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which　the　turbulence　of　the　Greek　clergy　was　continually

occasioning　at　Constantinople；　as　long　as　the　eastern　empire

subsisted；　the　convulsions　which；　during　the　course　of　several

centuries；　the　turbulence　of　the　Roman　clergy　was　continually

occasioning　in　every　part　of　Europe；　sufficiently　demonstrate　how

precarious　and　insecure　must　always　be　the　situation　of　the

sovereign　who　has　no　proper　means　of　influencing　the　clergy　of

the　established　and　governing　religion　of　his　country。

　　　　　Articles　of　faith；　as　well　as　all　other　spiritual　matters；

it　is　evident　enough；　are　not　within　the　proper　department　of　a

temporal　sovereign；　who；　though　he　may　be　very　well　qualified　for

protecting；　is　seldom　supposed　to　be　so　for　instructing　the

people。　With　regard　to　such　matters；　therefore；　his　authority　can

seldom　be　sufficient　to　counterbalance　the　united　authority　of

the　clergy　of　the　established　church。　The　public　tranquillity；

however；　and　his　own　security；　may　frequently　depend　upon　the

doctrines　which　they　may　think　proper　to　propagate　concerning

such　matters。　As　he　can　seldom　directly　oppose　their　decision；

therefore；　with　proper　weight　and　authority；　it　is　necessary　that

he　should　be　able　to　influence　it；　and　be　can　influence　it　only

by　the　fears　and　expectations　which　he　may　excite　in　the　greater

part　of　the　individuals　of　the　order。　Those　fears　and

expectations　may　consist　in　the　fear　of　deprivation　or　other

punishment；　and　in　the　expectation　of　further　preferment。

　　　　　In　all　Christian　churches　the　benefices　of　the　clergy　are　a

sort　of　freeholds　which　they　enjoy；　not　during　pleasure；　but

during　life　or　good　behaviour。　If　they　held　them　by　a　more

precarious　tenure；　and　were　liable　to　be　turned　out　upon　every

slight　disobligation　either　of　the　sovereign　or　of　his　ministers；

it　would　perhaps　be　impossible　for　them　to　maintain　their

authority　with　the　people；　who　would　then　consider　them　as

mercenary　dependents　upon　the　court；　in　the　security　of　whose

instructions　they　could　no　longer　have　any　confidence。　But　should

the　sovereign　attempt　irregularly；　and　by　violence；　to　deprive

any　number　of　clergymen　of　their　freeholds；　on　account；　perhaps；

of　their　having　propagated；　with　more　than　ordinary　zeal；　some

factious　or　seditious　doctrine；　he　would　only　render；　by　such

persecution；　both　them　and　their　doctrine　ten　times　more　popular；

and　therefore　ten　times　more　troublesome　and　dangerous；　than　they

had　been　before。　Fear　is　in　almost　all　cases　a　wretched

instrument　of　government；　and　ought　in　particular　never　to　be

employed　against　any　order　of　men　who　have　the　smallest

pretensions　to　independency。　To　attempt　to　terrify　them　serves

only　to　irritate　their　bad　humour；　and　to　confirm　them　in　an

opposition　which　more　gentle　usage　perhaps　might　easily　induce

them　either　to　soften　or　to　lay　aside　altogether。　The　violence

which　the　French　government　usually　employed　in　order　to　oblige

all　their　parliaments；　or　sovereign　courts　of　justice；　to

enregister　any　unpopular　edict；　very　seldom　succeeded。　The　means

commonly　employed；　however；　the　imprisonment　of　all　the

refractory　members；　one　would　think　were　forcible　enough。　The

princes　of　the　house　of　Stewart　sometimes　employed　the　like　means

in　order　to　influence　some　of　the　members　of　the　Parliament　of

England；　and　they　generally　found　them　equally　intractable。　The

Parliament　of　England　is　now　managed　in　another　manner；　and　a

very　small　experiment　which　the　Duke　of　Choiseul　made　about

twelve　years　ago　upon　the　Parliament　of　Paris；　demonstrated

sufficiently　that　all　the　parliaments　of　France　might　have　been

managed　still　more　easily　in　the　same　manner。　That　experiment　was

not　pursued。　For　though　management　and　persuasion　are　always　the

easiest　and　the　safest　instruments　of　governments；　as　force　and

violence　are　the　worst　and　the　most　dangerous；　yet　such；　it

seems；　is　the　natural　insolence　of　man　that　he　almost　always

disdains　to　use　the　good　instrument；　except　when　he　cannot　or

dare　not　use　the　bad　one。　The　French　government　could　and　durst

use　force；　and　therefore　disdained　to　use　management　and

persuasion。　But　there　is　no　order　of　men；　it　appears；　I　believe；

from　the　experience　of　all　ages；　upon　whom　it　is　so　dangerous；　or

rather　so　perfectly　ruinous；　to　employ　force　and　violence；　as

upon　the　respected　clergy　of　any　established　church。　The　rights；

the　privileges；　the　personal　liberty　of　every　individual

ecclesiastic　who　is　upon　good　terms　with　his　own　order　are；　even

in　the　most　despotic　governments；　more　respected　than　those　of

any　other　person　of　nearly　equal　rank　and　fortune。　It　is　so　in

every　gradation　of　despotism；　from　that　of　the　gentle　and　mild

government　of　Paris　to　that　of　the　violent　and　furious　government

of　Constantinople。　But　though　this　order　of　men　can　scarce　ever

be　forced；　they　may　be　managed　as　easily　as　any　other；　and　the

security　of　the　sovereign；　as　well　as　the　public　tranquillity；

seems　to　depend　very　much　upon　the　means　which　he　has　of　managing

them；　and　those　means　seem　to　consist　altogether　in　the

preferment　which　he　has　to　bestow　upon　them。

　　　　　In　the　ancient　constitution　of　the　Christian　church；　the

bishop　of　each　diocese　was　elected　by　the　joint　votes　of　the

clergy　and　of　the　people　of　the　episcopal　city。　The　people　did

not　long　retain　their　right　of　election；　and　while　they　did

retain　it；　they　almost　always　acted　under　the　influence　of　the

clergy；　who　in　such　spiritual　matters　appeared　to　be　their

natural　guides。　The　clergy；　however；　soon　grew　weary　of　the

trouble　of　managing　them；　and　found　it　easier　to　elect　their　own

bishops　themselves。　The　abbot；　in　the　same　manner；　was　elected　by

the　monks　of　the　monastery；　at　least　in　the　greater　part　of　the

abbacies。　All　the　inferior　ecclesiastical　benefices　comprehended

within　the　diocese　were　collated　by　the　bishop；　who　bestowed　them

upon　such　ecclesiastics　as　he　thought　proper。　All　church

preferments　were　in　this　manner　in　the　disposal　of　the　church。

The　sovereign；　though　he　might　have　some　indirect　influence　in

those　elections；　and　though　it　was　sometimes　usual　to　ask　both

his　consent　to　elect　and　his　approbation　of　the　election；　yet　had

no　direct　or　sufficient　means　of　managing　the　clergy。　The

ambition　of　every　clergyman　naturally　led　him　to　pay　court　not　so

much　to　his　sovereign　as　to　his　own　order；　from　which　only　he

could　expect　preferment。

　　　　　Through　the　greater　part　of　Europe　the　Pope　gradually　drew

to　himself　first　the　collation　of　almost　all　bishoprics　and

abbacies；　or　of　what　were　called　Consistorial　benefices；　and

afterwards；　by　various　machinations　and　pretences；　of　the　greater

part　of　inferior　benefices　comprehended　within　each　diocese；

little　more　being　left　to　the　bishop　than　what　was　barely

necessary　to　give　him　a　decent　authority　with　his　own　clergy。　By

this　arrangement　the　condition　of　the　sovereign　was　still　worse

than　it　had　been　before。　The　clergy　of　all　the　different

countries　of　Europe　were　thus　formed　into　a　sort　of　spiritual

army；　dispersed　in　different　quarters；　indeed；　but　of　which　all

the　movements　and　operations　could　now　be　directed　by　one　head；

and　conducted　upon　one　uniform　plan。　The　clergy　of　each

particular　country　might　be　considered　as　a　particular　detachment

of　that　army；　or　which　the　operations　could　easily　be　supported

and　seconded　by　all　the　other　detachments　quartered　in　the

different　countries　round　about。　Each　detachment　was　not　only

independent　of　the　sovereign　of　the　country　in　which　it　was

quartered；　and　by　which　it　was　maintained；　but　dependent　upon　a

foreign　sovereign；　who　could　at　any　time　turn　its　arms　against

the　sovereign　of　that　particular　country；　and　support　them　by　the

arms　of　all　the　other　detachments。

　　　　　Those　arms　were　the　most　formidable　that　can　well　be

imagined。　In　the　ancient　state　of　Europe；　before　the

establishment　of　arts　and　manufactures；　the　wealth　of　the　clergy

gave　them　the　same　sort　of　influence　over　the　common　people　which

that　of　the　great　barons　gave　them　over　their　respective　vassals；

tenants；　and　retainers。　In　the　great　landed　estates　which　the

mistaken　piety　both　of　princes　and　private　persons　had　bestowed

upon　the　church；　jurisdictions　were　established　of　the　same　kind

with　those　of　the　great　barons；　and　for　the　same　reason。　In　those

great　landed　estates；　the　clergy；　or　their　bailiffs；　could　easily

keep　the　peace　without　the　support　or　assistance　either　of　the

king　or　of　any　other　person；　and　neither　the　king　nor　any　other

person　could　keep　the　peace　there　without　the　support　and

assistance　of　the　clergy。　The　jurisdictions　of　the　clergy；

therefore；　in　their　particular　baronies　or　manors；　were　equally

independent；　and　equally　exclusive　of　the　authority　of　the　king's

courts；　as　those　of　the　great　temporal　lords。　The　tenants　of　the

clergy　were；　like　those　of　the　great　barons；　almost　all　tenants

at　will；　entirely　dependent　upon　their　immediate　lords；　and

therefore　liable　to　be　called　out　at　pleasure　in　order　to　fight

in　any　quarrel　in　which　the　clergy　might　think　proper　to　engage

them。　Over　and　above　the　rents　of　those　estates；　the　clergy

possessed　in　the　tithes；　a　very　large　portion　of　the　rents　of　all

the　other　estates　in　every　kingdom　of　Europe。　The　revenues

arising　from　both　those　species　of　rents　were；　the　greater　part

of　them；　paid　in　kind；　in　corn；　wine；　cattle　poultry；　etc。　The

quantity　exceeded　greatly　what　the　clergy　could　themselves

consume；　and　there　were　neither　arts　nor　manufactures　for　the

produce　of　which　they　could　exchange　the　surplus。　The　clergy

could　derive　advantage　from　this　immense　surplus　in　no　other　way

than　by　employing　it；　as　the　great　barons　employed　the　like

surplus　of　their　revenues；　in　the　most　profuse　hospitality；　and

in　the　most　extensive　charity。　Both　the　hospitality　and　the

charity　of　the　ancient　clergy；　accordingly；　are　said　to　have　been

very　great。　They　not