introduction to the metaphysic of morals- 第3部分

enjoyments　are　to　be　found。　And；　further；　the　knowledge　thus

acquired　is　available　for　each　individual　merely　in　his　own　way；　and

it　is　only　thus　he　can　learn　the　means　by　which　be　has　to　seek　those

enjoyments。　All　specious　rationalizing　a　priori；　in　this　connection；

is　nothing　at　bottom　but　carrying　facts　of　experience　up　to

generalizations　by　induction　（secundum　principia　generalia　non

universalia）；　and　the　generality　thus　attained　is　still　so　limited

that　numberless　exceptions　must　be　allowed　to　every　individual　in

order　that　he　may　adapt　the　choice　of　his　mode　of　life　to　his　own

Particular　inclinations　and　his　capacity　for　pleasure。　And；　after　all；

the　individual　has　really　to　acquire　his　prudence　at　the　cost　of　his

own　suffering　or　that　of　his　neighbors　the　form

　　But　it　is　quite　otherwise　with　the　principles　of　morality。　They

lay　down　commands　for　every　one　without　regard　to　his　particular

inclinations；　and　merely　because　and　so　far　as　he　is　free；　and　has　a

practical　reason。　Instruction　in　the　laws　of　morality　is　not　drawn

from　observation　of　oneself　or　of　our　animal　nature；　nor　from

perception　of　the　course　of　the　world　in　regard　to　what　happens；　or

how　men　act。*　But　reason　commands　how　we　ought　to　act；　even　although

no　example　of　such　action　were　to　be　found；　nor　does　reason　give　any

regard　to　the　advantage　which　may　accrue　to　us　by　so　acting；　and　which

experience　could　alone　actually　show。　For；　although　reason　allows　us

to　seek　what　is　for　our　advantage　in　every　possible　way；　and　although；

founding　upon　the　evidence　of　experience；　it　may　further　promise

that　greater　advantages　will　probably　follow　on　the　average　from　the

observance　of　her　commands　than　from　their　transgression；　especially

if　prudence　guides　the　conduct；　yet　the　authority　of　her　precepts　as

commands　does　not　rest　on　such　considerations。　They　are　used　by　reason

only　as　counsels；　and　by　way　of　a　counterpoise　against　seductions　to

an　opposite　course；　when　adjusting　beforehand　the　equilibrium　of　a

partial　balance　in　the　sphere　of　practical　judgement；　in　order　thereby

to　secure　the　decision　of　this　judgement；　according　to　the　due

weight　of　the　a　priori　principles　of　a　pure　practical　reason。



　　*This　holds　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　the　term　morals；〃　in　Latin

mores；　and　in　German　sitten；　signifies　originally　only　manners　or　mode

of　life。



　　Metaphysics　designates　any　system　of　knowledge　a　priori　that

consists　of　pure　conceptions。　Accordingly；　a　practical　philosophy

not　having　nature；　but　the　freedom　of　the　will　for　its　object；　will

presuppose　and　require　a　metaphysic　of　morals。　It　is　even　a　duty　to

have　such　a　metaphysic；　and　every　man　does；　indeed；　possess　it　in

himself；　although　commonly　but　in　an　obscure　way。　For　how　could　any

one　believe　that　he　has　a　source　of　universal　law　in　himself；

without　principles　a　priori？　And　just　as　in　a　metaphysics　of　nature

there　must　be　principles　regulating　the　application　of　the　universal

supreme　principles　of　nature　to　objects　of　experience；　so　there　cannot

but　be　such　principles　in　the　metaphysic　of　morals；　and　we　will

often　have　to　deal　objectively　with　the　particular　nature　of　man　as

known　only　by　experience；　in　order　to　show　in　it　the　consequences　of

these　universal　moral　principles。　But　this　mode　of　dealing　with

these　principles　in　their　particular　applications　will　in　no　way

detract　from　their　rational　purity；　or　throw　doubt　on　their　a　priori

origin。　In　other　words；　this　amounts　to　saying　that　a　metaphysic　of

morals　cannot　be　founded　on　anthropology　as　the　empirical　science　of

man；　but　may　be　applied　to　it。

　　The　counterpart　of　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　and　the　other　member　of

the　division　of　practical　philosophy；　would　be　a　moral　anthropology；

as　the　empirical　science　of　the　moral　nature　of　man。　This　science

would　contain　only　the　subjective　conditions　that　hinder　or　favor

the　realization　in　practice　of　the　universal　moral　laws　in　human

nature；　with　the　means　of　propagating；　spreading；　and　strengthening

the　moral　principles…　as　by　the　education　of　the　young　and　the

instruction　of　the　people…　and　all　other　such　doctrines　and　precepts

founded　upon　experience　and　indispensable　in　themselves；　although　they

must　neither　precede　the　metaphysical　investigation　of　the

principles　of　reason；　nor　be　mixed　up　with　it。　For；　by　doing　so；　there

would　be　a　great　danger　of　laying　down　false；　or　at　least　very

flexible　moral　laws；　which　would　hold　forth　as　unattainable　what　is

not　attached　only　because　the　law　has　not　been　comprehended　and

presented　in　its　purity；　in　which　also　its　strength　consists。　Or；

otherwise；　spurious　and　mixed　motives　might　be　adopted　instead　of　what

is　dutiful　and　good　in　itself；　and　these　would　furnish　no　certain

moral　principles　either　for　the　guidance　of　the　judgement　or　for　the

discipline　of　the　heart　in　the　practice　of　duty。　It　is　only　by　pure

reason；　therefore；　that　duty　can　and　must　be　prescribed。

　　The　higher　division　of　philosophy；　under　which　the　division　just

mentioned　stands；　is　into　theoretical　philosophy　and　practical

philosophy。　Practical　philosophy　is　just　moral　philosophy　in　its

widest　sense；　as　has　been　explained　elsewhere。*　All　that　is

practicable　and　possible；　according　to　natural　laws；　is　the　special

subject　of　the　activity　of　art；　and　its　precepts　and　rules　entirely

depend　on　the　theory　of　nature。　It　is　only　what　is　practicable

according　to　laws　of　freedom　that　can　have　principles　independent　of

theory；　for　there　is　no　theory　in　relation　to　what　passes　beyond　the

determinations　of　nature。　Philosophy　therefore　cannot　embrace　under

its　practical　division　a　technical　theory；　but　only　a　morally

practical　doctrine。　But　if　the　dexterity　of　the　will　in　acting

according　to　laws　of　freedom；　in　contradistinction　to　nature；　were

to　be　also　called　an　art；　it　would　necessarily　indicate　an　art　which

would　make　a　system　of　freedom　possible　like　the　system　of　nature。

This　would　truly　be　a　Divine　art；　if　we　were　in　a　position　by　means　of

it　to　realize　completely　what　reason　prescribes　to　us；　and　to　put

the　idea　into　practice。



　　*In　the　Critique　of　Judgement　（1790）。





　　　　　　　　　III。　THE　DIVISION　OF　A　METAPHYSIC　OF　MORALS。



　　All　legislation；　whether　relating　to　internal　or　external　action；

and　whether　prescribed　a　priori　by　mere　reason　or　laid　down　by　the

will　of　another；　involves　two　elements：　First；　a　law　which

represents　the　action　that　ought　to　happen　as　necessary　objectively；

thus　making　the　action　a　duty；　second；　a　motive　which　connects　the

principle　determining　the　will　to　this　action　with　the　mental

representation　of　the　law　subjectively；　so　that　the　law　makes　duty　the

motive　of　the　action。　By　the　first　element；　the　action　is

represented　as　a　duty；　in　accordance　with　the　mere　theoretical

knowledge　of　the　possibility　of　determining　the　activity　of　the　will

by　practical　rules。　By　the　second　element；　the　obligation　so　to　act　is

connected　in　the　subject　with　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　as

such。　All　legislation；　therefore；　may　be　differentiated　by　reference

to　its　motive…principle。*　The　legislation　which　makes　an　action　a

duty；　and　this　duty　at　the　same　time　a　motive；　is　ethical。　That

legislation　which　does　not　include　the　motive…principle　in　the　law；

and　consequently　admits　another　motive　than　the　idea　of　duty　itself；

is　juridical。　In　respect　of　the　latter；　it　is　evident　that　the　motives

distinct　from　the　idea　of　duty；　to　which　it　may　refer；　must　be　drawn

from　the　subjective　（pathological）　influences　of　inclination　and　of

aversion；　determining　the　voluntary　activity；　and　especially　from

the　latter；　because　it　is　a　legislation　which　has　to　be　compulsory；

and　not　merely　a　mode　of　attracting　or　persuading。　The　agreement　or

non…agreement　of　an　action　with　the　law；　without　reference　to　its

motive；　is　its　legality；　and　that　character　of　the　action　in　which　the

idea　of　duty　arising　from　the　law　at　the　same　time　forms　the　motive　of

the　action；　is　its　morality。



　　*This　ground　of　division　will　apply；　although　the　action　which　it

makes　a　duty　may　coincide　with　another　action　that　may　be　otherwise

looked　at　from　another　point　of　view。　For　instance；　actions　may　in　all

cases　be　classified　as　external。



　　Duties　specially　in　accord　with　a　juridical　legislation　can　only

be　external　duties。　For　this　mode　of　legislation　does　not　require　that

the　idea　of　the　duty；　which　is　internal；　shall　be　of　itself　the

determining　principle　of　the　act　of　will；　and　as　it　requires　a

motive　suitable　to　the　nature　of　its　laws；　it　can　only　connect　what　is

external　with　the　law。　Ethical　legislation；　on　the　other　hand；　makes

internal　actions　also　duties；　but　not　to　the　exclusion　of　the

external；　for　it　embraces　everything　which　is　of　the　nature　of　duty。

And　just　because　just　because　ethical　legislation　includes　within

its　law　the　internal　motive　of　the　action　as　contained　in　the　idea

of　duty；　it　involves　a　characteristic　which　cannot　at　all　enter　into

the　legislation　that　is　external。　Hence；　ethical　legislation　cannot　as

such　be　external；　not　even　when　proceeding　from　a　Divine　will；

although　it　may　receive　duties　which　rest　on　an　external　legislation

as　duties；　into　the　position　of　motives；　within　its　own　legislation。

　　From　what　has　been　said；　it　is　evident　that　all　duties；　merely

because　they　are　duties；　belong　to　ethics；　and　yet　the　legislation

upon　which　they　are　founded　is　not　on　that　account　in　all　cases

contained　in　ethics。　On　the　contrary；　the　law　of　many　of　them　lies

outside　of　ethics。　Thus　ethics　commands　that　I　must　fulfil　a　promise

entered　into　by　contract；　although　the　other　party　might　not　be　able

to　compel　me　to　do　so。　It　adopts　the　law　（pacta　sunt　servanda）　and　the

duty　corresponding　to　it；　from　jurisprudence　or　the　science　of

right；　by　which　they　are　established。　It　is　not　in　ethics；

therefore；　but　in　jurisprudence；　that　the　principle　of　the　legislation

lies；