the critique of pure reason- 第41部分

that　it　follows；　because　the　mere　succession　in　my　apprehension；　if　it

be　not　determined　by　a　rule　in　relation　to　something　preceding；　does

not　authorize　succession　in　the　object。　Only；　therefore；　in

reference　to　a　rule；　according　to　which　phenomena　are　determined　in

their　sequence；　that　is；　as　they　happen；　by　the　preceding　state；　can　I

make　my　subjective　synthesis　（of　apprehension）　objective；　and　it　is

only　under　this　presupposition　that　even　the　experience　of　an　event　is

possible。

　　No　doubt　it　appears　as　if　this　were　in　thorough　contradiction　to　all

the　notions　which　people　have　hitherto　entertained　in　regard　to　the

procedure　of　the　human　understanding。　According　to　these　opinions；

it　is　by　means　of　the　perception　and　comparison　of　similar

consequences　following　upon　certain　antecedent　phenomena　that　the

understanding　is　led　to　the　discovery　of　a　rule；　according　to　which

certain　events　always　follow　certain　phenomena；　and　it　is　only　by　this

process　that　we　attain　to　the　conception　of　cause。　Upon　such　a

basis；　it　is　clear　that　this　conception　must　be　merely　empirical；

and　the　rule　which　it　furnishes　us　with…　〃Everything　that　happens　must

have　a　cause〃…　would　be　just　as　contingent　as　experience　itself。　The

universality　and　necessity　of　the　rule　or　law　would　be　perfectly

spurious　attributes　of　it。　Indeed；　it　could　not　possess　universal

validity；　inasmuch　as　it　would　not　in　this　case　be　a　priori；　but

founded　on　deduction。　But　the　same　is　the　case　with　this　law　as　with

other　pure　a　priori　representations　（e。g。；　space　and　time）；　which　we

can　draw　in　perfect　clearness　and　completeness　from　experience；　only

because　we　had　already　placed　them　therein；　and　by　that　means；　and

by　that　alone；　had　rendered　experience　possible。　Indeed；　the　logical

clearness　of　this　representation　of　a　rule；　determining　the　series

of　events；　is　possible　only　when　we　have　made　use　thereof　in

experience。　Nevertheless；　the　recognition　of　this　rule；　as　a　condition

of　the　synthetical　unity　of　phenomena　in　time；　was　the　ground　of

experience　itself　and　consequently　preceded　it　a　priori。

　　It　is　now　our　duty　to　show　by　an　example　that　we　never；　even　in

experience；　attribute　to　an　object　the　notion　of　succession　or

effect　（of　an　event…　that　is；　the　happening　of　something　that　did

not　exist　before）；　and　distinguish　it　from　the　subjective　succession

of　apprehension；　unless　when　a　rule　lies　at　the　foundation；　which

compels　us　to　observe　this　order　of　perception　in　preference　to　any

other；　and　that；　indeed；　it　is　this　necessity　which　first　renders

possible　the　representation　of　a　succession　in　the　object。

　　We　have　representations　within　us；　of　which　also　we　can　be

conscious。　But；　however　widely　extended；　however　accurate　and

thoroughgoing　this　consciousness　may　be；　these　representations　are

still　nothing　more　than　representations；　that　is；　internal

determinations　of　the　mind　in　this　or　that　relation　of　time。　Now　how

happens　it　that　to　these　representations　we　should　set　an　object；　or

that；　in　addition　to　their　subjective　reality；　as　modifications；　we

should　still　further　attribute　to　them　a　certain　unknown　objective

reality？　It　is　clear　that　objective　significancy　cannot　consist　in　a

relation　to　another　representation　（of　that　which　we　desire　to　term

object）；　for　in　that　case　the　question　again　arises：　〃How　does　this

other　representation　go　out　of　itself；　and　obtain　objective

significancy　over　and　above　the　subjective；　which　is　proper　to　it；

as　a　determination　of　a　state　of　mind？〃　If　we　try　to　discover　what

sort　of　new　property　the　relation　to　an　object　gives　to　our　subjective

representations；　and　what　new　importance　they　thereby　receive；　we

shall　find　that　this　relation　has　no　other　effect　than　that　of

rendering　necessary　the　connection　of　our　representations　in　a　certain

manner；　and　of　subjecting　them　to　a　rule；　and　that　conversely；　it　is

only　because　a　certain　order　is　necessary　in　the　relations　of　time

of　our　representations；　that　objective　significancy　is　ascribed　to

them。

　　In　the　synthesis　of　phenomena；　the　manifold　of　our　representations

is　always　successive。　Now　hereby　is　not　represented　an　object；　for

by　means　of　this　succession；　which　is　common　to　all　apprehension；　no

one　thing　is　distinguished　from　another。　But　so　soon　as　I　perceive

or　assume　that　in　this　succession　there　is　a　relation　to　a　state

antecedent；　from　which　the　representation　follows　in　accordance　with　a

rule；　so　soon　do　I　represent　something　as　an　event；　or　as　a　thing　that

happens；　in　other　words；　I　cognize　an　object　to　which　I　must　assign

a　certain　determinate　position　in　time；　which　cannot　be　altered；

because　of　the　preceding　state　in　the　object。　When；　therefore；　I

perceive　that　something　happens；　there　is　contained　in　this

representation；　in　the　first　place；　the　fact；　that　something

antecedes；　because；　it。　is　only　in　relation　to　this　that　the

phenomenon　obtains　its　proper　relation　of　time；　in　other　words；　exists

after　an　antecedent　time；　in　which　it　did　not　exist。　But　it　can

receive　its　determined　place　in　time　only　by　the　presupposition　that

something　existed　in　the　foregoing　state；　upon　which　it　follows

inevitably　and　always；　that　is；　in　conformity　with　a　rule。　From　all

this　it　is　evident　that；　in　the　first　place；　I　cannot　reverse　the

order　of　succession；　and　make　that　which　happens　precede　that　upon

which　it　follows；　and　that；　in　the　second　place；　if　the　antecedent

state　be　posited；　a　certain　determinate　event　inevitably　and

necessarily　follows。　Hence　it　follows　that　there　exists　a　certain

order　in　our　representations；　whereby　the　present　gives　a　sure

indication　of　some　previously　existing　state；　as　a　correlate；　though

still　undetermined；　of　the　existing　event　which　is　given…　a

correlate　which　itself　relates　to　the　event　as　its　consequence；

conditions　it；　and　connects　it　necessarily　with　itself　in　the　series

of　time。

　　If　then　it　be　admitted　as　a　necessary　law　of　sensibility；　and

consequently　a　formal　condition　of　all　perception；　that　the

preceding　necessarily　determines　the　succeeding　time　（inasmuch　as　I

cannot　arrive　at　the　succeeding　except　through　the　preceding）；　it　must

likewise　be　an　indispensable　law　of　empirical　representation　of　the

series　of　time　that　the　phenomena　of　the　past　determine　all

phenomena　in　the　succeeding　time；　and　that　the　latter；　as　events；

cannot　take　place；　except　in　so　far　as　the　former　determine　their

existence　in　time；　that　is　to　say；　establish　it　according　to　a　rule。

For　it　is　of　course　only　in　phenomena　that　we　can　empirically

cognize　this　continuity　in　the　connection　of　times。

　　For　all　experience　and　for　the　possibility　of　experience；

understanding　is　indispensable；　and　the　first　step　which　it　takes　in

this　sphere　is　not　to　render　the　representation　of　objects　clear；

but　to　render　the　representation　of　an　object　in　general；　possible。　It

does　this　by　applying　the　order　of　time　to　phenomena；　and　their

existence。　In　other　words；　it　assigns　to　each　phenomenon；　as　a

consequence；　a　place　in　relation　to　preceding　phenomena；　determined

a　priori　in　time；　without　which　it　could　not　harmonize　with　time

itself；　which　determines　a　place　a　priori　to　all　its　parts。　This

determination　of　place　cannot　be　derived　from　the　relation　of

phenomena　to　absolute　time　（for　it　is　not　an　object　of　perception）；

but；　on　the　contrary；　phenomena　must　reciprocally　determine　the　places

in　time　of　one　another；　and　render　these　necessary　in　the　order　of

time。　In　other　words；　whatever　follows　or　happens；　must　follow　in

conformity　with　a　universal　rule　upon　that　which　was　contained　in

the　foregoing　state。　Hence　arises　a　series　of　phenomena；　which；　by

means　of　the　understanding；　produces　and　renders　necessary　exactly　the

same　order　and　continuous　connection　in　the　series　of　our　possible

perceptions；　as　is　found　a　priori　in　the　form　of　internal　intuition

（time）；　in　which　all　our　perceptions　must　have　place。

　　That　something　happens；　then；　is　a　perception　which　belongs　to　a

possible　experience；　which　becomes　real　only　because　I　look　upon　the

phenomenon　as　determined　in　regard　to　its　place　in　time；

consequently　as　an　object；　which　can　always　be　found　by　means　of　a

rule　in　the　connected　series　of　my　perceptions。　But　this　rule　of　the

determination　of　a　thing　according　to　succession　in　time　is　as

follows：　〃In　what　precedes　may　be　found　the　condition；　under　which

an　event　always　（that　is；　necessarily）　follows。〃　From　all　this　it　is

obvious　that　the　principle　of　cause　and　effect　is　the　principle　of

possible　experience；　that　is；　of　objective　cognition　of　phenomena；

in　regard　to　their　relations　in　the　succession　of　time。

　　The　proof　of　this　fundamental　proposition　rests　entirely　on　the

following　momenta　of　argument。　To　all　empirical　cognition　belongs

the　synthesis　of　the　manifold　by　the　imagination；　a　synthesis　which　is

always　successive；　that　is；　in　which　the　representations　therein

always　follow　one　another。　But　the　order　of　succession　in

imagination　is　not　determined；　and　the　series　of　successive

representations　may　be　taken　retrogressively　as　well　as　progressively。

But　if　this　synthesis　is　a　synthesis　of　apprehension　（of　the

manifold　of　a　given　phenomenon）；then　the　order　is　determined　in　the

object；　or　to　speak　more　accurately；　there　is　therein　an　order　of

successive　synthesis　which　determines　an　object；　and　according　to

which　something　necessarily　precedes；　and　when　this　is　posited；

something　else　necessarily　follows。　If；　then；　my　perception　is　to

contain　the　cognition　of　an　event；　that　is；　of　something　which

really　happens；　it　must　be　an　empirical　judgement；　wherein　we　think

that　the　succession　is　determined；　that　is；　it　presupposes　another

phenomenon；　upon　which　this　event　follows　necessarily；　or　in

conformity　with　a　rule。　If；　on　the　contrary；　when　I　posited　the

antecedent；　the　event　did　not　necessarily　follow；　I　should　be

obliged　to　consider　it　merely　as　a　subje