the critique of pure reason- 第85部分

could　be　placed　at　the　head　of　the　series　of　phenomena；　except　one

which　was　itself　a　phenomenon　and　consequently　a　member　of　the　series。



　　*For　the　understanding　cannot　admit　among　phenomena　a　condition

which　is　itself　empirically　unconditioned。　But　if　it　is　possible　to

cogitate　an　intelligible　condition…　one　which　is　not　a　member　of　the

series　of　phenomena…　for　a　conditioned　phenomenon；　without　breaking

the　series　of　empirical　conditions；　such　a　condition　may　be　admissible

as　empirically　unconditioned；　and　the　empirical　regress　continue

regular；　unceasing；　and　intact。



　　　　III。　Solution　of　the　Cosmological　Idea　of　the　Totality　of

　　　　　　　the　Deduction　of　Cosmical　Events　from　their　Causes。



　　There　are　only　two　modes　of　causality　cogitable…　the　causality　of

nature　or　of　freedom。　The　first　is　the　conjunction　of　a　particular

state　with　another　preceding　it　in　the　world　of　sense；　the　former

following　the　latter　by　virtue　of　a　law。　Now；　as　the　causality　of

phenomena　is　subject　to　conditions　of　time；　and　the　preceding　state；

if　it　had　always　existed；　could　not　have　produced　an　effect　which

would　make　its　first　appearance　at　a　particular　time；　the　causality　of

a　cause　must　itself　be　an　effect…　must　itself　have　begun　to　be；　and

therefore；　according　to　the　principle　of　the　understanding；　itself

requires　a　cause。

　　We　must　understand；　on　the　contrary；　by　the　term　freedom；　in　the

cosmological　sense；　a　faculty　of　the　spontaneous　origination　of　a

state；　the　causality　of　which；　therefore；　is　not　subordinated　to

another　cause　determining　it　in　time。　Freedom　is　in　this　sense　a

pure　transcendental　idea；　which；　in　the　first　place；　contains　no

empirical　element；　the　object　of　which；　in　the　second　place；　cannot　be

given　or　determined　in　any　experience；　because　it　is　a　universal　law

of　the　very　possibility　of　experience；　that　everything　which　happens

must　have　a　cause；　that　consequently　the　causality　of　a　cause；　being

itself　something　that　has　happened；　must　also　have　a　cause。　In　this

view　of　the　case；　the　whole　field　of　experience；　how　far　soever　it　may

extend；　contains　nothing　that　is　not　subject　to　the　laws　of　nature。

But；　as　we　cannot　by　this　means　attain　to　an　absolute　totality　of

conditions　in　reference　to　the　series　of　causes　and　effects；　reason

creates　the　idea　of　a　spontaneity；　which　can　begin　to　act　of　itself；

and　without　any　external　cause　determining　it　to　action；　according

to　the　natural　law　of　causality。

　　It　is　especially　remarkable　that　the　practical　conception　of　freedom

is　based　upon　the　transcendental　idea；　and　that　the　question　of　the

possibility　of　the　former　is　difficult　only　as　it　involves　the

consideration　of　the　truth　of　the　latter。　Freedom；　in　the　practical

sense；　is　the　independence　of　the　will　of　coercion　by　sensuous

impulses。　A　will　is　sensuous；　in　so　far　as　it　is　pathologically

affected　（by　sensuous　impulses）；　it　is　termed　animal　（arbitrium

brutum）；　when　it　is　pathologically　necessitated。　The　human　will　is

certainly　an　arbitrium　sensitivum；　not　brutum；　but　liberum；　because

sensuousness　does　not　necessitate　its　action；　a　faculty　existing　in

man　of　self…determination；　independently　of　all　sensuous　coercion。

　　It　is　plain　that；　if　all　causality　in　the　world　of　sense　were

natural…　and　natural　only…　every　event　would　be　determined　by

another　according　to　necessary　laws；　and　that；　consequently；

phenomena；　in　so　far　as　they　determine　the　will；　must　necessitate

every　action　as　a　natural　effect　from　themselves；　and　thus　all

practical　freedom　would　fall　to　the　ground　with　the　transcendental

idea。　For　the　latter　presupposes　that　although　a　certain　thing　has　not

happened；　it　ought　to　have　happened；　and　that；　consequently；　its

phenomenal　cause　was　not　so　powerful　and　determinative　as　to　exclude

the　causality　of　our　will…　a　causality　capable　of　producing　effects

independently　of　and　even　in　opposition　to　the　power　of　natural

causes；　and　capable；　consequently；　of　spontaneously　originating　a

series　of　events。

　　Here；　too；　we　find　it　to　be　the　case；　as　we　generally　found　in　the

self…contradictions　and　perplexities　of　a　reason　which　strives　to　pass

the　bounds　of　possible　experience；　that　the　problem　is　properly　not

physiological；　but　transcendental。　The　question　of　the　possibility

of　freedom　does　indeed　concern　psychology；　but；　as　it　rests　upon

dialectical　arguments　of　pure　reason；　its　solution　must　engage　the

attention　of　transcendental　philosophy。　Before　attempting　this

solution；　a　task　which　transcendental　philosophy　cannot　decline；　it

will　be　advisable　to　make　a　remark　with　regard　to　its　procedure　in　the

settlement　of　the　question。

　　If　phenomena　were　things　in　themselves；　and　time　and　space　forms

of　the　existence　of　things；　condition　and　conditioned　would　always

be　members　of　the　same　series；　and　thus　would　arise　in　the　present

case　the　antinomy　common　to　all　transcendental　ideas…　that　their

series　is　either　too　great　or　too　small　for　the　understanding。　The

dynamical　ideas；　which　we　are　about　to　discuss　in　this　and　the

following　section；　possess　the　peculiarity　of　relating　to　an　object；

not　considered　as　a　quantity；　but　as　an　existence；　and　thus；　in　the

discussion　of　the　present　question；　we　may　make　abstraction　of　the

quantity　of　the　series　of　conditions；　and　consider　merely　the

dynamical　relation　of　the　condition　to　the　conditioned。　The

question；　then；　suggests　itself；　whether　freedom　is　possible；　and；

if　it　is；　whether　it　can　consist　with　the　universality　of　the

natural　law　of　causality；　and；　consequently；　whether　we　enounce　a

proper　disjunctive　proposition　when　we　say：　〃Every　effect　must　have

its　origin　either　in　nature　or　in　freedom；〃　or　whether　both　cannot

exist　together　in　the　same　event　in　different　relations。　The　principle

of　an　unbroken　connection　between　all　events　in　the　phenomenal

world；　in　accordance　with　the　unchangeable　laws　of　nature；　is　a

well…established　principle　of　transcendental　analytic　which　admits

of　no　exception。　The　question；　therefore；　is：　〃Whether　an　effect；

determined　according　to　the　laws　of　nature；　can　at　the　same　time　be

produced　by　a　free　agent；　or　whether　freedom　and　nature　mutually

exclude　each　other？〃　And　here；　the　common　but　fallacious　hypothesis　of

the　absolute　reality　of　phenomena　manifests　its　injurious　influence　in

embarrassing　the　procedure　of　reason。　For　if　phenomena　are　things　in

themselves；　freedom　is　impossible。　In　this　case；　nature　is　the

complete　and　all…sufficient　cause　of　every　event；　and　condition　and

conditioned；　cause　and　effect　are　contained　in　the　same　series；　and

necessitated　by　the　same　law。　If；　on　the　contrary；　phenomena　are

held　to　be；　as　they　are　in　fact；　nothing　more　than　mere

representations；　connected　with　each　other　in　accordance　with

empirical　laws；　they　must　have　a　ground　which　is　not　phenomenal。　But

the　causality　of　such　an　intelligible　cause　is　not　determined　or

determinable　by　phenomena；　although　its　effects；　as　phenomena；　must　be

determined　by　other　phenomenal　existences。　This　cause　and　its

causality　exist　therefore　out　of　and　apart　from　the　series　of

phenomena；　while　its　effects　do　exist　and　are　discoverable　in　the

series　of　empirical　conditions。　Such　an　effect　may　therefore　be

considered　to　be　free　in　relation　to　its　intelligible　cause；　and

necessary　in　relation　to　the　phenomena　from　which　it　is　a　necessary

consequence…　a　distinction　which；　stated　in　this　perfectly　general　and

abstract　manner；　must　appear　in　the　highest　degree　subtle　and　obscure。

The　sequel　will　explain。　It　is　sufficient；　at　present；　to　remark　that；

as　the　complete　and　unbroken　connection　of　phenomena　is　an　unalterable

law　of　nature；　freedom　is　impossible…　on　the　supposition　that

phenomena　are　absolutely　real。　Hence　those　philosophers　who　adhere

to　the　common　opinion　on　this　subject　can　never　succeed　in　reconciling

the　ideas　of　nature　and　freedom。



　　　　　Possibility　of　Freedom　in　Harmony　with　the　Universal　Law

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Natural　Necessity。



　　That　element　in　a　sensuous　object　which　is　not　itself　sensuous；　I

may　be　allowed　to　term　intelligible。　If；　accordingly；　an　object

which　must　be　regarded　as　a　sensuous　phenomenon　possesses　a　faculty

which　is　not　an　object　of　sensuous　intuition；　but　by　means　of　which　it

is　capable　of　being　the　cause　of　phenomena；　the　causality　of　an　object

or　existence　of　this　kind　may　be　regarded　from　two　different　points　of

view。　It　may　be　considered　to　be　intelligible；　as　regards　its

action…　the　action　of　a　thing　which　is　a　thing　in　itself；　and

sensuous；　as　regards　its　effects…　the　effects　of　a　phenomenon

belonging　to　the　sensuous　world。　We　should　accordingly；　have　to　form

both　an　empirical　and　an　intellectual　conception　of　the　causality　of

such　a　faculty　or　power…　both；　however；　having　reference　to　the　same

effect。　This　twofold　manner　of　cogitating　a　power　residing　in　a

sensuous　object　does　not　run　counter　to　any　of　the　conceptions　which

we　ought　to　form　of　the　world　of　phenomena　or　of　a　possible

experience。　Phenomena…　not　being　things　in　themselves…　must　have　a

transcendental　object　as　a　foundation；　which　determines　them　as　mere

representations；　and　there　seems　to　be　no　reason　why　we　should　not

ascribe　to　this　transcendental　object；　in　addition　to　the　property

of　self…phenomenization；　a　causality　whose　effects　are　to　be　met

with　in　the　world　of　phenomena；　although　it　is　not　itself　a

phenomenon。　But　every　effective　cause　must　possess　a　character；　that

is　to　say；　a　law　of　its　causality；　without　which　it　would　cease　to

be　a　cause。　In　the　above　case；　then；　every　sensuous　object　would

possess　an　empirical　character；　which　guaranteed　that　its　actions；

as　phenomena；　stand　in　complete　and　harmonious　connection；　conformably

to　unvarying　natural　laws；　with　all　other　phenomena；　and　can　be

deduced　from　these；　as　conditions；　and　that　they　do　thus；　in

connection　with　these；　constitute　a　series　in　the　order　of　nature。

Th