the critique of pure reason- 第104部分

speculative　reason；　which　are　based　solely　upon　its　speculative

interest；　although　they　appear　to　be　objective　principles。

　　When　principles　which　are　really　regulative　are　regarded　as

constitutive；　and　employed　as　objective　principles；　contradictions

must　arise；　but　if　they　are　considered　as　mere　maxims；　there　is　no

room　for　contradictions　of　any　kind；　as　they　then　merely　indicate

the　different　interests　of　reason；　which　occasion　differences　in　the

mode　of　thought。　In　effect；　Reason　has　only　one　single　interest；　and

the　seeming　contradiction　existing　between　her　maxims　merely　indicates

a　difference　in；　and　a　reciprocal　limitation　of；　the　methods　by

which　this　interest　is　satisfied。

　　This　reasoner　has　at　heart　the　interest　of　diversity…　in

accordance　with　the　principle　of　specification；　another；　the

interest　of　unity…　in　accordance　with　the　principle　of　aggregation。

Each　believes　that　his　judgement　rests　upon　a　thorough　insight　into

the　subject　he　is　examining；　and　yet　it　has　been　influenced　solely

by　a　greater　or　less　degree　of　adherence　to　some　one　of　the　two

principles；　neither　of　which　are　objective；　but　originate　solely

from　the　interest　of　reason；　and　on　this　account　to　be　termed　maxims

rather　than　principles。　When　I　observe　intelligent　men　disputing　about

the　distinctive　characteristics　of　men；　animals；　or　plants；　and　even

of　minerals；　those　on　the　one　side　assuming　the　existence　of　certain

national　characteristics；　certain　well…defined　and　hereditary

distinctions　of　family；　race；　and　so　on；　while　the　other　side　maintain

that　nature　has　endowed　all　races　of　men　with　the　same　faculties　and

dispositions；　and　that　all　differences　are　but　the　result　of

external　and　accidental　circumstances…　I　have　only　to　consider　for　a

moment　the　real　nature　of　the　subject　of　discussion；　to　arrive　at

the　conclusion　that　it　is　a　subject　far　too　deep　for　us　to　judge　of；

and　that　there　is　little　probability　of　either　party　being　able　to

speak　from　a　perfect　insight　into　and　understanding　of　the　nature　of

the　subject　itself。　Both　have；　in　reality；　been　struggling　for　the

twofold　interest　of　reason；　the　one　maintaining　the　one　interest；

the　other　the　other。　But　this　difference　between　the　maxims　of

diversity　and　unity　may　easily　be　reconciled　and　adjusted；　although；

so　long　as　they　are　regarded　as　objective　principles；　they　must

occasion　not　only　contradictions　and　polemic；　but　place　hinderances　in

the　way　of　the　advancement　of　truth；　until　some　means　is　discovered　of

reconciling　these　conflicting　interests；　and　bringing　reason　into

union　and　harmony　with　itself。

　　The　same　is　the　case　with　the　so…called　law　discovered　by

Leibnitz；　and　supported　with　remarkable　ability　by　Bonnet…　the　law

of　the　continuous　gradation　of　created　beings；　which　is　nothing　more

than　an　inference　from　the　principle　of　affinity；　for　observation

and　study　of　the　order　of　nature　could　never　present　it　to　the　mind　as

an　objective　truth。　The　steps　of　this　ladder；　as　they　appear　in

experience；　are　too　far　apart　from　each　other；　and　the　so…called　petty

differences　between　different　kinds　of　animals　are　in　nature

commonly　so　wide　separations　that　no　confidence　can　be　placed　in

such　views　（particularly　when　we　reflect　on　the　great　variety　of

things；　and　the　ease　with　which　we　can　discover　resemblances）；　and

no　faith　in　the　laws　which　are　said　to　express　the　aims　and　purposes

of　nature。　On　the　other　hand；　the　method　of　investigating　the　order　of

nature　in　the　light　of　this　principle；　and　the　maxim　which　requires　us

to　regard　this　order…　it　being　still　undetermined　how　far　it

extends…　as　really　existing　in　nature；　is　beyond　doubt　a　legitimate

and　excellent　principle　of　reason…　a　principle　which　extends　farther

than　any　experience　or　observation　of　ours　and　which；　without　giving

us　any　positive　knowledge　of　anything　in　the　region　of　experience；

guides　us　to　the　goal　of　systematic　unity。



　　Of　the　Ultimate　End　of　the　Natural　Dialectic　of　Human　Reason。



　　The　ideas　of　pure　reason　cannot　be；　of　themselves　and　in　their　own

nature；　dialectical；　it　is　from　their　misemployment　alone　that

fallacies　and　illusions　arise。　For　they　originate　in　the　nature　of

reason　itself；　and　it　is　impossible　that　this　supreme　tribunal　for　all

the　rights　and　claims　of　speculation　should　be　itself　undeserving　of

confidence　and　promotive　of　error。　It　is　to　be　expected；　therefore；

that　these　ideas　have　a　genuine　and　legitimate　aim。　It　is　true；　the

mob　of　sophists　raise　against　reason　the　cry　of　inconsistency　and

contradiction；　and　affect　to　despise　the　government　of　that　faculty；

because　they　cannot　understand　its　constitution；　while　it　is　to　its

beneficial　influences　alone　that　they　owe　the　position　and　the

intelligence　which　enable　them　to　criticize　and　to　blame　its

procedure。

　　We　cannot　employ　an　a　priori　conception　with　certainty；　until　we

have　made　a　transcendental　deduction　therefore。　The　ideas　of　pure

reason　do　not　admit　of　the　same　kind　of　deduction　as　the　categories。

But　if　they　are　to　possess　the　least　objective　validity；　and　to

represent　anything　but　mere　creations　of　thought　（entia　rationis

ratiocinantis）；　a　deduction　of　them　must　be　possible。　This　deduction

will　complete　the　critical　task　imposed　upon　pure　reason；　and　it　is　to

this　part　Of　our　labours　that　we　now　proceed。

　　There　is　a　great　difference　between　a　thing's　being　presented　to　the

mind　as　an　object　in　an　absolute　sense；　or　merely　as　an　ideal

object。　In　the　former　case　I　employ　my　conceptions　to　determine　the

object；　in　the　latter　case　nothing　is　present　to　the　mind　but　a　mere

schema；　which　does　not　relate　directly　to　an　object；　not　even　in　a

hypothetical　sense；　but　which　is　useful　only　for　the　purpose　of

representing　other　objects　to　the　mind；　in　a　mediate　and　indirect

manner；　by　means　of　their　relation　to　the　idea　in　the　intellect。

Thus　I　say　the　conception　of　a　supreme　intelligence　is　a　mere　idea；

that　is　to　say；　its　objective　reality　does　not　consist　in　the　fact

that　it　has　an　immediate　relation　to　an　object　（for　in　this　sense　we

have　no　means　of　establishing　its　objective　validity）；　it　is　merely

a　schema　constructed　according　to　the　necessary　conditions　of　the

unity　of　reason…　the　schema　of　a　thing　in　general；　which　is　useful

towards　the　production　of　the　highest　degree　of　systematic　unity　in

the　empirical　exercise　of　reason；　in　which　we　deduce　this　or　that

object　of　experience　from　the　imaginary　object　of　this　idea；　as　the

ground　or　cause　of　the　said　object　of　experience。　In　this　way；　the

idea　is　properly　a　heuristic；　and　not　an　ostensive；　conception；　it

does　not　give　us　any　information　respecting　the　constitution　of　an

object；　it　merely　indicates　how；　under　the　guidance　of　the　idea；　we

ought　to　investigate　the　constitution　and　the　relations　of　objects

in　the　world　of　experience。　Now；　if　it　can　be　shown　that　the　three

kinds　of　transcendental　ideas　（psychological；　cosmological；　and

theological）；　although　not　relating　directly　to　any　object　nor

determining　it；　do　nevertheless；　on　the　supposition　of　the　existence

of　an　ideal　object；　produce　systematic　unity　in　the　laws　of　the

empirical　employment　of　the　reason；　and　extend　our　empirical

cognition；　without　ever　being　inconsistent　or　in　opposition　with　it…

it　must　be　a　necessary　maxim　of　reason　to　regulate　its　procedure

according　to　these　ideas。　And　this　forms　the　transcendental

deduction　of　all　speculative　ideas；　not　as　constitutive　principles

of　the　extension　of　our　cognition　beyond　the　limits　of　our　experience；

but　as　regulative　principles　of　the　systematic　unity　of　empirical

cognition；　which　is　by　the　aid　of　these　ideas　arranged　and　emended

within　its　own　proper　limits；　to　an　extent　unattainable　by　the

operation　of　the　principles　of　the　understanding　alone。

　　I　shall　make　this　plainer。　Guided　by　the　principles　involved　in

these　ideas；　we　must；　in　the　first　place；　so　connect　all　the

phenomena；　actions；　and　feelings　of　the　mind；　as　if　it　were　a　simple

substance；　which；　endowed　with　personal　identity；　possesses　a

permanent　existence　（in　this　life　at　least）；　while　its　states；　among

which　those　of　the　body　are　to　be　included　as　external　conditions；　are

in　continual　change。　Secondly；　in　cosmology；　we　must　investigate　the

conditions　of　all　natural　phenomena；　internal　as　well　as　external；

as　if　they　belonged　to　a　chain　infinite　and　without　any　prime　or

supreme　member；　while　we　do　not；　on　this　account；　deny　the　existence

of　intelligible　grounds　of　these　phenomena；　although　we　never　employ

them　to　explain　phenomena；　for　the　simple　reason　that　they　are　not

objects　of　our　cognition。　Thirdly；　in　the　sphere　of　theology；　we

must　regard　the　whole　system　of　possible　experience　as　forming　an

absolute；　but　dependent　and　sensuously…conditioned　unity；　and　at　the

same　time　as　based　upon　a　sole；　supreme；　and　all…sufficient　ground

existing　apart　from　the　world　itself…　a　ground　which　is　a

self…subsistent；　primeval　and　creative　reason；　in　relation　to　which　we

so　employ　our　reason　in　the　field　of　experience；　as　if　all　objects

drew　their　origin　from　that　archetype　of　all　reason。　In　other　words；

we　ought　not　to　deduce　the　internal　phenomena　of　the　mind　from　a

simple　thinking　substance；　but　deduce　them　from　each　other　under　the

guidance　of　the　regulative　idea　of　a　simple　being；　we　ought　not　to

deduce　the　phenomena；　order；　and　unity　of　the　universe　from　a

supreme　intelligence；　but　merely　draw　from　this　idea　of　a　supremely

wise　cause　the　rules　which　must　guide　reason　in　its　connection　of

causes　and　effects。

　　Now　there　is　nothing　to　hinder　us　from　admitting　these　ideas　to

possess　an　objective　and　hyperbolic　existence；　except　the　cosmological

ideas；　which　lead　reason　into　an　antinomy：　the　psychological　and

theological　ideas　are　not　antinomial。　They　contain　no　contradiction；

and　how；　then；　can　any　one　dispute　their　objective　reality；　since　he

who　denies　it　knows　as　little　about