the sphere of the family and civil society） but； for one thing； they also pass over
of their own accord into the interest of the universal； and； for another thing； they
know and will the universal； they even recognise it as their own substantive mind；
they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit。 The result is that the
universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular
interests and through the co…operation of particular knowing and willing； and
individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone； but in
the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal；
and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end。 The principle
of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle
of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self…subsistent
personal particularity； and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive
unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself。
Addition： The Idea of the state in modern times has a special character in that the state is the
actualisation of freedom not in accordance with subjective whim but in accordance with the
concept of the will； i。e。 in accordance with its universality and divinity。 Immature states are those in
which the Idea of the state is still veiled and where its particular determinations have not yet
attained free self…subsistence。 In the states of classical antiquity； universality was present； but
particularity had not then been released； given free scope； and brought back to universality； i。e。 to
the Universal end of the whole。 The essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up
with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well…being； that thus the
interests of family and civil society must concentrate themselves on the state； although the
…universal end cannot be advanced without the personal knowledge and will of its particular
members； whose own rights must be maintained。 Thus the universal must be furthered； but
subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development。 It is only when both these
moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely
organised。
§ 261。
In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare （the family and
civil society）； the state is from one point of view an external necessity and their
higher authority； its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to
it and dependent on it。 On the other hand； however； it is the end immanent within
them； and its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the
particular interest of individuals； in the fact that individuals have duties to the state
in proportion as they have rights against it （see § 155）。
Remark： In the Remark to § 3 above； reference was made to the fact that it was Montesquieu
above all who； in his famous work L’Esprit des Lois； kept in sight and tried to work out in detail
both the thought of the dependence of laws … in particular； laws concerning the rights of persons …
on the specific character of the state； and also the philosophic notion of always treating the part in
its relation to the whole。
Duty is primarily a relation to something which from my point of view is substantive； absolutely
universal。 A right； on the other hand； is simply the embodiment of this substance and thus is the
particular aspect of it and enshrines my particular freedom。 Hence at abstract levels； right and duty
appear parcelled out on different sides or in different persons。 In the state； as something ethical； as
the inter…penetration of the substantive and the particular； my obligation to what is substantive is at
the same time the embodiment of my particular freedom。 This means that in the state duty and right
are united in one and the same relation。 But further； since none the less the distinct moments
acquire in the state the shape and reality peculiar to each； and since therefore the distinction
between right and duty enters here once again； it follows that while implicitly； i。e。 in form； identical；
they at the same time differ in content。 In the spheres of personal rights and morality； the necessary
bearing of right and duty on one another falls short of actualisation； and hence there is at that point
only an abstract similarity of content between them； i。e。 in those abstract spheres； what is one
man's right ought also to be another's； and what is one man's duty ought also to be another's。 The
absolute identity of right and duty in the state is present in these spheres not as a genuine identity
but only as a similarity of content； because in them this content is determined as quite general and
is simply the fundamental principle of both right and duty； i。e。 the principle that men； as persons；
are free。 Slaves； therefore； have no duties because they have no rights； and vice versa。 （Religious
duties are not here in point。）
In the course of the inward development of the concrete Idea； however； its moments become
distinguished and their specific determinacy becomes at the same time a difference of content。 In
the family； the content of a son's duties to his father differs from the content of his rights against
him； the content of the rights of a member of civil society is not the same as the content of his
duties to his prince and government。
This concept of the union of duty and right is a point of vital importance and in it the inner strength
of states is contained。
Duty on its abstract side goes no farther than the persistent neglect and proscription of a man's
particular interest； on the ground that it is the inessential； even the discreditable； moment in his life。
Duty； taken concretely as Idea； reveals the moment of particularity as itself essential and so
regards its satisfaction as indisputably necessary。 In whatever way an individual may fulfil his duty；
he must at the same time find his account therein and attain his personal interest and satisfaction。
Out of his position in the state； a right must accrue to him whereby public affairs shall be his own
particular affair。 Particular interests should in fact not be set aside or completely suppressed；
instead； they should be put in correspondence with the universal； and thereby both they and the
universal are upheld。 The isolated individual； so far as his duties are concerned； is in subjection；
but as a member of civil society he finds in fulfilling his duties to it protection of his person and
property； regard for his private welfare； the satisfaction of the depths of his being； the
consciousness and feeling of himself as a member of the whole； and； in so far as he completely
fulfils his duties by performing tasks and services for the state； he is upheld and preserved。 Take
duty abstractly； and the universal's interest would consist simply in the completion as duties of the
tasks and services which it exacts。
Addition： In the state everything depends on the unity of universal and particular。 In the states
of antiquity； the subjective end simply coincided with the state's will。 In modern times； however；
we make claims for private judgement； private willing； and private conscience。 The ancients had
none of these in the modern sense； the ultimate thing with them was the will of the state。 Whereas
under the despots of Asia the individual had no inner life and no justification in himself； in the
modern world Man insists on respect being paid to his inner life。 The conjunction of duty and right
has a twofold aspect： what the state demands from us as a duty is eo ipso our right as individuals；
since the state is nothing but the articulation of the concept of freedom。 The determinations of the
individual will are given an objective embodiment through the state and thereby they attain their
truth and their actualisation for the first time。 The State is the one and only prerequisite of the
attainment of particular ends and welfare。
§ 262。
The actual Idea is mind； which； sundering itself into the two ideal spheres of its
concept； family and civil society； enters upon its finite phase； but it does so only
in order to rise above its ideality and become explicit as infinite actual mind。 It is
therefore to these ideal spheres that the actual Idea assigns the material of this its
finite actuality； viz。 human beings as a mass； in such a way that the function
assigned to any given individual is visibly mediated by circumstances； his caprice
and his personal choice of his station in life （see § 185 and the Remark thereto）。
Addition： In Plato's state； subjective freedom does not count； because people have their
occupations assigned to them by the Guardians。 In many oriental states； this assignment is
determined by birth。 But subjective freedom； which must be respected； demands that individuals
should have free choice in this matter。
§ 263。
In these spheres in which its moments； particularity and individuality； have their
immediate and reflected reality； mind is present as their objective universality
glimmering in them as the power of reason in necessity （see § 184）； i。e。 as the
institutions considered above。
Addition： The state； as mind； sunders itself into the particular determinations of its concept； of
its mode of being。 We might use here an illustration drawn from nature。 The nervous system is the
sensitive system proper； it is the abstract moment； the moment of being by oneself and so of
having identity with oneself。 But analysis of sensation reveals； that it has two aspects and these are
distinct in such a way that each of them seems to be a whole system by itself The first is feeling in
the abstract； keeping oneself self…enclosed； the dull movement which goes on internally；
reproduction； internal self…nutrition； growth； and digestion。 The second moment is that this
self…related existence has over against it the moment of difference； a movement outwards。 This is
irritability； sensation mo