the critique of pure reason- 第127部分

reason　become　docile；　more　enlightened；　and　more　capable　of　uniting

the　speculative　interest　with　the　practical。　But　if　you　do　not　take

care　at　the　outset；　or　at　least　midway；　to　make　men　good；　you　will

never　force　them　into　an　honest　belief。



　　But；　it　will　be　said；　is　this　all　that　pure　reason　can　effect；　in

opening　up　prospects　beyond　the　limits　of　experience？　Nothing　more

than　two　articles　of　belief？　Common　sense　could　have　done　as　much　as

this；　without　taking　the　philosophers　to　counsel　in　the　matter！

　　I　shall　not　here　eulogize　philosophy　for　the　benefits　which　the

laborious　efforts　of　its　criticism　have　conferred　on　human　reason…

even　granting　that　its　merit　should　turn　out　in　the　end　to　be　only

negative…　for　on　this　point　something　more　will　be　said　in　the　next

section。　But；　I　ask；　do　you　require　that　that　knowledge　which　concerns

all　men；　should　transcend　the　common　understanding；　and　should　only　be

revealed　to　you　by　philosophers？　The　very　circumstance　which　has

called　forth　your　censure；　is　the　best　confirmation　of　the　correctness

of　our　previous　assertions；　since　it　discloses；　what　could　not　have

been　foreseen；　that　Nature　is　not　chargeable　with　any　partial

distribution　of　her　gifts　in　those　matters　which　concern　all　men

without　distinction　and　that；　in　respect　to　the　essential　ends　of

human　nature；　we　cannot　advance　further　with　the　help　of　the　highest

philosophy；　than　under　the　guidance　which　nature　has　vouchsafed　to　the

meanest　understanding。

　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　III。　The　Architectonic　of　Pure　Reason。



　　By　the　term　architectonic　I　mean　the　art　of　constructing　a　system。

Without　systematic　unity；　our　knowledge　cannot　become　science；　it　will

be　an　aggregate；　and　not　a　system。　Thus　architectonic　is　the

doctrine　of　the　scientific　in　cognition；　and　therefore　necessarily

forms　part　of　our　methodology。

　　Reason　cannot　permit　our　knowledge　to　remain　in　an　unconnected　and

rhapsodistic　state；　but　requires　that　the　sum　of　our　cognitions　should

constitute　a　system。　It　is　thus　alone　that　they　can　advance　the　ends

of　reason。　By　a　system　I　mean　the　unity　of　various　cognitions　under

one　idea。　This　idea　is　the　conception…　given　by　reason…　of　the　form　of

a　whole；　in　so　far　as　the　conception　determines　a　priori　not　only

the　limits　of　its　content；　but　the　place　which　each　of　its　parts　is　to

occupy。　The　scientific　idea　contains；　therefore；　the　end　and　the

form　of　the　whole　which　is　in　accordance　with　that　end。　The　unity　of

the　end；　to　which　all　the　parts　of　the　system　relate；　and　through

which　all　have　a　relation　to　each　other；　communicates　unity　to　the

whole　system；　so　that　the　absence　of　any　part　can　be　immediately

detected　from　our　knowledge　of　the　rest；　and　it　determines　a　priori

the　limits　of　the　system；　thus　excluding　all　contingent　or　arbitrary

additions。　The　whole　is　thus　an　organism　（articulatio）；　and　not　an

aggregate　（coacervatio）；　it　may　grow　from　within　（per

intussusceptionem）；　but　it　cannot　increase　by　external　additions

（per　appositionem）。　It　is；　thus；　like　an　animal　body；　the　growth　of

which　does　not　add　any　limb；　but；　without　changing　their

proportions；　makes　each　in　its　sphere　stronger　and　more　active。

　　We　require；　for　the　execution　of　the　idea　of　a　system；　a　schema；

that　is；　a　content　and　an　arrangement　of　parts　determined　a　priori

by　the　principle　which　the　aim　of　the　system　prescribes。　A　schema

which　is　not　projected　in　accordance　with　an　idea；　that　is；　from　the

standpoint　of　the　highest　aim　of　reason；　but　merely　empirically；　in

accordance　with　accidental　aims　and　purposes　（the　number　of　which

cannot　be　predetermined）；　can　give　us　nothing　more　than　technical

unity。　But　the　schema　which　is　originated　from　an　idea　（in　which

case　reason　presents　us　with　aims　a　priori；　and　does　not　look　for　them

to　experience）；　forms　the　basis　of　architectonical　unity。　A　science；

in　the　proper　acceptation　of　that　term。　cannot　be　formed

technically；　that　is；　from　observation　of　the　similarity　existing

between　different　objects；　and　the　purely　contingent　use　we　make　of

our　knowledge　in　concreto　with　reference　to　all　kinds　of　arbitrary

external　aims；　its　constitution　must　be　framed　on　architectonical

principles；　that　is；　its　parts　must　be　shown　to　possess　an　essential

affinity；　and　be　capable　of　being　deduced　from　one　supreme　and

internal　aim　or　end；　which　forms　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of

the　scientific　whole。　The　schema　of　a　science　must　give　a　priori　the

plan　of　it　（monogramma）；　and　the　division　of　the　whole　into　parts；

in　conformity　with　the　idea　of　the　science；　and　it　must　also

distinguish　this　whole　from　all　others；　according　to　certain

understood　principles。

　　No　one　will　attempt　to　construct　a　science；　unless　he　have　some　idea

to　rest　on　as　a　proper　basis。　But；　in　the　elaboration　of　the

science；　he　finds　that　the　schema；　nay；　even　the　definition　which　he

at　first　gave　of　the　science；　rarely　corresponds　with　his　idea；　for

this　idea　lies；　like　a　germ；　in　our　reason；　its　parts　undeveloped

and　hid　even　from　microscopical　observation。　For　this　reason；　we　ought

to　explain　and　define　sciences；　not　according　to　the　description　which

the　originator　gives　of　them；　but　according　to　the　idea　which　we

find　based　in　reason　itself；　and　which　is　suggested　by　the　natural

unity　of　the　parts　of　the　science　already　accumulated。　For　it　will

of　ten　be　found　that　the　originator　of　a　science　and　even　his　latest

successors　remain　attached　to　an　erroneous　idea；　which　they　cannot

render　clear　to　themselves；　and　that　they　thus　fail　in　determining　the

true　content；　the　articulation　or　systematic　unity；　and　the　limits

of　their　science。

　　It　is　unfortunate　that；　only　after　having　occupied　ourselves　for　a

long　time　in　the　collection　of　materials；　under　the　guidance　of　an

idea　which　lies　undeveloped　in　the　mind；　but　not　according　to　any

definite　plan　of　arrangement…　nay；　only　after　we　have　spent　much

time　and　labour　in　the　technical　disposition　of　our　materials；　does　it

become　possible　to　view　the　idea　of　a　science　in　a　clear　light；　and　to

project；　according　to　architectonical　principles；　a　plan　of　the　whole；

in　accordance　with　the　aims　of　reason。　Systems　seem；　like　certain

worms；　to　be　formed　by　a　kind　of　generatio　aequivoca…　by　the　mere

confluence　of　conceptions；　and　to　gain　completeness　only　with　the

progress　of　time。　But　the　schema　or　germ　of　all　lies　in　reason；　and

thus　is　not　only　every　system　organized　according　to　its　own　idea；　but

all　are　united　into　one　grand　system　of　human　knowledge；　of　which　they

form　members。　For　this　reason；　it　is　possible　to　frame　an

architectonic　of　all　human　cognition；　the　formation　of　which；　at　the

present　time；　considering　the　immense　materials　collected　or　to　be

found　in　the　ruins　of　old　systems；　would　not　indeed　be　very　difficult。

Our　purpose　at　present　is　merely　to　sketch　the　plan　of　the

architectonic　of　all　cognition　given　by　pure　reason；　and　we　begin　from

the　point　where　the　main　root　of　human　knowledge　divides　into　two；　one

of　which　is　reason。　By　reason　I　understand　here　the　whole　higher

faculty　of　cognition；　the　rational　being　placed　in　contradistinction

to　the　empirical。

　　If　I　make　complete　abstraction　of　the　content　of　cognition；

objectively　considered；　all　cognition　is；　from　a　subjective　point　of

view；　either　historical　or　rational。　Historical　cognition　is

cognitio　ex　datis；　rational；　cognitio　ex　principiis。　Whatever　may　be

the　original　source　of　a　cognition；　it　is；　in　relation　to　the　person

who　possesses　it；　merely　historical；　if　he　knows　only　what　has　been

given　him　from　another　quarter；　whether　that　knowledge　was

communicated　by　direct　experience　or　by　instruction。　Thus　the　Person

who　has　learned　a　system　of　philosophy…　say　the　Wolfian…　although　he

has　a　perfect　knowledge　of　all　the　principles；　definitions；　and

arguments　in　that　philosophy；　as　well　as　of　the　divisions　that　have

been　made　of　the　system；　possesses　really　no　more　than　an　historical

knowledge　of　the　Wolfian　system；　he　knows　only　what　has　been　told　him；

his　judgements　are　only　those　which　he　has　received　from　his　teachers。

Dispute　the　validity　of　a　definition；　and　he　is　completely　at　a　loss

to　find　another。　He　has　formed　his　mind　on　another's；　but　the

imitative　faculty　is　not　the　productive。　His　knowledge　has　not　been

drawn　from　reason；　and　although；　objectively　considered；　it　is

rational　knowledge；　subjectively；　it　is　merely　historical。　He　has

learned　this　or　that　philosophy　and　is　merely　a　plaster　cast　of　a

living　man。　Rational　cognitions　which　are　objective；　that　is；　which

have　their　source　in　reason；　can　be　so　termed　from　a　subjective

point　of　view；　only　when　they　have　been　drawn　by　the　individual

himself　from　the　sources　of　reason；　that　is；　from　principles；　and　it

is　in　this　way　alone　that　criticism；　or　even　the　rejection　of　what　has

been　already　learned；　can　spring　up　in　the　mind。

　　All　rational　cognition　is；　again；　based　either　on　conceptions；　or　on

the　construction　of　conceptions。　The　former　is　termed　philosophical；

the　latter　mathematical。　I　have　already　shown　the　essential　difference

of　these　two　methods　of　cognition　in　the　first　chapter。　A　cognition

may　be　objectively　philosophical　and　subjectively　historical…　as　is

the　case　with　the　majority　of　scholars　and　those　who　cannot　look

beyond　the　limits　of　their　system；　and　who　remain　in　a　state　of

pupilage　all　their　lives。　But　it　is　remarkable　that　mathematical

knowledge；　when　committed　to　memory；　is　valid；　from　the　subjective

point　of　view；　as　rational　knowledge　also；　and　that　the　same

distinction　cannot　be　drawn　here　as　in　the　case　of　philosophical

cognition。　The　reason　is　that　the　only　way　of　arriving　at　this

knowledge　is　through　the　essential　principles　of　reason；　and　thus　it

is　always　certain　and　indisputable；　because　reason　is　employed　in

concreto…　but　at　the　same　time　a　priori…　that　is；　in　pure　and；

therefore；　infallible　intuition；　and　thus　all