wealbk05- 第16部分

three　judges　to　be　appointed　by　the　crown。　In　Europe；　the

qualification　necessary　to　entitle　a　proprietor　to　vote　at　their

general　courts　was　raised　from　five　hundred　pounds；　the　original

price　of　a　share　in　the　stock　of　the　company；　to　a　thousand

pounds。　In　order　to　vote　upon　this　qualification　too；　it　was

declared　necessary　that　he　should　have　possessed　it；　if　acquired

by　his　own　purchase；　and　not　by　inheritance；　for　at　least　one

year；　instead　of　six　months；　the　term　requisite　before。　The　court

of　twenty…four　directors　had　before　been　chosen　annually；　but　it

was　now　enacted　that　each　director　should；　for　the　future；　be

chosen　for　four　years；　six　of　them；　however；　to　go　out　of　office

by　rotation　every　year；　and　not　to　be　capable　of　being　re…chosen

at　the　election　of　the　six　new　directors　for　the　ensuing　year。　In

consequence　of　these　alterations；　the　courts；　both　of　the

proprietors　and　directors；　it　was　expected；　would　be　likely　to

act　with　more　dignity　and　steadiness　than　they　had　usually　done

before。　But　it　seems　impossible；　by　any　alterations；　to　render

those　courts；　in　any　respect；　fit　to　govern；　or　even　to　share　in

the　government　of　a　great　empire；　because　the　greater　part　of

their　members　must　always　have　too　little　interest　in　the

prosperity　of　that　empire　to　give　any　serious　attention　to　what

may　promote　it。　Frequently　a　man　of　great；　sometimes　even　a　man

of　small　fortune；　is　willing　to　purchase　a　thousand　pounds'　share

in　India　stock　merely　for　the　influence　which　he　expects　to

acquire　by　a　vote　in　the　court　of　proprietors。　It　gives　him　a

share；　though　not　in　the　plunder；　yet　in　the　appointment　of　the

plunderers　of　India；　the　court　of　directors；　though　they　make

that　appointment；　being　necessarily　more　or　less　under　the

influence　of　the　proprietors；　who　not　only　elect　those　directors；

but　sometimes　overrule　the　appointments　of　their　servants　in

India。　Provided　he　can　enjoy　this　influence　for　a　few　years；　and

thereby　provide　for　a　certain　number　of　his　friends；　he

frequently　cares　little　about　the　dividend；　or　even　about　the

value　of　the　stock　upon　which　his　vote　is　founded。　About　the

prosperity　of　the　great　empire；　in　the　government　of　which　that

vote　gives　him　a　share；　he　seldom　cares　at　all。　No　other

sovereigns　ever　were；　or；　from　the　nature　of　things；　ever　could

be；　so　perfectly　indifferent　about　the　happiness　or　misery　of

their　subjects；　the　improvement　or　waste　of　their　dominions；　the

glory　or　disgrace　of　their　administration；　as；　from　irresistible

moral　causes；　the　greater　part　of　the　proprietors　of　such　a

mercantile　company　are；　and　necessarily　must　be。　This

indifference；　too；　was　more　likely　to　be　increased　than

diminished　by　some　of　the　new　regulations　which　were　made　in

consequence　of　the　Parliamentary　inquiry。　By　a　resolution　of　the

House　of　Commons；　for　example；　it　was　declared；　that　when　the

fourteen　hundred　thousand　pounds　lent　to　the　company　by

government　should　be　paid；　and　their　bond…debts　be　reduced　to

fifteen　hundred　thousand　pounds；　they　might　then；　and　not　till

then；　divide　eight　per　cent　upon　their　capital；　and　that　whatever

remained　of　their　revenues　and　net　profits　at　home　should　be

divided　into　four　parts；　three　of　them　to　be　paid　into　the

exchequer　for　the　use　of　the　public；　and　the　fourth　to　be

reserved　as　a　fund　either　for　the　further　reduction　of　their

bond…debts；　or　for　the　discharge　of　other　contingent　exigencies

which　the　company　might　labour　under。　But　if　the　company　were　bad

stewards；　and　bad　sovereigns；　when　the　whole　of　their　net　revenue

and　profits　belonged　to　themselves；　and　were　at　their　own

disposal；　they　were　surely　not　likely　to　be　better　when

three…fourths　of　them　were　to　belong　to　other　people；　and　the

other　fourth；　though　to　be　laid　out　for　the　benefit　of　the

company；　yet　to　be　so　under　the　inspection　and　with　the

approbation　of　other　people。

　　　　　It　might　be　more　agreeable　to　the　company　that　their　own

servants　and　dependants　should　have　either　the　pleasure　of

wasting　or　the　profit　of　embezzling　whatever　surplus　might　remain

after　paying　the　proposed　dividend　of　eight　per　cent　than　that　it

should　come　into　the　hands　of　a　set　of　people　with　whom　those

resolutions　could　scarce　fail　to　set　them；　in　some　measure；　at

variance。　The　interest　of　those　servants　and　dependants　might　so

far　predominate　in　the　court　of　proprietors　as　sometimes　to

dispose　it　to　support　the　authors　of　depredations　which　had　been

committed　in　direct　violation　of　its　own　authority。　With　the

majority　of　proprietors；　the　support　even　of　the　authority　of

their　own　court　might　sometimes　be　a　matter　of　less　consequence

than　the　support　of　those　who　had　set　that　authority　at　defiance。

　　　　　The　regulations　of　1773；　accordingly；　did　not　put　an　end　to

the　disorders　of　the　company's　government　in　India。

Notwithstanding　that；　during　a　momentary　fit　of　good　conduct；

they　had　at　one　time　collected　into　the　treasury　of　Calcutta　more

than　three　millions　sterling；　notwithstanding　that　they　had

afterwards　extended；　either　their　dominion；　or　their

depredations；　over　a　vast　accession　of　some　of　the　richest　and

most　fertile　countries　in　India；　all　was　wasted　and　destroyed。

They　found　themselves　altogether　unprepared　to　stop　or　resist　the

incursion　of　Hyder　Ali；　and；　in　consequence　of　those　disorders；

the　company　is　now　（1784）　in　greater　distress　than　ever；　and；　in

order　to　prevent　immediate　bankruptcy；　is　once　more　reduced　to

supplicate　the　assistance　of　government。　Different　plans　have

been　proposed　by　the　different　parties　in　Parliament　for　the

better　management　of　its　affairs。　And　all　those　plans　seem　to

agree　insupposing；　what　was　indeed　always　abundantly　evident；

that　it　is　altogether　unfit　to　govern　its　territorial

possessions。　Even　the　company　itself　seems　to　be　convinced　of　its

own　incapacity　so　far；　and　seems；　upon　that　account；　willing　to

give　them　up　to　government。

　　　　　With　the　right　of　possessing　forts　and　garrisons　in　distant

and　barbarous　countries　is　necessarily　connected　the　right　of

making　peace　and　war　in　those　countries。　The　joint　stock

companies　which　have　had　the　one　right　have　constantly　exercised

the　other；　and　have　frequently　had　it　expressly　conferred　upon

them。　How　unjustly；　how　capriciously；　how　cruelly　they　have

commonly　exercised　it；　is　too　well　known　from　recent　experience。

　　　　　When　a　company　of　merchants　undertake；　at　their　own　risk　and

expense；　to　establish　a　new　trade　with　some　remote　and　barbarous

nation；　it　may　not　be　unreasonable　to　incorporate　them　into　a

joint　stock　company；　and　to　grant　them；　in　case　of　their　success；

a　monopoly　of　the　trade　for　a　certain　number　of　years。　It　is　the

easiest　and　most　natural　way　in　which　the　state　can　recompense

them　for　hazarding　a　dangerous　and　expensive　experiment；　of　which

the　public　is　afterwards　to　reap　the　benefit。　A　temporary

monopoly　of　this　kind　may　be　vindicated　upon　the　same　principles

upon　which　a　like　monopoly　of　a　new　machine　is　granted　to　its

inventor；　and　that　of　a　new　book　to　its　author。　But　upon　the

expiration　of　the　term；　the　monopoly　ought　certainly　to

determine；　the　forts　and　garrisons；　if　it　was　found　necessary　to

establish　any；　to　be　taken　into　the　hands　of　government；　their

value　to　be　paid　to　the　company；　and　the　trade　to　be　laid　open　to

all　the　subjects　of　the　state。　By　a　perpetual　monopoly；　all　the

other　subjects　of　the　state　are　taxed　very　absurdly　in　two

different　ways：　first；　by　the　high　price　of　goods；　which；　in　the

case　of　a　free　trade；　they　could　buy　much　cheaper；　and；　secondly；

by　their　total　exclusion　from　a　branch　of　business　which　it　might

be　both　convenient　and　profitable　for　many　of　them　to　carry　on。

It　is　for　the　most　worthless　of　all　purposes；　too；　that　they　are

taxed　in　this　manner。　It　is　merely　to　enable　the　company　to

support　the　negligence；　profusion；　and　malversation　of　their　own

servants；　whose　disorderly　conduct　seldom　allows　the　dividend　of

the　company　to　exceed　the　ordinary　rate　of　profit　in　trades　which

are　altogether　free；　and　very　frequently　makes　it　fall　even　a

good　deal　short　of　that　rate。　Without　a　monopoly；　however；　a

joint　stock　company；　it　would　appear　from　experience；　cannot　long

carry　on　any　branch　of　foreign　trade。　To　buy　in　one　market；　in

order　to　sell；　with　profit；　in　another；　when　there　are　many

competitors　in　both；　to　watch　over；　not　only　the　occasional

variations　in　the　demand；　but　the　much　greater　and　more　frequent

variations　in　the　competition；　or　in　the　supply　which　that　demand

is　likely　to　get　from　other　people；　and　to　suit　with　dexterity

and　judgment　both　the　quantity　and　quality　of　each　assortment　of

goods　to　all　these　circumstances；　is　a　species　of　warfare　of

which　the　operations　are　continually　changing；　and　which　can

scarce　ever　be　conducted　successfully　without　such　an　unremitting

exertion　of　vigilance　and　attention　as　cannot　long　be　expected

from　the　directors　of　a　joint　stock　company。　The　East　India

Company；　upon　the　redemption　of　their　funds；　and　the　expiration

of　their　exclusive　privilege；　have　right；　by　Act　of　Parliament；

to　continue　a　corporation　with　a　joint　stock；　and　to　trade　in

their　corporate　capacity　to　the　East　Indies　in　common　with　the

rest　of　their　fellow…subjects。　But　in　this　situation；　the

superior　vigilance　and　attention　of　private　adventurers　would；　in

all　probability；　soon　make　them　weary　of　the　trade。

　　　　　An　eminent　French　author；　of　great　knowledge　in　matters　of

political　economy；　the　Abbe　Morellet；　gives　a　list　of　fifty…five

joint　stock　companies　for　foreign　trade　which　have　been

established　in　different　parts　of　Europe　since　the　year　1600；　and

which；　according　to　him；　have　all　failed　from　mismanagement；

notwithstanding　they　had　exclusive　privileges。　He　has　been

misinformed　with　regard　to　the　history　of　two　or　three　of　them；

which　were　not　joint　stock　companies　and　have　not　failed。　But；　in

compensat