent　master　of　



anything；　nor　is　there　anything　in　nature；　which　can　be　said　to　belong　to　



one　man　rather　than　another：　all　things　are　common　to　all。　Hence；　in　the　



state　of　nature；　we　can　conceive　no　wish　to　render　to　every　man　his　own；　



or　to　deprive　a　man　of　that　which　belongs　to　him；　in　other　words；　there　is　



nothing　in　the　state　of　nature　answering　to　justice　and　injustice。　Such　



ideas　are　only　possible　in　a　social　state；　when　it　is　decreed　by　common　



consent　what　belongs　to　one　man　and　what　to　another。







From　all　these　considerations　it　is　evident；　that　justice　and　



injustice；　sin　and　merit；　are　extrinsic　ideas；　and　not　attributes　which　



display　the　nature　of　the　mind。　But　I　have　said　enough。















Prop。　XXXVIII。　Whatsoever　disposes　the　human　



body；　so　as　to　render　it　capable　of　being　



affected　in　an　increased　number　of　ways；　or　



of　affecting　external　bodies　in　an　increased　



number　of　ways；　is　useful　to　man　；　and　is　so；　



in　proportion　as　the　body　is　thereby　rendered　



more　capable　of　being　affected　or　affecting　



other　bodies　in　an　increased　number　of　ways；　



contrariwise；　whatsoever　renders　the　body　less　



capable　in　this　respect　is　hurtful　to　man。







Proof。…　Whatsoever　thus　increases　the　capabilities　of　the　body　increases　



also　the　mind's　capability　of　perception　（II：xiv。）；　therefore；　whatsoever　



thus　disposes　the　body　and　thus　renders　it　capable；　is　necessarily　good　or　



useful　（IV：xxvi。；　IV：xxvii。）；　and　is　so　in　proportion　to　the　extent　to　



which　it　can　render　the　body　capable；　contrariwise　（II：xiv。；　IV：xxvi。；　



IV：xxvii。）；　it　is　hurtful；　if　it　renders　the　body　in　this　respect　less　



capable。　Q。E。D。















Prop。　XXXIX。　Whatsoever　brings　about　



the　preservation　of　the　proportion　of　



motion　and　rest；　which　the　parts　of　



the　human　body　mutually　possess；　is　



good；　contrariwise；　whatsoever　causes　



a　change　in　such　proportion　is　bad。







Proof。…　The　human　body　needs　many　other　bodies　for　its　preservation　



（II：Post。iv。）。　But　that　which　constitutes　the　specific　reality　（forma）　



of　a　human　body　is；　that　its　parts　communicate　their　several　motions　



one　to　another　in　a　certain　fixed　proportion　（Def。　before　Lemma　iv。　after　



II：xiii。）。　Therefore；　whatsoever　brings　about　the　preservat