the critique of judgement- 第15部分

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　17。　Ideal　of　beauty。

　　There　can　be　no　objective　rule　of　taste　by　which　what　is　beautiful　may　be　defined　by　means　of　concepts。　For　every　judgement　from　that　source　is　aesthetic；　i。e。；　its　determining　ground　is　the　feeling　of　the　subject；　and　not　any　concept　of　an　object。　It　is　only　throwing　away　labour　to　look　for　a　principle　of　taste　that　affords　a　universal　criterion　of　the　beautiful　by　definite　concepts；　because　what　is　sought　is　a　thing　impossible　and　inherently　contradictory。　But　in　the　universal　communicability　of　the　sensation　（of　delight　or　aversion）…a　communicability；　too；　that　exists　apart　from　any　concept…in　the　accord；　so　far　as　possible；　of　all　ages　and　nations　as　to　this　feeling　in　the　representation　of　certain　objects；　we　have　the　empirical　criterion；　weak　indeed　and　scarce　sufficient　to　raise　a　presumption；　of　the　derivation　of　a　taste；　thus　confirmed　by　examples；　from　grounds　deep　seated　and　shared　alike　by　all　men；　underlying　their　agreement　in　estimating　the　forms　under　which　objects　are　given　to　them。　　　For　this　reason　some　products　of　taste　are　looked　on　as　exemplary…not　meaning　thereby　that　by　imitating　others　taste　may　be　acquired。　For　taste　must　be　an　original　faculty；　whereas　one　who　imitates　a　model；　while　showing　skill　commensurate　with　his　success；　only　displays　taste　as　himself　a　critic　of　this　model。*　Hence　it　follows　that　the　highest　model；　the　archetype　of　taste；　is　a　mere　idea；　which　each　person　must　beget　in　his　own　consciousness；　and　according　to　which　he　must　form　his　estimate　of　everything　that　is　an　object　of　taste；　or　that　is　an　example　of　critical　taste；　and　even　of　universal　taste　itself。　Properly　speaking；　an　idea　signifies　a　concept　of　reason；　and　an　ideal　the　representation　of　an　individual　existence　as　adequate　to　an　idea。　Hence　this　archetype　of　taste…which　rests；　indeed；　upon　reason's　indeterminate　idea　of　a　maximum；　but　is　not；　however；　capable　of　being　represented　by　means　of　concepts；　but　only　in　an　individual　presentation…may　more　appropriately　be　called　the　ideal　of　the　beautiful。　While　not　having　this　ideal　in　our　possession；　we　still　strive　to　beget　it　within　us。　But　it　is　bound　to　be　merely　an　ideal　of　the　imagination；　seeing　that　it　rests；　not　upon　concepts；　but　upon　the　presentation…the　faculty　of　presentation　being　the　imagination。　Now；　how　do　we　arrive　at　such　an　ideal　of　beauty？　Is　it　a　priori　or　empirically？　Further；　what　species　of　the　beautiful　admits　of　an　ideal？

　　*Models　of　taste　with　respect　to　the　arts　of　speech　must　be　composed　in　a　dead　and　learned　language；　the　first；　to　prevent　their　having　to　suffer　the　changes　that　inevitably　overtake　living　ones；　making　dignified　expressions　become　degraded；　common　ones　antiquated；　and　ones　newly　coined　after　a　short　currency　obsolete：　the　second　to　ensure　its　having　a　grammar　that　is　not　subject　to　the　caprices　of　fashion；　but　has　fixed　rules　of　its　own。

　　First　of　all；　we　do　well　to　observe　that　the　beauty　for　which　an　ideal　has　to　be　sought　cannot　be　a　beauty　that　is　free　and　at　large；　but　must　be　one　fixed　by　a　concept　of　objective　finality。　Hence　it　cannot　belong　to　the　object　of　an　altogether　pure　judgement　of　taste；　but　must　attach　to　one　that　is　partly　intellectual。　In　other　words；　where　an　ideal　is　to　have　place　among　the　grounds　upon　which　any　estimate　is　formed；　then　beneath　grounds　of　that　kind　there　must　lie　some　idea　of　reason　according　to　determinate　concepts；　by　which　the　end　underlying　the　internal　possibility　of　the　object　is　determined　a　priori。　An　ideal　of　beautiful　flowers；　of　a　beautiful　suite　of　furniture；　or　of　a　beautiful　view；　is　unthinkable。　But；　it　may　also　be　impossible　to　represent　an　ideal　of　a　beauty　dependent　on　definite　ends；　e。g。；　a　beautiful　residence；　a　beautiful　tree；　a　beautiful　garden；　etc。；　presumably　because　their　ends　are　not　sufficiently　defined　and　fixed　by　their　concept；　with　the　result　that　their　finality　is　nearly　as　free　as　with　beauty　that　is　quite　at　large。　Only　what　has　in　itself　the　end　of　its　real　existence…only　man　that　is　able　himself　to　determine　his　ends　by　reason；　or；　where　he　has　to　derive　them　from　external　perception；　can　still　compare　them　with　essential　and　universal　ends；　and　then　further　pronounce　aesthetically　upon　their　accord　with　such　ends；　only　he；　among　all　objects　in　the　world；　admits；　therefore；　of　an　ideal　of　beauty；　just　as　humanity　in　his　person；　as　intelligence；　alone　admits　of　the　ideal　of　perfection。　　　Two　factors　are　here　involved。　First；　there　is　the　aesthetic　normal　idea；　which　is　an　individual　intuition　（of　the　imagination）。　This　represents　the　norm　by　which　we　judge　of　a　man　as　a　member　of　a　particular　animal　species。　Secondly；　there　is　the　rational　idea。　This　deals　with　the　ends　of　humanity　so　far　as　capable　of　sensuous　representation；　and　converts　them　into　a　principle　for　estimating　his　outward　form；　through　which　these　ends　are　revealed　in　their　phenomenal　effect。　The　normal　idea　must　draw　from　experience　the　constituents　which　it　requires　for　the　form　of　an　animal　of　a　particular　kind。　But　the　greatest　finality　in　the　construction　of　this　form…that　which　would　serve　as　a　universal　norm　for　forming　an　estimate　of　each　individual　of　the　species　in　question…the　image　that；　as　it　were；　forms　an　intentional　basis　underlying　the　technic　of　nature；　to　which　no　separate　individual；　but　only　the　race　as　a　whole；　is　adequate；　has　its　seat　merely　in　the　idea　of　the　judging　subject。　Yet　it　is；　with　all　its　proportions；　an　aesthetic　idea；　and；　as　such；　capable　of　being　fully　presented　in　concreto　in　a　model　image。　Now；　how　is　this　effected？　In　order　to　render　the　process　to　some　extent　intelligible　（for　who　can　wrest　nature's　whole　secret　from　her？）；　let　us　attempt　a　psychological　explanation。　　　It　is　of　note　that　the　imagination；　in　a　manner　quite　incomprehensible　to　us；　is　able　on　occasion；　even　after　a　long　lapse　of　time；　not　alone　to　recall　the　signs　for　concepts；　but　also　to　reproduce　the　image　and　shape　of　an　object　out　of　a　countless　number　of　others　of　a　different；　or　even　of　the　very　same；　kind。　And；　further；　if　the　mind　is　engaged　upon　comparisons；　we　may　well　suppose　that　it　can　in　actual　fact；　though　the　process　is　unconscious；　superimpose　as　it　were　one　image　upon　another；　and　from　the　coincidence　of　a　number　of　the　same　kind　arrive　at　a　mean　contour　which　serves　as　a　common　standard　for　all。　Say；　for　instance；　a　person　has　seen　a　thousand　full…grown　men。　Now　if　he　wishes　to　judge　normal　size　determined　upon　a　comparative　estimate；　then　imagination　（to　my　mind）　allows　a　great　number　of　these　images　（perhaps　the　whole　thousand）　to　fall　one　upon　the　other；　and；　if　I　may　be　allowed　to　extend　to　the　case　the　analogy　of　optical　presentation；　in　the　space　where　they　come　most　together；　and　within　the　contour　where　the　place　is　illuminated　by　the　greatest　concentration　of　colour；　one　gets　a　perception　of　the　average　size；　which　alike　in　height　and　breadth　is　equally　removed　from　the　extreme　limits　of　the　greatest　and　smallest　statures；　and　this　is　the　stature　of　a　beautiful　man。　（The　same　result　could　be　obtained　in　a　mechanical　way；　by　taking　the　measures　of　all　the　thousand；　and　adding　together　their　heights；　and　their　breadths　＇and　thicknesses＇；　and　dividing　the　sum　in　each　case　by　a　thousand。）　But　the　power　of　imagination　does　all　this　by　means　of　a　dynamical　effect　upon　the　organ　of　internal　sense；　arising　from　the　frequent　apprehension　of　such　forms。　If；　again；　for　our　average　man　we　seek　on　similar　lines　for　the　average　head；　and　for　this　the　average　nose；　and　so　on；　then　we　get　the　figure　that　underlies　the　normal　idea　of　a　beautiful　man　in　the　country　where　the　comparison　is　instituted。　For　this　reason　a　Negro　must　necessarily　（under　these　empirical　conditions）　have　a　different　normal　idea　of　the　beauty　of　forms　from　what　a　white　man　has；　and　the　Chinaman　one　different　from　the　European。　And　the。　process　would　be　just　the　same　with　the　model　of　a　beautiful　horse　or　dog　（of　a　particular　breed）。　This　normal　idea　is　not　derived　from　proportions　taken　from　experience　as　definite　rules：　rather　is　it　according　to　this　idea　that　rules　forming　estimates　first　become　possible。　It　is　an　intermediate　between　all　singular　intuitions　of　individuals；　with　their　manifold　variations…a　floating　image　for　the　whole　genus；　which　nature　has　set　as　an　archetype　underlying　those　of　her　products　that　belong　to　the　same　species；　but　which　in　no　single　case　she　seems　to　have　completely　attained。　But　the　normal　idea　is　far　from　giving　the　complete　archetype　of　beauty　in　the　genus。　It　only　gives　the　form　that　constitutes　the　indispensable　condition　of　all　beauty；　and；　consequently；　only　correctness　in　the　presentation　of　the　genus。　It　is；　as　the　famous　〃Doryphorus〃　of　Polycletus　was　called；　the　rule　（and　Myron's　〃Cow〃　might　be　similarly　employed　for　its　kind）。　It　cannot；　for　that　very　reason；　contain　anything　specifically　characteristic；　for　otherwise　it　would　not　be　the　normal　idea　for　the　genus。　Further；　it　is　not　by　beauty　that　its　presentation　pleases；　but　merely　because　it　does　not　contradict　any　of　the　conditions　under　which　alone　a　thing　belonging　to　this　genus　can　be　beautiful。　The　presentation　is　merely　academically　correct。*

　　*It　will　be　found　that　a　perfectly　regular　face　one　that　a　painter　might　fix　his　eye　on　for　a　model…ordinarily　conveys　nothing。　This　is　because　it　is　devoid　of　anything　characteristic；　and　so　the　idea　of　the　race　is　expressed　in　it　rather　than　the　specific　qualities　of　a　person。　The　exaggeration　of　what　is　characteristic　in　this　way；　i。e。；　exaggeration　violating　the　normal　idea　（the　finality　of　the　race）；　is　called　caricature。　Also　experience　shows　that　these　quite　regular　faces　indicate　as　a　rule　internally　only　a　mediocre　type　of　man；　presumably…if　one　may　assume　that　nature　in　its　external　form　expresses　the　proportions　of　the　internal　…because；　where　none　of　the　mental　qualities　exceed　the　proportion　requisite　to　constitute　a　man　free　from　faults；　nothing　can　be　expected　in　the　way　of　what　is　called　genius；　in　which　nature　seems　to　make　a　departure　from　its　wonted　relations　of　the　mental　powers　in　favour　of　some　special　one。

　　But　the　ideal　of　the　beautiful　is　still　something　different　from　its　nor