the critique of pure reason- 第50部分

being；　whether　it　relates　to　an　object　and　thus　possesses　any　meaning。



　　It　follows　incontestably；　that　the　pure　conceptions　of　the

understanding　are　incapable　of　transcendental；　and　must　always　be　of

empirical　use　alone；　and　that　the　principles　of　the　pure　understanding

relate　only　to　the　general　conditions　of　a　possible　experience；　to

objects　of　the　senses；　and　never　to　things　in　general；　apart　from

the　mode　in　which　we　intuite　them。

　　Transcendental　analytic　has　accordingly　this　important　result；　to

wit；　that　the　understanding　is　competent'　effect　nothing　a　priori；

except　the　anticipation　of　the　form　of　a　possible　experience　in

general；　and　that；　as　that　which　is　not　phenomenon　cannot　be　an　object

of　experience；　it　can　never　overstep　the　limits　of　sensibility；　within

which　alone　objects　are　presented　to　us。　Its　principles　are　merely

principles　of　the　exposition　of　phenomena；　and　the　proud　name　of　an

ontology；　which　professes　to　present　synthetical　cognitions　a　priori

of　things　in　general　in　a　systematic　doctrine；　must　give　place　to

the　modest　title　of　analytic　of　the　pure　understanding。

　　Thought　is　the　act　of　referring　a　given　intuition　to　an　object。　If

the　mode　of　this　intuition　is　unknown　to　us；　the　object　is　merely

transcendental；　and　the　conception　of　the　understanding　is　employed

only　transcendentally；　that　is；　to　produce　unity　in　the　thought　of　a

manifold　in　general。　Now　a　pure　category；　in　which　all　conditions　of

sensuous　intuition…　as　the　only　intuition　we　possess…　are

abstracted；　does　not　determine　an　object；　but　merely　expresses　the

thought　of　an　object　in　general；　according　to　different　modes。　Now；　to

employ　a　conception；　the　function　of　judgement　is　required；　by　which

an　object　is　subsumed　under　the　conception；　consequently　the　at

least　formal　condition；　under　which　something　can　be　given　in

intuition。　Failing　this　condition　of　judgement　（schema）；　subsumption

is　impossible；　for　there　is　in　such　a　case　nothing　given；　which　may　be

subsumed　under　the　conception。　The　merely　transcendental　use　of　the

categories　is　therefore；　in　fact；　no　use　at　all　and　has　no　determined；

or　even；　as　regards　its　form；　determinable　object。　Hence　it　follows

that　the　pure　category　is　incompetent　to　establish　a　synthetical　a

priori　principle；　and　that　the　principles　of　the　pure　understanding

are　only　of　empirical　and　never　of　transcendental　use；　and　that　beyond

the　sphere　of　possible　experience　no　synthetical　a　priori　principles

are　possible。

　　It　may　be　advisable；　therefore；　to　express　ourselves　thus。　The

pure　categories；　apart　from　the　formal　conditions　of　sensibility；　have

a　merely　transcendental　meaning；　but　are　nevertheless　not　of

transcendental　use；　because　this　is　in　itself　impossible；　inasmuch

as　all　the　conditions　of　any　employment　or　use　of　them　（in　judgements）

are　absent；　to　wit；　the　formal　conditions　of　the　subsumption　of　an

object　under　these　conceptions。　As；　therefore；　in　the　character　of

pure　categories；　they　must　be　employed　empirically；　and　cannot　be

employed　transcendentally；　they　are　of　no　use　at　all；　when　separated

from　sensibility；　that　is；　they　cannot　be　applied　to　an　object。　They

are　merely　the　pure　form　of　the　employment　of　the　understanding　in

respect　of　objects　in　general　and　of　thought；　without　its　being　at　the

same　time　possible　to　think　or　to　determine　any　object　by　their　means。

　　But　there　lurks　at　the　foundation　of　this　subject　an　illusion

which　it　is　very　difficult　to　avoid。　The　categories　are　not　based；

as　regards　their　origin；　upon　sensibility；　like　the　forms　of

intuition；　space；　and　time；　they　seem；　therefore；　to　be　capable　of

an　application　beyond　the　sphere　of　sensuous　objects。　But　this　is

not　the　case。　They　are　nothing　but　mere　forms　of　thought；　which

contain　only　the　logical　faculty　of　uniting　a　priori　in

consciousness　the　manifold　given　in　intuition。　Apart；　then；　from　the

only　intuition　possible　for　us；　they　have　still　less　meaning　than

the　pure　sensuous　forms；　space　and　time；　for　through　them　an　object　is

at　least　given；　while　a　mode　of　connection　of　the　manifold；　when　the

intuition　which　alone　gives　the　manifold　is　wanting；　has　no　meaning　at

all。　At　the　same　time；　when　we　designate　certain　objects　as

phenomena　or　sensuous　existences；　thus　distinguishing　our　mode　of

intuiting　them　from　their　own　nature　as　things　in　themselves；　it　is

evident　that　by　this　very　distinction　we　as　it　were　place　the

latter；　considered　in　this　their　own　nature；　although　we　do　not　so

intuite　them；　in　opposition　to　the　former；　or；　on　the　other　hand；　we

do　so　place　other　possible　things；　which　are　not　objects　of　our

senses；　but　are　cogitated　by　the　understanding　alone；　and　call　them

intelligible　existences　（noumena）。　Now　the　question　arises　whether　the

pure　conceptions　of　our　understanding　do　possess　significance　in

respect　of　these　latter；　and　may　possibly　be　a　mode　of　cognizing　them。

　　But　we　are　met　at　the　very　commencement　with　an　ambiguity；　which　may

easily　occasion　great　misapprehension。　The　understanding；　when　it

terms　an　object　in　a　certain　relation　phenomenon；　at　the　same　time

forms　out　of　this　relation　a　representation　or　notion　of　an　object

in　itself；　and　hence　believes　that　it　can　form　also　conceptions　of

such　objects。　Now　as　the　understanding　possesses　no　other

fundamental　conceptions　besides　the　categories；　it　takes　for　granted

that　an　object　considered　as　a　thing　in　itself　must　be　capable　of

being　thought　by　means　of　these　pure　conceptions；　and　is　thereby　led

to　hold　the　perfectly　undetermined　conception　of　an　intelligible

existence；　a　something　out　of　the　sphere　of　our　sensibility；　for　a

determinate　conception　of　an　existence　which　we　can　cognize　in　some

way　or　other　by　means　of　the　understanding。

　　If；　by　the　term　noumenon；　we　understand　a　thing　so　far　as　it　is

not　an　object　of　our　sensuous　intuition；　thus　making　abstraction　of

our　mode　of　intuiting　it；　this　is　a　noumenon　in　the　negative　sense

of　the　word。　But　if　we　understand　by　it　an　object　of　a　non…sensuous

intuition；　we　in　this　case　assume　a　peculiar　mode　of　intuition；　an

intellectual　intuition；　to　wit；　which　does　not；　however；　belong　to　us；

of　the　very　possibility　of　which　we　have　no　notion…　and　this　is　a

noumenon　in　the　positive　sense。

　　The　doctrine　of　sensibility　is　also　the　doctrine　of　noumena　in　the

negative　sense；　that　is；　of　things　which　the　understanding　is

obliged　to　cogitate　apart　from　any　relation　to　our　mode　of

intuition；　consequently　not　as　mere　phenomena；　but　as　things　in

themselves。　But　the　understanding　at　the　same　time　comprehends　that　it

cannot　employ　its　categories　for　the　consideration　of　things　in

themselves；　because　these　possess　significance　only　in　relation　to　the

unity　of　intuitions　in　space　and　time；　and　that　they　are　competent

to　determine　this　unity　by　means　of　general　a　priori　connecting

conceptions　only　on　account　of　the　pure　ideality　of　space　and　time。

Where　this　unity　of　time　is　not　to　be　met　with；　as　is　the　case　with

noumena；　the　whole　use；　indeed　the　whole　meaning　of　the　categories

is　entirely　lost；　for　even　the　possibility　of　things　to　correspond

to　the　categories　is　in　this　case　incomprehensible。　On　this　point；　I

need　only　refer　the　reader　to　what　I　have　said　at　the　commencement

of　the　General　Remark　appended　to　the　foregoing　chapter。　Now；　the

possibility　of　a　thing　can　never　be　proved　from　the　fact　that　the

conception　of　it　is　not　self…contradictory；　but　only　by　means　of　an

intuition　corresponding　to　the　conception。　If；　therefore；　we　wish　to

apply　the　categories　to　objects　which　cannot　be　regarded　as　phenomena；

we　must　have　an　intuition　different　from　the　sensuous；　and　in　this

case　the　objects　would　be　a　noumena　in　the　positive　sense　of　the　word。

Now；　as　such　an　intuition；　that　is；　an　intellectual　intuition；　is　no

part　of　our　faculty　of　cognition；　it　is　absolutely　impossible　for

the　categories　to　possess　any　application　beyond　the　limits　of

experience。　It　may　be　true　that　there　are　intelligible　existences　to

which　our　faculty　of　sensuous　intuition　has　no　relation；　and　cannot　be

applied；　but　our　conceptions　of　the　understanding；　as　mere　forms　of

thought　for　our　sensuous　intuition；　do　not　extend　to　these。　What；

therefore；　we　call　noumenon　must　be　understood　by　us　as　such　in　a

negative　sense。

　　If　I　take　away　from　an　empirial　intuition　all　thought　（by　means　of

the　categories）；　there　remains　no　cognition　of　any　object；　for　by

means　of　mere　intuition　nothing　is　cogitated；　and；　from　the

existence　of　such　or　such　an　affection　of　sensibility　in　me；　it　does

not　follow　that　this　affection　or　representation　has　any　relation　to

an　object　without　me。　But　if　I　take　away　all　intuition；　there　still

remains　the　form　of　thought；　that　is；　the　mode　of　determining　an

object　for　the　manifold　of　a　possible　intuition。　Thus　the　categories

do　in　some　measure　really　extend　further　than　sensuous　intuition；

inasmuch　as　they　think　objects　in　general；　without　regard　to　the

mode　（of　sensibility）　in　which　these　objects　are　given。　But　they　do

not　for　this　reason　apply　to　and　determine　a　wider　sphere　of

objects；　because　we　cannot　assume　that　such　can　be　given；　without

presupposing　the　possibility　of　another　than　the　sensuous　mode　of

intuition；　a　supposition　we　are　not　justified　in　making。

　　I　call　a　conception　problematical　which　contains　in　itself　no

contradiction；　and　which　is　connected　with　other　cognitions　as　a

limitation　of　given　conceptions；　but　whose　objective　reality　cannot　be

cognized　in　any　manner。　The　conception　of　a　noumenon；　that　is；　of　a

thing　which　must　be　cogitated　not　as　an　object　of　sense；　but　as　a

thing　in　itself　（solely　through　the　pure　understanding）；　is　not

self…contradictory；　for　we　are　not　entitled　to　maintain　that

sensibility　is　the　only　possible　mode　of　intuition。　Nay；　further；　this

conception　is　necessary　to　restrain　sensuous　intuition　within　the

bounds　of　phenomena；　and　thus　to　limit　the　obje