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repeated。　The　amercement；　besides；　of　the　person　complained　of；

might　frequently　suggest　a　very　strong　reason　for　finding　him　in

the　wrong；　even　when　he　had　not　really　been　so。　That　such　abuses

were　far　from　being　uncommon　the　ancient　history　of　every　country

in　Europe　bears　witness。

　　　　　When　the　sovereign　or　chief　exercised　his　judicial　authority

in　his　own　person；　how　much　soever　he　might　abuse　it；　it　must

have　been　scarce　possible　to　get　any　redress；　because　there　could

seldom　be　anybody　powerful　enough　to　call　him　to　account。　When　he

exercised　it　by　a　bailiff；　indeed；　redress　might　sometimes　be

had。　If　it　was　for　his　own　benefit　only　that　the　bailiff　had　been

guilty　of　any　act　of　injustice；　the　sovereign　himself　might　not

always　be　unwilling　to　punish　him；　or　to　oblige　him　to　repair　the

wrong。　But　if　it　was　for　the　benefit　of　his　sovereign；　if　it　was

in　order　to　make　court　to　the　person　who　appointed　him　and　who

might　prefer　him；　that　he　had　committed　any　act　of　oppression；

redress　would　upon　most　occasions　be　as　impossible　as　if　the

sovereign　had　committed　it　himself。　In　all　barbarous　governments；

accordingly；　in　all　those　ancient　governments　of　Europe　in

particular　which　were　founded　upon　the　ruins　of　the　Roman　empire；

the　administration　of　justice　appears　for　a　long　time　to　have

been　extremely　corrupt；　far　from　being　quite　equal　and　impartial

even　under　the　best　monarchs；　and　altogether　profligate　under　the

worst。

　　　　　Among　nations　of　shepherds；　where　the　sovereign　or　chief　is

only　the　greatest　shepherd　or　herdsman　of　the　horde　or　clan；　he

is　maintained　in　the　same　manner　as　any　of　his　vassals　or

subjects；　by　the　increase　of　his　own　herds　or　flocks。　Among　those

nations　of　husbandmen　who　are　but　just　come　out　of　the　shepherd

state；　and　who　are　not　much　advanced　beyond　that　state；　such　as

the　Greek　tribes　appear　to　have　been　about　the　time　of　the　Trojan

war；　and　our　German　and　Scythian　ancestors　when　they　first

settled　upon　the　ruins　of　the　western　empire；　the　sovereign　or

chief　is；　in　the　same　manner；　only　the　greatest　landlord　of　the

country；　and　is　maintained；　in　the　same　manner　as　any　other

landlord；　by　a　revenue　derived　from　his　own　private　estate；　or

from　what；　in　modern　Europe；　was　called　the　demesne　of　the　crown。

His　subjects；　upon　ordinary　occasions；　contributed　nothing　to　his

support；　except　when；　in　order　to　protect　them　from　the

oppression　of　some　of　their　fellow…subjects；　they　stand　in　need

of　his　authority。　The　presents　which　they　make　him　upon　such

occasions　constitute　the　whole　ordinary　revenue；　the　whole　of　the

emoluments　which；　except　perhaps　upon　some　very　extraordinary

emergencies；　he　derives　from　his　dominion　over　them。　When

Agamemnon；　in　Homer；　offers　to　Achilles　for　his　friendship　the

sovereignty　of　seven　Greek　cities；　the　sole　advantage　which　he

mentions　as　likely　to　be　derived　from　it　was　that　the　people

would　honour　him　with　presents。　As　long　as　such　presents；　as　long

as　the　emoluments　of　justice；　or　what　may　be　called　the　fees　of

court；　constituted　in　this　manner　the　whole　ordinary　revenue

which　the　sovereign　derived　from　his　sovereignty；　it　could　not

well　be　expected；　it　could　not　even　decently　be　proposed；　that　he

should　give　them　up　altogether。　It　might；　and　it　frequently　was

proposed；　that　he　should　regulate　and　ascertain　them。　But　after

they　had　been　so　regulated　and　ascertained；　how　to　hinder　a

person　who　was　all…powerful　from　extending　them　beyond　those

regulations　was　still　very　difficult；　not　to　say　impossible。

During　the　continuance　of　this　state　of　things；　therefore；　the

corruption　of　justice；　naturally　resulting　from　the　arbitrary　and

uncertain　nature　of　those　presents；　scarce　admitted　of　any

effectual　remedy。

　　　　　But　when　from　different　causes；　chiefly　from　the　continually

increasing　expenses　of　defending　the　nation　against　the　invasion

of　other　nations；　the　private　estate　of　the　sovereign　had　become

altogether　insufficient　for　defraying　the　expense　of　the

sovereignty；　and　when　it　had　become　necessary　that　the　people

should；　for　their　own　security；　contribute　towards　this　expense

by　taxes　of　different　kinds；　it　seems　to　have　been　very　commonly

stipulated　that　no　present　for　the　administration　of　justice

should；　under　any　pretence；　be　accepted　either　by　the　sovereign；

or　by　his　bailiffs　and　substitutes；　the　judges。　Those　presents；

it　seems　to　have　been　supposed；　could　more　easily　be　abolished

altogether　than　effectually　regulated　and　ascertained。　Fixed

salaries　were　appointed　to　the　judges；　which　were　supposed　to

compensate　to　them　the　loss　of　whatever　might　have　been　their

share　of　the　ancient　emoluments　of　justice；　as　the　taxes　more

than　compensated　to　the　sovereign　the　loss　of　his。　Justice　was

then　said　to　be　administered　gratis。

　　　　　Justice；　however；　never　was　in　reality　administered　gratis

in　any　country。　Lawyers　and　attorneys；　at　least；　must　always　be

paid　by　the　parties；　and；　if　they　were　not；　they　would　perform

their　duty　still　worse　than　they　actually　perform　it。　The　fees

annually　paid　to　lawyers　and　attorneys　amount；　in　every　court；　to

a　much　greater　sum　than　the　salaries　of　the　judges。　The

circumstance　of　those　salaries　being　paid　by　the　crown　can

nowhere　much　diminish　the　necessary　expense　of　a　law…suit。　But　it

was　not　so　much　to　diminish　the　expense；　as　to　prevent　the

corruption　of　justice；　that　the　judges　were　prohibited　from

receiving　any　present　or　fee　from　the　parties。

　　　　　The　office　of　judge　is　in　itself　so　very　honourable　that　men

are　willing　to　accept　of　it；　though　accompanied　with　very　small

emoluments。　The　inferior　office　of　justice　of　peace；　though

attended　with　a　good　deal　of　trouble；　and　in　most　cases　with　no

emoluments　at　all；　is　an　object　of　ambition　to　the　greater　part

of　our　country　gentlemen。　The　salaries　of　all　the　different

judges；　high　and　low；　together　with　the　whole　expense　of　the

administration　and　execution　of　justice；　even　where　it　is　not

managed　with　very　good　economy；　makes；　in　any　civilised　country；

but　a　very　inconsiderable　part　of　the　whole　expense　of

government。

　　　　　The　whole　expense　of　justice；　too；　might　easily　be　defrayed

by　the　fees　of　court；　and；　without　exposing　the　administration　of

justice　to　any　real　hazard　of　corruption；　the　public　revenue

might　thus　be　discharged　from　a　certain；　though；　perhaps；　but　a

small　incumbrance。　It　is　difficult　to　regulate　the　fees　of　court

effectually　where　a　person　so　powerful　as　the　sovereign　is　to

share　in　them；　and　to　derive　any　considerable　part　of　his　revenue

from　them。　It　is　very　easy　where　the　judge　is　the　principal

person　who　can　reap　any　benefit　from　them。　The　law　can　very

easily　oblige　the　judge　to　respect　the　regulation；　though　it

might　not　always　be　able　to　make　the　sovereign　respect　it。　Where

the　fees　of　court　are　precisely　regulated　and　ascertained；　where

they　are　paid　all　at　once；　at　a　certain　period　of　every　process；

into　the　hands　of　a　cashier　or　receiver；　to　be　by　him　distributed

in　certain　known　proportions　among　the　different　judges　after　the

process　is　decided；　and　not　till　it　is　decided；　there　seems　to　be

no　more　danger　of　corruption　than　where　such　fees　are　prohibited

altogether。　Those　fees；　without　occasioning　any　considerable

increase　in　the　expense　of　a　lawsuit；　might　be　rendered　fully

sufficient　for　defraying　the　whole　expense　of　justice。　By　not

being　paid　to　the　judges　till　the　process　was　determined；　they

might　be　some　incitement　to　the　diligence　of　the　court　in

examining　and　deciding　it。　In　courts　which　consisted　of　a

considerable　number　of　judges；　by　proportioning　the　share　of　each

judge　to　the　number　of　hours　and　days　which　he　had　employed　in

examining　the　process；　either　in　the　court　or　in　a　committee　by

order　of　the　court；　those　fees　might　give　some　encouragement　to

the　diligence　of　each　particular　judge。　Public　services　are　never

better　performed　than　when　their　reward　comes　only　in　consequence

of　their　being　performed；　and　is　proportioned　to　the　diligence

employed　in　performing　them。　In　the　different　parliaments　of

France；　the　fees　of　court　（called　epices　and　vacations）

constitute　the　far　greater　part　of　the　emoluments　of　the　judges。

After　all　deductions　are　made；　the　net　salary　paid　by　the　crown

to　a　counsellor　or　judge　in　the　Parliament　of　Toulouse；　in　rank

and　dignity　the　second　parliament　of　the　kingdom；　amounts　only　to

a　hundred　and　fifty　livres；　about　six　pounds　eleven　shillings

sterling　a　year。　About　seven　years　ago　that　sum　was　in　the　same

place　the　ordinary　yearly　wages　of　a　common　footman。　The

distribution　of　those　epices；　too；　is　according　to　the　diligence

of　the　judges。　A　diligent　judge　gains　a　comfortable；　though

moderate；　revenue　by　his　office：　an　idle　one　gets　little　more

than　his　salary。　Those　Parliaments　are　perhaps；　in　many　respects；

not　very　convenient　courts　of　justice；　but　they　have　never　been

accused；　they　seem　never　even　to　have　been　suspected；　of

corruption。

　　　　　The　fees　of　court　seem　originally　to　have　been　the　principal

support　of　the　different　courts　of　justice　in　England。　Each　court

endeavoured　to　draw　to　itself　as　much　business　as　it　could；　and

was；　upon　that　account；　willing　to　take　cognisance　of　many　suits

which　were　not　originally　intended　to　fall　under　its

jurisdiction。　The　Court　of　King's　Bench；　instituted　for　the　trial

of　criminal　causes　only；　took　cognisance　of　civil　suits；　the

plaintiff　pretending　that　the　defendant；　in　not　doing　him

justice；　had　been　guilty　of　some　trespass　or　misdemeanour。　The

Court　of　Exchequer；　instituted　for　the　levying　of　the　king's

revenue；　and　for　enforcing　the　payment　of　such　debts　only　as　were

due　to　the　king；　took　cognisance　of　all　other　contract　debts；　the

plaintiff　alleging　that　he　could　not　pay　the　king　because　the

defendant　would　not　pay　him。　In　consequence　of　such　fictions　it

came；　in　many　cases；　to　depend　altogether　upon　the　parties　b