ituent parts of the critique of taste； they may still serve to elucidate its fundamental propositions。 They are these： （I） to think for oneself； （2） to think from the standpoint of everyone else； （3） always to think consistently。 The first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought； the second that of enlarged thought； the third that of consistent thought。 The first is the maxim of a never…passive reason。 To be given to such passivity； consequently to heteronomy of reason； is called prejudice； and the greatest of all prejudices is that of fancying nature not to be subject to rules which the understanding by virtue of its own essential laws lays at its basis； i。e。； superstition。 Emancipation from superstition is called enlightenment*； for although this term applies also to emancipation from prejudices generally； still superstition deserves pre…eminently （in sensu eminenti） to be called a prejudice。 For the condition of blindness into which superstition puts one； which is as much as demands from one as an obligation； makes the need of being led by others； and consequently the passive state of the reason； pre…eminently conspicuous。 As to the second maxim belonging to our habits of thought； we have quite got into the way of calling a man narrow （narrow； as opposed to being of enlarged mind） whose talents fall short of what is required for employment upon work of any magnitude （especially that involving intensity）。 But the question here is not one of the faculty of cognition； but of the mental habit of making a final use of it。 This； however small the range and degree to which man's natural endowments extend； still indicates a man of enlarged mind： if he detaches himself from the subjective personal conditions of his judgement； which cramp the minds of so many others； and reflects upon his own judgement from a universal standpoint （which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others）。 The third maxim…that； namely； of consistent thought…is the hardest of attainment； and is only attainable by the union of both the former； and after constant attention to them has made one at home in their observance。 We may say： The first of these is the maxim of understanding； the second that of judgement； the third of that reason。
*We readily see that enlightenment； while easy； no doubt； in thesi； in hypothesis is difficult and slow of realization。 For not to be passive with one's reason； but always to be self…legislative； is doubtless quite an easy matter for a man who only desires to be adapted to his essential end； and does not seek to know what is beyond his understanding。 But as the tendency in the latter direction is hardly avoidable； and others are always coming and promising with full assurance that they are able to satisfy one's curiosity； it must be very difficult to preserve or restore in the mind （and particularly in the public mind） that merely negative attitude （which constitutes enlightenment proper）。
I resume the thread of the discussion interrupted by the above digression； and I say that taste can with more justice be called a sensus communis than can sound understanding； and that the aesthetic； rather than the intellectual； judgement can bear the name of a public sense；* i。e。； taking it that we are prepared to use the word sense of an effect that mere reflection has upon the mind； for then by sense we mean the feeling of pleasure。 We might even define taste as the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept。
*Taste may be designated a sensus communis aestheticus； common human understanding a sensus communis logicus。
The aptitude of men for communicating their thoughts requires； also； a relation between the imagination and the understanding； in order to connect intuitions with concepts； and concepts； in turn； with intuitions； which both unite in cognition。 But there the agreement of both mental powers is according to law； and under the constraint of definite concepts。 Only when the imagination in its freedom stirs the understanding； and the understanding apart from concepts puts the imagination into regular play； does the representation communicate itself not as thought； but as an internal feeling of a final state of the mind。 Taste is； therefore； the faculty of forming an a priori estimate of the communicability of the feeling that； without the mediation of a concept； are connected with a given representation。 Supposing； now； that we could assume that the mere universal communicability of our feeling must of itself carry with it an interest for us （an assumption； however； which we are not entitled to draw as a conclusion from the character of a merely reflective judgement）； we should then be in a position to explain how the feeling in the judgement of taste comes to be exacted from everyone as a sort of duty。
SS 41。 The empirical interest in the beautiful。
Abundant proof bas been given above to show that the judgement of taste by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest as its determining ground。 But it does not follow from this that； after it has once been posited as a pure aesthetic judgement； an interest cannot then enter into combination with it。 This combination； however； can never be anything but indirect。 Taste must； that is to say； first of all be represented in conjunction with something else； if the delight attending the mere reflection upon an object is to admit of having further conjoined with it a pleasure in the real existence of the object （as that wherein all interest consists）。 For the saying； a posse ad esse non valet consequentia；* which is applied to cognitive judgements； holds good here in the case of aesthetic judgements。 Now this 〃something else〃 may be something empirical； such as an inclination proper to the nature of human beings； or it may be something intellectual； as a property of the will whereby it admits of rational determination a priori。 Both of these involve a delight in the existence of the object； and so can lay the foundation for an interest in what has already pleased of itself and without regard to any interest whatsoever。
*＇〃From possibility to actuality。〃＇
The empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in society。 And if we admit that the impulse to society is natural to mankind； and that the suitability for and the propensity towards it； i。e。； sociability； is a property essential to the requirements of man as a creature intended for society； and one； therefore； that belongs to humanity； it is inevitable that we should also look upon taste in the light of a faculty for estimating whatever enables us to communicate even our feeling to every one else； and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural inclination of everyone is set。 With no one to take into account but himself； a man abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either himself or his hut； nor would he look for flowers； and still less plant them； with the object of providing himself with personal adornments。 Only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a man； but a man refined after the manner of his kind （the beginning of civilization）…for that is the estimate formed of one who has the bent and turn for communicating his pleasure to others； and who is not quite satisfied with an object unless his feeling of delight in it can be shared in communion with others。 Further； a regard to universal communicability is a thing which every one expects and requires from every one else； just as if it were part of an original compact dictated by humanity itself。 And thus； no doubt； at first only charms； e。g。； colours for painting oneself （roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iroquois）； or flowers； sea…shells； beautifully coloured feathers； then； in the course of time； also beautiful forms （as in canoes； wearing…apparel； etc。） which convey no gratification； i。e。； delight of enjoyment； become of moment in society and attract a considerable interest。 Eventually； when civilization has reached its height it makes this work of communication almost the main business of refined inclination； and the entire value of sensations is placed in the degree to which they permit of universal communication。 At this stage； then； even where the pleasure which each one has in an object is but insignificant and possesses of itself no conspicuous interest； still the idea of its universal communicability almost indefinitely augments its value。 This interest； indirectly attached to the beautiful by the inclination towards society； and； consequently； empirical； is； however； of no importance for us here。 For that to which we have alone to look is what can have a bearing a priori； even though indirect； upon the judgement of taste。 For； if even in this form an associated interest should betray itself； taste would then reveal a transition on the part of our critical faculty。 from the enjoyment of sense to the moral feeling。 This would not merely mean that we should be supplied with a more effectual guide for the final employment of taste； but taste would further be presented as a link in the chain' of the human faculties a priori upon which all legislation； depend。 This much may certainly be said of the empirical interest in objects of taste； and in taste itself； that as taste thus pays homage to inclination； however refined； such interest will nevertheless readily fuse also with all inclinations and passions； which in society attain to their greatest variety and highest degree； and the interest in the beautiful； if this is made its ground； can but afford a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable to the good。 We have reason； however； to inquire whether this transition may not still in some way be furthered by means of taste when taken in its purity。
SS 42。 The intellectual interest in the beautiful。
It has been with the best intentions that those who love to see in the ultimate end of humanity； namely the morally good； the goal of all activities to which men are impelled by the inner bent of their nature； have regarded it as a mark of a good moral character to take an interest in the beautiful generally。 But they have； not without reason； been contradicted