phaedrus- 第13部分

about　the　art　of　speaking　we　should　like　to　hear　him；　but　if　not；　we



are　satisfied　with　our　own　view；　that　unless　a　man　estimates　the



various　characters　of　his　heaters　and　is　able　to　divide　all　things



into　classes　and　to　comprehend　them　under　single　ideas　he　will　never



be　a　skilful　rhetorician　even　within　the　limits　of　human　power。　And



this　skill　he　will　not　attain　without　a　great　deal　of　trouble；　which　a



good　man　ought　to　undergo；　not　for　the　sake　of　speaking　and　acting



before　men；　but　in　order　that　he　may　be　able　to　say　what　is　acceptable



to　God　and　always　to　act　acceptably　to　Him　as　far　as　in　him　lies；



for　there　is　a　saying　of　wiser　men　than　ourselves；　that　a　man　of　sense



should　not　try　to　please　his　fellow…servants　（at　least　this　should　not



be　his　first　object）　but　his　good　and　noble　masters；　and　therefore



if　the　way　is　long　and　circuitous；　marvel　not　at　this；　for；　where



the　end　is　great；　there　we　may　take　the　longer　road；　but　not　for



lesser　ends　such　as　yours。　Truly；　the　argument　may　say；　Tisias；　that



if　you　do　not　mind　going　so　far；　rhetoric　has　a　fair　beginning　here。



　　Phaedr。　I　think；　Socrates；　that　this　is　admirable；　if　only



practicable。



　　Soc。　But　even　to　fail　in　an　honourable　object　is　honourable。



　　Phaedr。　True。



　　Soc。　Enough　appears　to　have　been　said　by　us　of　a　true　and　false



art　of　speaking。



　　Phaedr。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　But　there　is　something　yet　to　be　said　of　propriety　and



impropriety　of　writing。



　　Phaedr。　Yes。



　　Soc。　Do　you　know　how　you　can　speak　or　act　about　rhetoric　in　a　manner



which　will　be　acceptable　to　God？



　　Phaedr。　No；　indeed。　Do　you？



　　Soc。　I　have　heard　a　tradition　of　the　ancients；　whether　true　or　not



they　only　know；　although　if　we　had　found　the　truth　ourselves；　do　you



think　that　we　should　care　much　about　the　opinions　of　men？



　　Phaedr。　Your　question　needs　no　answer；　but　I　wish　that　you　would



tell　me　what　you　say　that　you　have　heard。



　　Soc。　At　the　Egyptian　city　of　Naucratis；　there　was　a　famous　old



god；　whose　name　was　Theuth；　the　bird　which　is　called　the　Ibis　is



sacred　to　him；　and　he　was　the　inventor　of　many　arts；　such　as



arithmetic　and　calculation　and　geometry　and　astronomy　and　draughts　and



dice；　but　his　great　discovery　was　the　use　of　letters。　Now　in　those



days　the　god　Thamus　was　the　king　of　the　whole　country　of　Egypt；　and　he



dwelt　in　that　great　city　of　Upper　Egypt　which　the　Hellenes　call



Egyptian　Thebes；　and　the　god　himself　is　called　by　them　Ammon。　To　him



came　Theuth　and　showed　his　inventions；　desiring　that　the　other



Egyptians　might　be　allowed　to　have　the　benefit　of　them；　he　enumerated



them；　and　Thamus　enquired　about　their　several　uses；　and　praised　some



of　them　and　censured　others；　as　he　approved　or　disapproved　of　them。　It



would　take　a　long　time　to　repeat　all　that　Thamus　said　to　Theuth　in



praise　or　blame　of　the　various　arts。　But　when　they　came　to　letters；



This；　said　Theuth；　will　make　the　Egyptians　wiser　and　give　them



better　memories；　it　is　a　specific　both　for　the　memory　and　for　the　wit。



Thamus　replied：　O　most　ingenious　Theuth；　the　parent　or　inventor　of



an　art　is　not　always　the　best　judge　of　the　utility　or　inutility　of　his



own　inventions　to　the　users　of　them。　And　in　this　instance；　you　who　are



the　father　of　letters；　from　a　paternal　love　of　your　own　children



have　been　led　to　attribute　to　them　a　quality　which　they　cannot　have；



for　this　discovery　of　yours　will　create　forgetfulness　in　the　learners'



souls；　because　they　will　not　use　their　memories；　they　will　trust　to



the　external　written　characters　and　not　remember　of　themselves。　The



specific　which　you　have　discovered　is　an　aid　not　to　memory；　but　to



reminiscence；　and　you　give　your　disciples　not　truth；　but　only　the



semblance　of　truth；　they　will　be　hearers　of　many　things　and　will



have　learned　nothing；　they　will　appear　to　be　omniscient　and　will



generally　know　nothing；　they　will　be　tiresome　company；　having　the　show



of　wisdom　without　the　reality。



　　Phaedr。　Yes；　Socrates；　you　can　easily　invent　tales　of　Egypt；　or　of



any　other　country。



　　Soc。　There　was　a　tradition　in　the　temple　of　Dodona　that　oaks　first



gave　prophetic　utterances。　The　men　of　old；　unlike　in　their



simplicity　to　young　philosophy；　deemed　that　if　they　heard　the　truth



even　from　〃oak　or　rock；〃　it　was　enough　for　them；　whereas　you　seem　to



consider　not　whether　a　thing　is　or　is　not　true；　but　who　the　speaker　is



and　from　what　country　the　tale　comes。



　　Phaedr。　I　acknowledge　the　justice　of　your　rebuke；　and　I　think　that



the　Theban　is　right　in　his　view　about　letters。



　　Soc。　He　would　be　a　very　simple　person；　and　quite　a　stranger　to　the



oracles　of　Thamus　or　Ammon；　who　should　leave　in　writing　or　receive



in　writing　any　art　under　the　idea　that　the　written　word　would　be



intelligible　or　certain；　or　who　deemed　that　writing　was　at　all



better　than　knowledge　and　recollection　of　the　same　matters？



　　Phaedr。　That　is　most　true。



　　Soc。　I　cannot　help　feeling；　Phaedrus；　that　writing　is



unfortunately　like　painting；　for　the　creations　of　the　painter　have　the



attitude　of　life；　and　yet　if　you　ask　them　a　question　they　preserve　a



solemn　silence。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　speeches。　You　would



imagine　that　they　had　intelligence；　but　if　you　want　to　know　anything



and　put　a　question　to　one　of　them；　the　speaker　always　gives　one



unvarying　answer。　And　when　they　have　been　once　written　down　they　are



tumbled　about　anywhere　among　those　who　may　or　may　not　understand　them；



and　know　not　to　whom　they　should　reply；　to　whom　not：　and；　if　they



are　maltreated　or　abused；　they　have　no　parent　to　protect　them；　and



they　cannot　protect　or　defend　themselves。



　　Phaedr。　That　again　is　most　true。



　　Soc。　Is　there　not　another　kind　of　word　or　speech　far　better　than



this；　and　having　far　greater　power…a　son　of　the　same　family；　but



lawfully　begotten？



　　Phaedr。　Whom　do　you　mean；　and　what　is　his　origin？



　　Soc。　I　mean　an　intelligent　word　graven　in　the　soul　of　the　learner；



which　can　defend　itself；　and　knows　when　to　speak　and　when　to　be



silent。



　　Phaedr。　You　mean　the　living　word　of　knowledge　which　has　a　soul；



and　of　which　written　word　is　properly　no　more　than　an　image？



　　Soc。　Yes；　of　course　that　is　what　I　mean。　And　now　may　I　be　allowed　to



ask　you　a　question：　Would　a　husbandman；　who　is　a　man　of　sense；　take



the　seeds；　which　he　values　and　which　he　wishes　to　bear　fruit；　and　in



sober　seriousness　plant　them　during　the　heat　of　summer；　in　some　garden



of　Adonis；　that　he　may　rejoice　when　he　sees　them　in　eight　days



appearing　in　beauty？　at　least　he　would　do　so；　if　at　all；　only　for



the　sake　of　amusement　and　pastime。　But　when　he　is　in　earnest　he　sows



in　fitting　soil；　and　practises　husbandry；　and　is　satisfied　if　in　eight



months　the　seeds　which　he　has　sown　arrive　at　perfection？



　　Phaedr。　Yes；　Socrates；　that　will　be　his　way　when　he　is　in　earnest；



he　will　do　the　other；　as　you　say；　only　in　play。



　　Soc。　And　can　we　suppose　that　he　who　knows　the　just　and　good　and



honourable　has　less　understanding；　than　the　husbandman；　about　his



own　seeds？



　　Phaedr。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　Then　he　will　not　seriously　incline　to　〃write〃　his　thoughts



〃in　water〃　with　pen　and　ink；　sowing　words　which　can　neither　speak



for　themselves　nor　teach　the　truth　adequately　to　others？



　　Phaedr。　No；　that　is　not　likely。



　　Soc。　No；　that　is　not　likely…in　the　garden　of　letters　he　will　sow　and



plant；　but　only　for　the　sake　of　recreation　and　amusement；　he　will



write　them　down　as　memorials　to　be　treasured　against　the　forgetfulness



of　old　age；　by　himself；　or　by　any　other　old　man　who　is　treading　the



same　path。　He　will　rejoice　in　beholding　their　tender　growth；　and　while



others　are　refreshing　their　souls　with　banqueting　and　the　like；　this



will　be　the　pastime　in　which　his　days　are　spent。



　　Phaedr。　A　pastime；　Socrates；　as　noble　as　the　other　is　ignoble；　the



pastime　of　a　man　who　can　be　amused　by　serious　talk；　and　can



discourse　merrily　about　justice　and　the　like。



　　Soc。　True；　Phaedrus。　But　nobler　far　is　the　serious　pursuit　of　the



dialectician；　who；　finding　a　congenial　soul；　by　the　help　of　science



sows　and　plants　therein　words　which　are　able　to　help　themselves　and



him　who　planted　them；　and　are　not　unfruitful；　but　have　in　them　a



seed　which　others　brought　up　in　different　soils　render　immortal；



making　the　possessors　of　it　happy　to　the　utmost　extent　of　human



happiness。



　　Phaedr。　Far　nobler；　certainly。



　　Soc。　And　now；　Phaedrus；　having　agreed　upon　the　premises　we　decide



about　the　conclusion。



　　Phaedr。　About　what　conclusion？



　　Soc。　About　Lysias；　whom　we　censured；　and　his　art　of　writing；　and　his



discourses；　and　the　rhetorical　skill　or　want　of　skill　which　was



shown　in　them…these　are　the　questions　which　we　sought　to　determine；



and　they　brought　us　to　this　point。　And　I　think　that　we　are　now



pretty　well　informed　about　the　nature　of　art　and　its　opposite。



　　Phaedr。　Yes；　I　think　with　you；　but　I　wish　that　you　would　repeat　what



was　said。



　　Soc。　Until　a　man　knows　the　truth　of　the　several　particulars　of　which



he　is　writing　or　speaking；　and　is　able　to　define　them　as　they　are；　and



having　defined　them　again　to　divide　them　until　they　can　be　no　longer



divided；　and　until　in　like　manner　he　is　able　to　discern　the　nature



of　the　soul；　and　discover　the　different　modes　of　discourse　which　are



adapted　to　different　natures；　and　to　arrange　and　dispose　them　in



such　a　way　that　the　simple　form　of　speech　may　be　addressed　to　the



simpler　nature；　and