the critique of pure reason- 第92部分

regard　to　things　in　general。　And　thus　we　are　induced　to　hold　the

empirical　principle　of　our　conceptions　of　the　possibility　of　things；

as　phenomena；　by　leaving　out　this　limitative　condition；　to　be　a

transcendental　principle　of　the　possibility　of　things　in　general。

　　We　proceed　afterwards　to　hypostatize　this　idea　of　the　sum…total　of

all　reality；　by　changing　the　distributive　unity　of　the　empirical

exercise　of　the　understanding　into　the　collective　unity　of　an

empirical　whole…　a　dialectical　illusion；　and　by　cogitating　this

whole　or　sum　of　experience　as　an　individual　thing；　containing　in

itself　all　empirical　reality。　This　individual　thing　or　being　is

then；　by　means　of　the　above…mentioned　transcendental　subreption；

substituted　for　our　notion　of　a　thing　which　stands　at　the　head　of

the　possibility　of　all　things；　the　real　conditions　of　whose　complete

determination　it　presents。*



　　*This　ideal　of　the　ens　realissimum…　although　merely　a　mental

representation…　is　first　objectivized；　that　is；　has　an　objective

existence　attributed　to　it；　then　hypostatized；　and　finally；　by　the

natural　progress　of　reason　to　the　completion　of　unity；　personified；　as

we　shall　show　presently。　For　the　regulative　unity　of　experience　is　not

based　upon　phenomena　themselves；　but　upon　the　connection　of　the

variety　of　phenomena　by　the　understanding　in　a　consciousness；　and　thus

the　unity　of　the　supreme　reality　and　the　complete　determinability　of

all　things；　seem　to　reside　in　a　supreme　understanding；　and；

consequently；　in　a　conscious　intelligence。



　　　SECTION　III。　Of　the　Arguments　employed　by　Speculative　Reason　in

　　　　　　　　　　　　Proof　of　the　Existence　of　a　Supreme　Being。



　　Notwithstanding　the　pressing　necessity　which　reason　feels；　to　form

some　presupposition　that　shall　serve　the　understanding　as　a　proper

basis　for　the　complete　determination　of　its　conceptions；　the

idealistic　and　factitious　nature　of　such　a　presupposition　is　too

evident　to　allow　reason　for　a　moment　to　persuade　itself　into　a

belief　of　the　objective　existence　of　a　mere　creation　of　its　own

thought。　But　there　are　other　considerations　which　compel　reason　to

seek　out　some　resting　place　in　the　regress　from　the　conditioned　to　the

unconditioned；　which　is　not　given　as　an　actual　existence　from　the　mere

conception　of　it；　although　it　alone　can　give　completeness　to　the

series　of　conditions。　And　this　is　the　natural　course　of　every　human

reason；　even　of　the　most　uneducated；　although　the　path　at　first

entered　it　does　not　always　continue　to　follow。　It　does　not　begin

from　conceptions；　but　from　common　experience；　and　requires　a　basis

in　actual　existence。　But　this　basis　is　insecure；　unless　it　rests

upon　the　immovable　rock　of　the　absolutely　necessary。　And　this

foundation　is　itself　unworthy　of　trust；　if　it　leave　under　and　above　it

empty　space；　if　it　do　not　fill　all；　and　leave　no　room　for　a　why　or　a

wherefore；　if　it　be　not；　in　one　word；　infinite　in　its　reality。

　　If　we　admit　the　existence　of　some　one　thing；　whatever　it　may　be；

we　must　also　admit　that　there　is　something　which　exists　necessarily。

For　what　is　contingent　exists　only　under　the　condition　of　some　other

thing；　which　is　its　cause；　and　from　this　we　must　go　on　to　conclude　the

existence　of　a　cause　which　is　not　contingent；　and　which　consequently

exists　necessarily　and　unconditionally。　Such　is　the　argument　by

which　reason　justifies　its　advances　towards　a　primal　being。

　　Now　reason　looks　round　for　the　conception　of　a　being　that　may　be

admitted；　without　inconsistency；　to　be　worthy　of　the　attribute　of

absolute　necessity；　not　for　the　purpose　of　inferring　a　priori；　from

the　conception　of　such　a　being；　its　objective　existence　（for　if　reason

allowed　itself　to　take　this　course；　it　would　not　require　a　basis　in

given　and　actual　existence；　but　merely　the　support　of　pure

conceptions）；　but　for　the　purpose　of　discovering；　among　all　our

conceptions　of　possible　things；　that　conception　which　possesses　no

element　inconsistent　with　the　idea　of　absolute　necessity。　For　that

there　must　be　some　absolutely　necessary　existence；　it　regards　as　a

truth　already　established。　Now；　if　it　can　remove　every　existence

incapable　of　supporting　the　attribute　of　absolute　necessity；　excepting

one…　this　must　be　the　absolutely　necessary　being；　whether　its

necessity　is　comprehensible　by　us；　that　is；　deducible　from　the

conception　of　it　alone；　or　not。

　　Now　that；　the　conception　of　which　contains　a　therefore　to　every

wherefore；　which　is　not　defective　in　any　respect　whatever；　which　is

all…sufficient　as　a　condition；　seems　to　be　the　being　of　which　we　can

justly　predicate　absolute　necessity…　for　this　reason；　that；　possessing

the　conditions　of　all　that　is　possible；　it　does　not　and　cannot

itself　require　any　condition。　And　thus　it　satisfies；　in　one　respect　at

least；　the　requirements　of　the　conception　of　absolute　necessity。　In

this　view；　it　is　superior　to　all　other　conceptions；　which；　as

deficient　and　incomplete；　do　not　possess　the　characteristic　of

independence　of　all　higher　conditions。　It　is　true　that　we　cannot　infer

from　this　that　what　does　not　contain　in　itself　the　supreme　and

complete　condition…　the　condition　of　all　other　things…　must　possess

only　a　conditioned　existence；　but　as　little　can　we　assert　the

contrary；　for　this　supposed　being　does　not　possess　the　only

characteristic　which　can　enable　reason　to　cognize　by　means　of　an　a

priori　conception　the　unconditioned　and　necessary　nature　of　its

existence。

　　The　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum　is　that　which　best　agrees

with　the　conception　of　an　unconditioned　and　necessary　being。　The

former　conception　does　not　satisfy　all　the　requirements　of　the　latter；

but　we　have　no　choice；　we　are　obliged　to　adhere　to　it；　for　we　find

that　we　cannot　do　without　the　existence　of　a　necessary　being；　and　even

although　we　admit　it；　we　find　it　out　of　our　power　to　discover　in　the

whole　sphere　of　possibility　any　being　that　can　advance　wellgrounded

claims　to　such　a　distinction。

　　The　following　is；　therefore；　the　natural　course　of　human　reason。

It　begins　by　persuading　itself　of　the　existence　of　some　necessary

being。　In　this　being　it　recognizes　the　characteristics　of

unconditioned　existence。　It　then　seeks　the　conception　of　that　which　is

independent　of　all　conditions；　and　finds　it　in　that　which　is　itself

the　sufficient　condition　of　all　other　things…　in　other　words；　in

that　which　contains　all　reality。　But　the　unlimited　all　is　an

absolute　unity；　and　is　conceived　by　the　mind　as　a　being　one　and

supreme；　and　thus　reason　concludes　that　the　Supreme　Being；　as　the

primal　basis　of　all　things；　possesses　an　existence　which　is　absolutely

necessary。

　　This　conception　must　be　regarded　as　in　some　degree　satisfactory；

if　we　admit　the　existence　of　a　necessary　being；　and　consider　that

there　exists　a　necessity　for　a　definite　and　final　answer　to　these

questions。　In　such　a　case；　we　cannot　make　a　better　choice；　or　rather

we　have　no　choice　at　all；　but　feel　ourselves　obliged　to　declare　in

favour　of　the　absolute　unity　of　complete　reality；　as　the　highest

source　of　the　possibility　of　things。　But　if　there　exists　no　motive　for

coming　to　a　definite　conclusion；　and　we　may　leave　the　question

unanswered　till　we　have　fully　weighed　both　sides…　in　other　words；　when

we　are　merely　called　upon　to　decide　how　much　we　happen　to　know　about

the　question；　and　how　much　we　merely　flatter　ourselves　that　we　know…

the　above　conclusion　does　not　appear　to　be　so　great　advantage；　but；　on

the　contrary；　seems　defective　in　the　grounds　upon　which　it　is

supported。

　　For；　admitting　the　truth　of　all　that　has　been　said；　that；　namely；

the　inference　from　a　given　existence　（my　own；　for　example）　to　the

existence　of　an　unconditioned　and　necessary　being　is　valid　and

unassailable；　that；　in　the　second　place；　we　must　consider　a　being

which　contains　all　reality；　and　consequently　all　the　conditions　of

other　things；　to　be　absolutely　unconditioned；　and　admitting　too；

that　we　have　thus　discovered　the　conception　of　a　thing　to　which　may　be

attributed；　without　inconsistency；　absolute　necessity…　it　does　not

follow　from　all　this　that　the　conception　of　a　limited　being；　in

which　the　supreme　reality　does　not　reside；　is　therefore　incompatible

with　the　idea　of　absolute　necessity。　For；　although　I　do　not　discover

the　element　of　the　unconditioned　in　the　conception　of　such　a　being…　an

element　which　is　manifestly　existent　in　the　sum…total　of　all

conditions…　I　am　not　entitled　to　conclude　that　its　existence　is

therefore　conditioned；　just　as　I　am　not　entitled　to　affirm；　in　a

hypothetical　syllogism；　that　where　a　certain　condition　does　not

exist　（in　the　present；　completeness；　as　far　as　pure　conceptions　are

concerned）；　the　conditioned　does　not　exist　either。　On　the　contrary；　we

are　free　to　consider　all　limited　beings　as　likewise　unconditionally

necessary；　although　we　are　unable　to　infer　this　from　the　general

conception　which　we　have　of　them。　Thus　conducted；　this　argument　is

incapable　of　giving　us　the　least　notion　of　the　properties　of　a

necessary　being；　and　must　be　in　every　respect　without　result。

　　This　argument　continues；　however；　to　possess　a　weight　and　an

authority；　which；　in　spite　of　its　objective　insufficiency；　it　has

never　been　divested　of。　For；　granting　that　certain　responsibilities

lie　upon　us；　which；　as　based　on　the　ideas　of　reason；　deserve　to　be

respected　and　submitted　to；　although　they　are　incapable　of　a　real　or

practical　application　to　our　nature；　or；　in　other　words；　would　be

responsibilities　without　motives；　except　upon　the　supposition　of　a

Supreme　Being　to　give　effect　and　influence　to　the　practical　laws：　in

such　a　case　we　should　be　bound　to　obey　our　conceptions；　which；

although　objectively　insufficient；　do；　according　to　the　standard　of

reason；　preponderate　over　and　are　superior　to　any　claims　that　may　be

advanced　from　any　other　quarter。　The　equilibrium　of　doubt　would　in

this　case　be　destroyed　by　a　practical　addition；　indeed；　Reason　would

be　compelled　t