the critique of pure reason- 第15部分

object　as　a　thing　in　itself；　but　in　the　subject　to　which　it　appears…

which　form　of　intuition　nevertheless　belongs　really　and　necessarily　to

the　phenomenal　object。

　　Time　and　space　are；　therefore；　two　sources　of　knowledge；　from　which；

a　priori；　various　synthetical　cognitions　can　be　drawn。　Of　this　we　find

a　striking　example　in　the　cognitions　of　space　and　its　relations；　which

form　the　foundation　of　pure　mathematics。　They　are　the　two　pure　forms

of　all　intuitions；　and　thereby　make　synthetical　propositions　a

priori　possible。　But　these　sources　of　knowledge　being　merely

conditions　of　our　sensibility；　do　therefore；　and　as　such；　strictly

determine　their　own　range　and　purpose；　in　that　they　do　not　and

cannot　present　objects　as　things　in　themselves；　but　are　applicable

to　them　solely　in　so　far　as　they　are　considered　as　sensuous　phenomena。

The　sphere　of　phenomena　is　the　only　sphere　of　their　validity；　and　if

we　venture　out　of　this；　no　further　objective　use　can　be　made　of

them。　For　the　rest；　this　formal　reality　of　time　and　space　leaves　the

validity　of　our　empirical　knowledge　unshaken；　for　our　certainty　in

that　respect　is　equally　firm；　whether　these　forms　necessarily　inhere

in　the　things　themselves；　or　only　in　our　intuitions　of　them。　On　the

other　hand；　those　who　maintain　the　absolute　reality　of　time　and　space；

whether　as　essentially　subsisting；　or　only　inhering；　as　modifications；

in　things；　must　find　themselves　at　utter　variance　with　the

principles　of　experience　itself。　For；　if　they　decide　for　the　first

view；　and　make　space　and　time　into　substances；　this　being　the　side

taken　by　mathematical　natural　philosophers；　they　must　admit　two

self…subsisting　nonentities；　infinite　and　eternal；　which　exist　（yet

without　there　being　anything　real）　for　the　purpose　of　containing　in

themselves　everything　that　is　real。　If　they　adopt　the　second　view　of

inherence；　which　is　preferred　by　some　metaphysical　natural

philosophers；　and　regard　space　and　time　as　relations　（contiguity　in

space　or　succession　in　time）；　abstracted　from　experience；　though

represented　confusedly　in　this　state　of　separation；　they　find

themselves　in　that　case　necessitated　to　deny　the　validity　of

mathematical　doctrines　a　priori　in　reference　to　real　things　（for

example；　in　space）…　at　all　events　their　apodeictic　certainty。　For　such

certainty　cannot　be　found　in　an　a　posteriori　proposition；　and　the

conceptions　a　priori　of　space　and　time　are；　according　to　this　opinion；

mere　creations　of　the　imagination；　having　their　source　really　in

experience；　inasmuch　as；　out　of　relations　abstracted　from

experience；　imagination　has　made　up　something　which　contains；

indeed；　general　statements　of　these　relations；　yet　of　which　no

application　can　be　made　without　the　restrictions　attached　thereto　by

nature。　The　former　of　these　parties　gains　this　advantage；　that　they

keep　the　sphere　of　phenomena　free　for　mathematical　science。　On　the

other　hand；　these　very　conditions　（space　and　time）　embarrass　them

greatly；　when　the　understanding　endeavours　to　pass　the　limits　of

that　sphere。　The　latter　has；　indeed；　this　advantage；　that　the

representations　of　space　and　time　do　not　come　in　their　way　when　they

wish　to　judge　of　objects；　not　as　phenomena；　but　merely　in　their

relation　to　the　understanding。　Devoid；　however；　of　a　true　and

objectively　valid　a　priori　intuition；　they　can　neither　furnish　any

basis　for　the　possibility　of　mathematical　cognitions　a　priori；　nor

bring　the　propositions　of　experience　into　necessary　accordance　with

those　of　mathematics。　In　our　theory　of　the　true　nature　of　these　two

original　forms　of　the　sensibility；　both　difficulties　are　surmounted。

　　In　conclusion；　that　transcendental　aesthetic　cannot　contain　any　more

than　these　two　elements…　space　and　time；　is　sufficiently　obvious

from　the　fact　that　all　other　conceptions　appertaining　to

sensibility；　even　that　of　motion；　which　unites　in　itself　both

elements；　presuppose　something　empirical。　Motion；　for　example；

presupposes　the　perception　of　something　movable。　But　space

considered　in　itself　contains　nothing　movable；　consequently　motion

must　be　something　which　is　found　in　space　only　through　experience…

in　other　words；　an　empirical　datum。　In　like　manner；　transcendental

aesthetic　cannot　number　the　conception　of　change　among　its　data　a

priori；　for　time　itself　does　not　change；　but　only　something　which　is

in　time。　To　acquire　the　conception　of　change；　therefore；　the

perception　of　some　existing　object　and　of　the　succession　of　its

determinations；　in　one　word；　experience；　is　necessary。



　　　　　　SS　9　General　Remarks　on　Transcendental　Aesthetic。



　　I。　In　order　to　prevent　any　misunderstanding；　it　will　be　requisite；

in　the　first　place；　to　recapitulate；　as　clearly　as　possible；　what

our　opinion　is　with　respect　to　the　fundamental　nature　of　our

sensuous　cognition　in　general。　We　have　intended；　then；　to　say　that　all

our　intuition　is　nothing　but　the　representation　of　phenomena；　that　the

things　which　we　intuite；　are　not　in　themselves　the　same　as　our

representations　of　them　in　intuition；　nor　are　their　relations　in

themselves　so　constituted　as　they　appear　to　us；　and　that　if　we　take

away　the　subject；　or　even　only　the　subjective　constitution　of　our

senses　in　general；　then　not　only　the　nature　and　relations　of　objects

in　space　and　time；　but　even　space　and　time　themselves　disappear；　and

that　these；　as　phenomena；　cannot　exist　in　themselves；　but　only　in

us。　What　may　be　the　nature　of　objects　considered　as　things　in

themselves　and　without　reference　to　the　receptivity　of　our　sensibility

is　quite　unknown　to　us。　We　know　nothing　more　than　our　mode　of

perceiving　them；　which　is　peculiar　to　us；　and　which；　though　not　of

necessity　pertaining　to　every　animated　being；　is　so　to　the　whole　human

race。　With　this　alone　we　have　to　do。　Space　and　time　are　the　pure　forms

thereof；　sensation　the　matter。　The　former　alone　can　we　cognize　a

priori；　that　is；　antecedent　to　all　actual　perception；　and　for　this

reason　such　cognition　is　called　pure　intuition。　The　latter　is　that

in　our　cognition　which　is　called　cognition　a　posteriori；　that　is；

empirical　intuition。　The　former　appertain　absolutely　and　necessarily

to　our　sensibility；　of　whatsoever　kind　our　sensations　may　be；　the

latter　may　be　of　very　diversified　character。　Supposing　that　we

should　carry　our　empirical　intuition　even　to　the　very　highest　degree

of　clearness；　we　should　not　thereby　advance　one　step　nearer　to　a

knowledge　of　the　constitution　of　objects　as　things　in　themselves。

For　we　could　only；　at　best；　arrive　at　a　complete　cognition　of　our

own　mode　of　intuition；　that　is　of　our　sensibility；　and　this　always

under　the　conditions　originally　attaching　to　the　subject；　namely；

the　conditions　of　space　and　time；　while　the　question：　〃What　are

objects　considered　as　things　in　themselves？〃　remains　unanswerable　even

after　the　most　thorough　examination　of　the　phenomenal　world。

　　To　say；　then；　that　all　our　sensibility　is　nothing　but　the　confused

representation　of　things　containing　exclusively　that　which　belongs

to　them　as　things　in　themselves；　and　this　under　an　accumulation　of

characteristic　marks　and　partial　representations　which　we　cannot

distinguish　in　consciousness；　is　a　falsification　of　the　conception

of　sensibility　and　phenomenization；　which　renders　our　whole　doctrine

thereof　empty　and　useless。　The　difference　between　a　confused　and　a

clear　representation　is　merely　logical　and　has　nothing　to　do　with

content。　No　doubt　the　conception　of　right；　as　employed　by　a　sound

understanding；　contains　all　that　the　most　subtle　investigation　could

unfold　from　it；　although；　in　the　ordinary　practical　use　of　the　word；

we　are　not　conscious　of　the　manifold　representations　comprised　in

the　conception。　But　we　cannot　for　this　reason　assert　that　the　ordinary

conception　is　a　sensuous　one；　containing　a　mere　phenomenon；　for

right　cannot　appear　as　a　phenomenon；　but　the　conception　of　it　lies

in　the　understanding；　and　represents　a　property　（the　moral　property）

of　actions；　which　belongs　to　them　in　themselves。　On　the　other　hand；

the　representation　in　intuition　of　a　body　contains　nothing　which　could

belong　to　an　object　considered　as　a　thing　in　itself；　but　merely　the

phenomenon　or　appearance　of　something；　and　the　mode　in　which　we　are

affected　by　that　appearance；　and　this　receptivity　of　our　faculty　of

cognition　is　called　sensibility；　and　remains　toto　caelo　different　from

the　cognition　of　an　object　in　itself；　even　though　we　should　examine

the　content　of　the　phenomenon　to　the　very　bottom。

　　It　must　be　admitted　that　the　Leibnitz…Wolfian　philosophy　has

assigned　an　entirely　erroneous　point　of　view　to　all　investigations

into　the　nature　and　origin　of　our　cognitions；　inasmuch　as　it　regards

the　distinction　between　the　sensuous　and　the　intellectual　as　merely

logical；　whereas　it　is　plainly　transcendental；　and　concerns　not　merely

the　clearness　or　obscurity；　but　the　content　and　origin　of　both。　For

the　faculty　of　sensibility　not　only　does　not　present　us　with　an

indistinct　and　confused　cognition　of　objects　as　things　in

themselves；　but；　in　fact；　gives　us　no　knowledge　of　these　at　all。　On

the　contrary；　so　soon　as　we　abstract　in　thought　our　own　subjective

nature；　the　object　represented；　with　the　properties　ascribed　to　it

by　sensuous　intuition；　entirely　disappears；　because　it　was　only　this

subjective　nature　that　determined　the　form　of　the　object　as　a

phenomenon。

　　In　phenomena；　we　commonly；　indeed；　distinguish　that　which

essentially　belongs　to　the　intuition　of　them；　and　is　valid　for　the

sensuous　faculty　of　every　human　being；　from　that　which　belongs　to

the　same　intuition　accidentally；　as　valid　not　for　the　sensuous　faculty

in　general；　but　for　a　particular　state　or　organization　of　this　or　that

sense。　Accordingly；　we　are　accustomed　to　say　that　the　former　is　a

cognition　which　represents　the　object　itself；　whilst　the　latter

presents　only　a　particular　appearance　or　phenomenon　thereof。　This

distinction；　however；　is　only　empiric