the critique of pure reason- 第99部分

necessity　of　his　nature；　or　as　a　free　agent；　is　left　undetermined；　the

latter　considers　this　being　as　the　author　of　the　world。

　　Transcendental　theology　aims　either　at　inferring　the　existence　of

a　Supreme　Being　from　a　general　experience；　without　any　closer

reference　to　the　world　to　which　this　experience　belongs；　and　in　this

case　it　is　called　cosmotheology；　or　it　endeavours　to　cognize　the

existence　of　such　a　being；　through　mere　conceptions；　without　the　aid

of　experience；　and　is　then　termed　ontotheology。

　　Natural　theology　infers　the　attributes　and　the　existence　of　an

author　of　the　world；　from　the　constitution　of；　the　order　and　unity

observable　in；　the　world；　in　which　two　modes　of　causality　must　be

admitted　to　exist…　those　of　nature　and　freedom。　Thus　it　rises　from

this　world　to　a　supreme　intelligence；　either　as　the　principle　of　all

natural；　or　of　all　moral　order　and　perfection。　In　the　former　case　it

is　termed　physico…theology；　in　the　latter；　ethical　or　moral…theology。*



　　*Not　theological　ethics；　for　this　science　contains　ethical　laws；

which　presuppose　the　existence　of　a　Supreme　Governor　of　the　world；

while　moral…theology；　on　the　contrary；　is　the　expression　of　a

conviction　of　the　existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；　founded　upon　ethical

laws。



　　As　we　are　wont　to　understand　by　the　term　God　not　merely　an　eternal

nature；　the　operations　of　which　are　insensate　and　blind；　but　a　Supreme

Being；　who　is　the　free　and　intelligent　author　of　all　things；　and　as　it

is　this　latter　view　alone　that　can　be　of　interest　to　humanity；　we

might；　in　strict　rigour；　deny　to　the　deist　any　belief　in　God　at　all；

and　regard　him　merely　as　a　maintainer　of　the　existence　of　a　primal

being　or　thing…　the　supreme　cause　of　all　other　things。　But；　as　no

one　ought　to　be　blamed；　merely　because　he　does　not　feel　himself

justified　in　maintaining　a　certain　opinion；　as　if　he　altogether　denied

its　truth　and　asserted　the　opposite；　it　is　more　correct…　as　it　is　less

harsh…　to　say；　the　deist　believes　in　a　God；　the　theist　in　a　living　God

（summa　intelligentia）。　We　shall　now　proceed　to　investigate　the　sources

of　all　these　attempts　of　reason　to　establish　the　existence　of　a

Supreme　Being。

　　It　may　be　sufficient　in　this　place　to　define　theoretical　knowledge

or　cognition　as　knowledge　of　that　which　is；　and　practical　knowledge　as

knowledge　of　that　which　ought　to　be。　In　this　view；　the　theoretical

employment　of　reason　is　that　by　which　I　cognize　a　priori　（as

necessary）　that　something　is；　while　the　practical　is　that　by　which　I

cognize　a　priori　what　ought　to　happen。　Now；　if　it　is　an　indubitably

certain；　though　at　the　same　time　an　entirely　conditioned　truth；　that

something　is；　or　ought　to　happen；　either　a　certain　determinate

condition　of　this　truth　is　absolutely　necessary；　or　such　a　condition

may　be　arbitrarily　presupposed。　In　the　former　case　the　condition　is

postulated　（per　thesin）；　in　the　latter　supposed　（per　hypothesin）。

There　are　certain　practical　laws…　those　of　morality…　which　are

absolutely　necessary。　Now；　if　these　laws　necessarily　presuppose　the

existence　of　some　being；　as　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of

their　obligatory　power；　this　being　must　be　postulated；　because　the

conditioned；　from　which　we　reason　to　this　determinate　condition；　is

itself　cognized　a　priori　as　absolutely　necessary。　We　shall　at　some

future　time　show　that　the　moral　laws　not　merely　presuppose　the

existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；　but　also；　as　themselves　absolutely

necessary　in　a　different　relation；　demand　or　postulate　it…　although

only　from　a　practical　point　of　view。　The　discussion　of　this　argument

we　postpone　for　the　present。

　　When　the　question　relates　merely　to　that　which　is；　not　to　that　which

ought　to　be；　the　conditioned　which　is　presented　in　experience　is

always　cogitated　as　contingent。　For　this　reason　its　condition　cannot

be　regarded　as　absolutely　necessary；　but　merely　as　relatively

necessary；　or　rather　as　needful；　the　condition　is　in　itself　and　a

priori　a　mere　arbitrary　presupposition　in　aid　of　the　cognition；　by

reason；　of　the　conditioned。　If；　then；　we　are　to　possess　a

theoretical　cognition　of　the　absolute　necessity　of　a　thing；　we

cannot　attain　to　this　cognition　otherwise　than　a　priori　by　means　of

conceptions；　while　it　is　impossible　in　this　way　to　cognize　the

existence　of　a　cause　which　bears　any　relation　to　an　existence　given　in

experience。

　　Theoretical　cognition　is　speculative　when　it　relates　to　an　object　or

certain　conceptions　of　an　object　which　is　not　given　and　cannot　be

discovered　by　means　of　experience。　It　is　opposed　to　the　cognition　of

nature；　which　concerns　only　those　objects　or　predicates　which　can　be

presented　in　a　possible　experience。

　　The　principle　that　everything　which　happens　（the　empirically

contingent）　must　have　a　cause；　is　a　principle　of　the　cognition　of

nature；　but　not　of　speculative　cognition。　For；　if　we　change　it　into　an

abstract　principle；　and　deprive　it　of　its　reference　to　experience

and　the　empirical；　we　shall　find　that　it　cannot　with　justice　be

regarded　any　longer　as　a　synthetical　proposition；　and　that　it　is

impossible　to　discover　any　mode　of　transition　from　that　which　exists

to　something　entirely　different…　termed　cause。　Nay；　more；　the

conception　of　a　cause　likewise　that　of　the　contingent…　loses；　in

this　speculative　mode　of　employing　it；　all　significance；　for　its

objective　reality　and　meaning　are　comprehensible　from　experience

alone。

　　When　from　the　existence　of　the　universe　and　the　things　in　it　the

existence　of　a　cause　of　the　universe　is　inferred；　reason　is　proceeding

not　in　the　natural；　but　in　the　speculative　method。　For　the　principle

of　the　former　enounces；　not　that　things　themselves　or　substances；

but　only　that　which　happens　or　their　states…　as　empirically

contingent；　have　a　cause：　the　assertion　that　the　existence　of

substance　itself　is　contingent　is　not　justified　by　experience；　it　is

the　assertion　of　a　reason　employing　its　principles　in　a　speculative

manner。　If；　again；　I　infer　from　the　form　of　the　universe；　from　the　way

in　which　all　things　are　connected　and　act　and　react　upon　each　other；

the　existence　of　a　cause　entirely　distinct　from　the　universe…　this

would　again　be　a　judgement　of　purely　speculative　reason；　because　the

object　in　this　case…　the　cause…　can　never　be　an　object　of　possible

experience。　In　both　these　cases　the　principle　of　causality；　which　is

valid　only　in　the　field　of　experience…　useless　and　even　meaningless

beyond　this　region；　would　be　diverted　from　its　proper　destination。

　　Now　I　maintain　that　all　attempts　of　reason　to　establish　a　theology

by　the　aid　of　speculation　alone　are　fruitless；　that　the　principles

of　reason　as　applied　to　nature　do　not　conduct　us　to　any　theological

truths；　and；　consequently；　that　a　rational　theology　can　have　no

existence；　unless　it　is　founded　upon　the　laws　of　morality。　For　all

synthetical　principles　of　the　understanding　are　valid　only　as　immanent

in　experience；　while　the　cognition　of　a　Supreme　Being　necessitates

their　being　employed　transcendentally；　and　of　this　the　understanding

is　quite　incapable。　If　the　empirical　law　of　causality　is　to　conduct　us

to　a　Supreme　Being；　this　being　must　belong　to　the　chain　of　empirical

objects…　in　which　case　it　would　be；　like　all　phenomena；　itself

conditioned。　If　the　possibility　of　passing　the　limits　of　experience　be

admitted；　by　means　of　the　dynamical　law　of　the　relation　of　an　effect

to　its　cause；　what　kind　of　conception　shall　we　obtain　by　this

procedure？　Certainly　not　the　conception　of　a　Supreme　Being；　because

experience　never　presents　us　with　the　greatest　of　all　possible

effects；　and　it　is　only　an　effect　of　this　character　that　could　witness

to　the　existence　of　a　corresponding　cause。　If；　for　the　purpose　of

fully　satisfying　the　requirements　of　Reason；　we　recognize　her　right　to

assert　the　existence　of　a　perfect　and　absolutely　necessary　being；　this

can　be　admitted　only　from　favour；　and　cannot　be　regarded　as　the　result

or　irresistible　demonstration。　The　physico…theological　proof　may　add

weight　to　others…　if　other　proofs　there　are…　by　connecting　speculation

with　experience；　but　in　itself　it　rather　prepares　the　mind　for

theological　cognition；　and　gives　it　a　right　and　natural　direction；

than　establishes　a　sure　foundation　for　theology。

　　It　is　now　perfectly　evident　that　transcendental　questions　admit　only

of　transcendental　answers…　those　presented　a　priori　by　pure

conceptions　without　the　least　empirical　admixture。　But　the　question　in

the　present　case　is　evidently　synthetical…　it　aims　at　the　extension　of

our　cognition　beyond　the　bounds　of　experience…　it　requires　an

assurance　respecting　the　existence　of　a　being　corresponding　with　the

idea　in　our　minds；　to　which　no　experience　can　ever　be　adequate。　Now　it

has　been　abundantly　proved　that　all　a　priori　synthetical　cognition

is　possible　only　as　the　expression　of　the　formal　conditions　of　a

possible　experience；　and　that　the　validity　of　all　principles　depends

upon　their　immanence　in　the　field　of　experience；　that　is；　their

relation　to　objects　of　empirical　cognition　or　phenomena。　Thus　all

transcendental　procedure　in　reference　to　speculative　theology　is

without　result。

　　If　any　one　prefers　doubting　the　conclusiveness　of　the　proofs　of

our　analytic　to　losing　the　persuasion　of　the　validity　of　these　old　and

time　honoured　arguments；　he　at　least　cannot　decline　answering　the

question…　how　he　can　pass　the　limits　of　all　possible　experience　by　the

help　of　mere　ideas。　If　he　talks　of　new　arguments；　or　of　improvements

upon　old　arguments；　I　request　him　to　spare　me。　There　is　certainly　no

great　choice　in　this　sphere　of　discussion；　as　all　speculative

arguments　must　at　last　look　for　support　to　the　ontological；　and　I

have；　therefore；　very　little　to　fear　from　the　argumentative

fecundity　of　the　dogmatical　defenders　of　a　non…sensuous　reason。

Without　looking　upon　myself　as　a　remarkably　combative　person；　I

shall　not　decline　the　challenge　to　detect　the　fallacy　and　destroy