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¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡REFUTATION¡¡OF¡¡IDEALISM¡£
¡¡¡¡Idealism¡¡¡I¡¡mean¡¡material¡¡idealism¡¡¡is¡¡the¡¡theory¡¡which¡¡declares¡¡the
existence¡¡of¡¡objects¡¡in¡¡space¡¡without¡¡us¡¡to¡¡be¡¡either¡¡£¨£©¡¡doubtful
and¡¡indemonstrable£»¡¡or¡¡£¨2£©¡¡false¡¡and¡¡impossible¡£¡¡The¡¡first¡¡is¡¡the
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am¡£¡¨¡¡The¡¡second¡¡is¡¡the¡¡dogmatical¡¡idealism¡¡of¡¡Berkeley£»¡¡who
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inseparable¡¡condition£»¡¡is¡¡a¡¡thing¡¡which¡¡is¡¡in¡¡itself¡¡impossible£»¡¡and
that¡¡consequently¡¡the¡¡objects¡¡in¡¡space¡¡are¡¡mere¡¡products¡¡of¡¡the
imagination¡£¡¡The¡¡dogmatical¡¡theory¡¡of¡¡idealism¡¡is¡¡unavoidable£»¡¡if¡¡we
regard¡¡space¡¡as¡¡a¡¡property¡¡of¡¡things¡¡in¡¡themselves£»¡¡for¡¡in¡¡that¡¡case
it¡¡is£»¡¡with¡¡all¡¡to¡¡which¡¡it¡¡serves¡¡as¡¡condition£»¡¡a¡¡nonentity¡£¡¡But
the¡¡foundation¡¡for¡¡
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