is； in relation to that which is given by experience； not
necessarily and universally valid。
The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective
Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions
contained therein。 SS 15
I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians
give of a judgement。 It is； according to them； the representation of a
relation between two conceptions。 I shall not dwell here on the
faultiness of this definition； in that it suits only for categorical
and not for hypothetical or disjunctive judgements； these latter
containing a relation not of conceptions but of judgements themselves…
a blunder from which many evil results have followed。* It is more
important for our present purpose to observe； that this definition
does not determine in what the said relation consists。
*The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns
only categorical syllogisms； and although it is nothing more than an
artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions
（consequentiae immediatae） among the premises of a pure syllogism；
to give ism' give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing a
conclusion than that in the first figure； the artifice would not
have had much success； had not its authors succeeded in bringing
categorical judgements into exclusive respect； as those to which all
others must be referred… a doctrine； however； which； according to SS
5； is utterly false。
But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions
in every judgement； and distinguish it； as belonging to the
understanding； from the relation which is produced according to laws
of the reproductive imagination （which has only subjective
validity）； I find that judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing
given cognitions under the objective unit of apperception。 This is
plain from our use of the term of relation is in judgements； in
order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from
the subjective unity。 For this term indicates the relation of these
representations to the original apperception； and also their necessary
unity； even although the judgement is empirical； therefore contingent；
as in the judgement： 〃All bodies are heavy。〃 I do not mean by this；
that these representations do necessarily belong to each other in
empirical intuition； but that by means of the necessary unity of
appreciation they belong to each other in the synthesis of intuitions；
that is to say； they belong to each other according to principles of
the objective determination of all our representations； in so far as
cognition can arise from them； these principles being all deduced from
the main principle of the transcendental unity of apperception。 In
this way alone can there arise from this relation a judgement； that
is； a relation which has objective validity； and is perfectly distinct
from that relation of the very same representations which has only
subjective validity… a relation； to wit； which is produced according
to laws of association。 According to these laws； I could only say：
〃When I hold in my hand or carry a body； I feel an impression of
weight〃； but I could not say： 〃It； the body； is heavy〃； for this is
tantamount to saying both these representations are conjoined in the
object； that is； without distinction as to the condition of the
subject； and do not merely stand together in my perception； however
frequently the perceptive act may be repeated。
All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories； as
Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of
them can be united in one Consciousness。 SS 16
The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition es necessarily
under the original synthetical unity of apperception； because
thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible （SS 13）。 But that act
of the understanding； by which the manifold content of given
representations （whether intuitions or conceptions） is brought under
one apperception； is the logical function of judgements （SS 15）。 All
the manifold； therefore； in so far as it is given in one empirical
intuition； is determined in relation to one of the logical functions
of judgement； by means of which it is brought into union in one
consciousness。 Now the categories are nothing else than these
functions of judgement so far as the manifold in a given intuition
is determined in relation to them （SS 9）。 Consequently； the manifold
in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories of the
understanding。
Observation。 SS 17
The manifold in an intuition； which I call mine； is represented by
means of the synthesis of the understanding； as belonging to the
necessary unity of self…consciousness； and this takes place by means
of the category。* The category indicates accordingly that the
empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject
to a pure self…consciousness a priori； in the same manner as an
empirical intuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition； which
is also a priori。 In the above proposition； then； lies the beginning
of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding。 Now； as
the categories have their origin in the understanding alone；
independently of sensibility； I must in my deduction make
abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical
intuition is given； in order to fix my attention exclusively on the
unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by
means of the category。 In what follows （SS 22）； it will be shown； from
the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of
sensibility； that the unity which belongs to it is no other than
that which the category （according to SS 16） imposes on the manifold
in a given intuition； and thus； its a priori validity in regard to all
objects of sense being established； the purpose of our deduction
will be fully attained。
*The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition； by
means of which an object is given； and which always includes in itself
a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited； and also the relation of
this latter to unity of apperception。
But there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could
not make abstraction； namely； that the manifold to be intuited must be
given previously to the synthesis of the understanding； and
independently of it。 How this takes place remains here undetermined。
For if I cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive （as； for
example； a divine understanding which should not represent given
objects； but by whose representation the objects themselves should
be given or produced）； the categories would possess no significance in
relation to such a faculty of cognition。 They are merely rules for
an understanding； whose whole power consists in thought； that is； in
the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented
to it in intuition from a very different quarter； to the unity of
apperception； a faculty； therefore； which cognizes nothing per se； but
only connects and arranges the material of cognition； the intuition；
namely； which must be presented to it by means of the object。 But to
show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings； that
it produces unity of apperception a priori only by means of
categories； and a certain kind and number thereof； is as impossible as
to explain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of
judgement and no more； or why time and space are the only forms of our
intuition。
In Cognition； its Application to Objects of Experience is
the only legitimate use of the Category。 SS 18
To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same
thing。 In cognition there are two elements： firstly； the conception；
whereby an object is cogitated （the category）； and； secondly； the
intuition； whereby the object is given。 For supposing that to the
conception a corresponding intuition could not be given； it would
still be a thought as regards its form； but without any object； and no
cognition of anything would be possible by means of it； inasmuch as；
so far as I knew； there existed and could exist nothing to which my
thought could be applied。 Now all intuition possible to us is
sensuous； consequently； our thought of an object by means of a pure
conception of the understanding； can bee cognition for us only in
so far as this conception is applied to objects of the senses。
Sensuous intuition is either pure intuition （space and time） or
empirical intuition… of that which is immediately represented in space
and time by means of sensation as real。 Through the determination of
pure intuition we obtain a priori cognitions of objects； as in
mathematics； but only as regards their form as phenomena； whether
there can exist things which must be intuited in this form is not
thereby established。 All mathematical conceptions； therefore； are
not per se cognition； except in so far as we presuppose that there
exist things which can only be represented conformably to the form
of our pure sensuous intuition。 But things in space and time are given
only in so far as they are perceptions （representations acpanied
with sensation）； therefore only by empirical representation。
Consequently the pure conceptions of the understanding； even when they
are applied to intuitions a priori （as in mathematics）； produce
cognition only in so far as these （and therefore the conceptions of
the understanding by means of them） can be applied to empirical
intuitions。 Consequently the categories do not； even by means of
pure intuition afford us any cognition of things； they can only do
so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition。 That is to
say； the； categories serve only to render empirical cognition
possible。 But this is what we call experience。 Consequently； in
cognition； their application to objects of experience is the only
legitimate use of the categories。
SS 19
The foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance； for it
determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the
understanding in regard to o