the critique of pure reason- 第124部分

according　to　reason　in　its　practical　use；　so　it　is　equally　necessary

according　to　reason　in　its　theoretical　use　to　assume　that　every　one

has　ground　to　hope　for　happiness　in　the　measure　in　which　he　has　made

himself　worthy　of　it　in　his　conduct；　and　that　therefore　the　system

of　morality　is　inseparably　（though　only　in　the　idea　of　pure　reason）

connected　with　that　of　happiness。

　　Now　in　an　intelligible；　that　is；　in　the　moral　world；　in　the

conception　of　which　we　make　abstraction　of　all　the　impediments　to

morality　（sensuous　desires）；　such　a　system　of　happiness；　connected

with　and　proportioned　to　morality；　may　be　conceived　as　necessary；

because　freedom　of　volition…　partly　incited；　and　partly　restrained

by　moral　laws…　would　be　itself　the　cause　of　general　happiness；　and

thus　rational　beings；　under　the　guidance　of　such　principles；　would

be　themselves　the　authors　both　of　their　own　enduring　welfare　and

that　of　others。　But　such　a　system　of　self…rewarding　morality　is　only

an　idea；　the　carrying　out　of　which　depends　upon　the　condition　that

every　one　acts　as　he　ought；　in　other　words；　that　all　actions　of

reasonable　beings　be　such　as　they　would　be　if　they　sprung　from　a

Supreme　Will；　comprehending　in；　or　under；　itself　all　particular　wills。

But　since　the　moral　law　is　binding　on　each　individual　in　the　use　of

his　freedom　of　volition；　even　if　others　should　not　act　in　conformity

with　this　law；　neither　the　nature　of　things；　nor　the　causality　of

actions　and　their　relation　to　morality；　determine　how　the　consequences

of　these　actions　will　be　related　to　happiness；　and　the　necessary

connection　of　the　hope　of　happiness　with　the　unceasing　endeavour　to

become　worthy　of　happiness；　cannot　be　cognized　by　reason；　if　we　take

nature　alone　for　our　guide。　This　connection　can　be　hoped　for　only　on

the　assumption　that　the　cause　of　nature　is　a　supreme　reason；　which

governs　according　to　moral　laws。

　　I　term　the　idea　of　an　intelligence　in　which　the　morally　most　perfect

will；　united　with　supreme　blessedness；　is　the　cause　of　all　happiness

in　the　world；　so　far　as　happiness　stands　in　strict　｝　relation　to

morality　（as　the　worthiness　of　being　happy）；　the　ideal　of　the

supreme　Good。　supreme　original　good；　that　pure　reason　can　find　the

ground　of　the　practically　necessary　connection　of　both　elements　of　the

highest　derivative　good；　and　accordingly　of　an　intelligible；　that

is；　moral　world。　Now　since　we　are　necessitated　by　reason　to　conceive

ourselves　as　belonging　to　such　a　world；　while　the　senses　present　to　us

nothing　but　a　world　of　phenomena；　we　must　assume　the　former　as　a

consequence　of　our　conduct　in　the　world　of　sense　（since　the　world　of

sense　gives　us　no　hint　of　it）；　and　therefore　as　future　in　relation

to　us。　Thus　God　and　a　future　life　are　two　hypotheses　which；

according　to　the　principles　of　pure　reason；　are　inseparable　from　the

obligation　which　this　reason　imposes　upon　us。

　　Morality　per　se　constitutes　a　system。　But　we　can　form　no　system　of

happiness；　except　in　so　far　as　it　is　dispensed　in　strict　proportion　to

morality。　But　this　is　only　possible　in　the　intelligible　world；　under　a

wise　author　and　ruler。　Such　a　ruler；　together　with　life　in　such　a

world；　which　we　must　look　upon　as　future；　reason　finds　itself

compelled　to　assume；　or　it　must　regard　the　moral　laws　as　idle

dreams；　since　the　necessary　consequence　which　this　same　reason

connects　with　them　must；　without　this　hypothesis；　fall　to　the

ground。　Hence　also　the　moral　laws　are　universally　regarded　as

commands；　which　they　could　not　be　did　they　not　connect　a　priori

adequate　consequences　with　their　dictates；　and　thus　carry　with　them

promises　and　threats。　But　this；　again；　they　could　not　do；　did　they　not

reside　in　a　necessary　being；　as　the　Supreme　Good；　which　alone　can

render　such　a　teleological　unity　possible。

　　Leibnitz　termed　the　world；　when　viewed　in　relation　to　the　rational

beings　which　it　contains；　and　the　moral　relations　in　which　they

stand　to　each　other；　under　the　government　of　the　Supreme　Good；　the

kingdom　of　Grace；　and　distinguished　it　from　the　kingdom　of　Nature；

in　which　these　rational　beings　live；　under　moral　laws；　indeed；　but

expect　no　other　consequences　from　their　actions　than　such　as　follow

according　to　the　course　of　nature　in　the　world　of　sense。　To　view

ourselves；　therefore；　as　in　the　kingdom　of　grace；　in　which　all

happiness　awaits　us；　except　in　so　far　as　we　ourselves　limit　our

participation　in　it　by　actions　which　render　us　unworthy　of

happiness；　is　a　practically　necessary　idea　of　reason。

　　Practical　laws；　in　so　far　as　they　are　subjective　grounds　of　actions；

that　is；　subjective　principles；　are　termed　maxims。　The　judgements　of

moral　according　to　in　its　purity　and　ultimate　results　are　framed

according　ideas；　the　observance　of　its　laws；　according　to　according　to

maxims。

　　The　whole　course　of　our　life　must　be　subject　to　moral　maxims；　but

this　is　impossible；　unless　with　the　moral　law；　which　is　a　mere　idea；

reason　connects　an　efficient　cause　which　ordains　to　all　conduct

which　is　in　conformity　with　the　moral　law　an　issue　either　in　this　or

in　another　life；　which　is　in　exact　conformity　with　our　highest　aims。

Thus；　without　a　God　and　without　a　world；　invisible　to　us　now；　but

hoped　for；　the　glorious　ideas　of　morality　are；　indeed；　objects　of

approbation　and　of　admiration；　but　cannot　be　the　springs　of　purpose

and　action。　For　they　do　not　satisfy　all　the　aims　which　are　natural

to　every　rational　being；　and　which　are　determined　a　priori　by　pure

reason　itself；　and　necessary。

　　Happiness　alone　is；　in　the　view　of　reason；　far　from　being　the

complete　good。　Reason　does　not　approve　of　it　（however　much　inclination

may　desire　it）；　except　as　united　with　desert。　On　the　other　hand；

morality　alone；　and　with　it；　mere　desert；　is　likewise　far　from　being

the　complete　good。　To　make　it　complete；　he　who　conducts　himself　in　a

manner　not　unworthy　of　happiness；　must　be　able　to　hope　for　the

possession　of　happiness。　Even　reason；　unbiased　by　private　ends；　or

interested　considerations；　cannot　judge　otherwise；　if　it　puts　itself

in　the　place　of　a　being　whose　business　it　is　to　dispense　all　happiness

to　others。　For　in　the　practical　idea　both　points　are　essentially

combined；　though　in　such　a　way　that　participation　in　happiness　is

rendered　possible　by　the　moral　disposition；　as　its　condition；　and

not　conversely；　the　moral　disposition　by　the　prospect　of　happiness。

For　a　disposition　which　should　require　the　prospect　of　happiness　as

its　necessary　condition　would　not　be　moral；　and　hence　also　would　not

be　worthy　of　complete　happiness…　a　happiness　which；　in　the　view　of

reason；　recognizes　no　limitation　but　such　as　arises　from　our　own

immoral　conduct。

　　Happiness；　therefore；　in　exact　proportion　with　the　morality　of

rational　beings　（whereby　they　are　made　worthy　of　happiness）；

constitutes　alone　the　supreme　good　of　a　world　into　which　we　absolutely

must　transport　ourselves　according　to　the　commands　of　pure　but

practical　reason。　This　world　is；　it　is　true；　only　an　intelligible

world；　for　of　such　a　systematic　unity　of　ends　as　it　requires；　the

world　of　sense　gives　us　no　hint。　Its　reality　can　be　based　on　nothing

else　but　the　hypothesis　of　a　supreme　original　good。　In　it

independent　reason；　equipped　with　all　the　sufficiency　of　a　supreme

cause；　founds；　maintains；　and　fulfils　the　universal　order　of　things；

with　the　most　perfect　teleological　harmony；　however　much　this　order

may　be　hidden　from　us　in　the　world　of　sense。

　　This　moral　theology　has　the　peculiar　advantage；　in　contrast　with

speculative　theology；　of　leading　inevitably　to　the　conception　of　a

sole；　perfect；　and　rational　First　Cause；　whereof　speculative

theology　does　not　give　us　any　indication　on　objective　grounds；　far

less　any　convincing　evidence。　For　we　find　neither　in　transcendental

nor　in　natural　theology；　however　far　reason　may　lead　us　in　these；

any　ground　to　warrant　us　in　assuming　the　existence　of　one　only

Being；　which　stands　at　the　head　of　all　natural　causes；　and　on　which

these　are　entirely　dependent。　On　the　other　band；　if　we　take　our

stand　on　moral　unity　as　a　necessary　law　of　the　universe；　and　from　this

point　of　view　consider　what　is　necessary　to　give　this　law　adequate

efficiency　and；　for　us；　obligatory　force；　we　must　come　to　the

conclusion　that　there　is　one　only　supreme　will；　which　comprehends

all　these　laws　in　itself。　For　how；　under　different　wills；　should　we

find　complete　unity　of　ends？　This　will　must　be　omnipotent；　that　all

nature　and　its　relation　to　morality　in　the　world　may　be　subject　to　it；

omniscient；　that　it　may　have　knowledge　of　the　most　secret　feelings　and

their　moral　worth；　omnipresent；　that　it　may　be　at　hand　to　supply　every

necessity　to　which　the　highest　weal　of　the　world　may　give　rise；

eternal；　that　this　harmony　of　nature　and　liberty　may　never　fail；　and

so　on。

　　But　this　systematic　unity　of　ends　in　this　world　of　intelligences…

which；　as　mere　nature；　is　only　a　world　of　sense；　but；　as　a　system　of

freedom　of　volition；　may　be　termed　an　intelligible；　that　is；　moral

world　（regnum　gratiae）…　leads　inevitably　also　to　the　teleological

unity　of　all　things　which　constitute　this　great　whole；　according　to

universal　natural　laws…　just　as　the　unity　of　the　former　is　according

to　universal　and　necessary　moral　laws…　and　unites　the　practical　with

the　speculative　reason。　The　world　must　be　represented　as　having

originated　from　an　idea；　if　it　is　to　harmonize　with　that　use　of　reason

without　which　we　cannot　even　consider　ourselves　as　worthy　of　reason…

namely；　the　moral　use；　which　rests　entirely　on　the　idea　of　the　supreme

good。　Hence　the　investigation　of　nature　receives　a　teleological

direction；　and　becomes；　in　its　widest　extension；　physico…theology。　But

this；　taking　its　rise　in　moral　order　as　a　unity　founded　on　the　essence

of　freedom；　and　not　accidentally　instituted　by　external　commands；

establishes　the　teleological　view　of　nature　on　grounds　which　must　be

inseparably　connected　with　the　internal　possibility　o