with the demands of reason； and； the judge pleting the statement of
the grounds of claim； which both parties had left in an unsatisfactory
state； the question may be settled on its own merits； not by
dismissing the claimants； but by a parison of the arguments on both
sides。 If we consider merely their extension； and whether they are
adequate with ideas； the series of conditions may be regarded as all
homogeneous。 But the conception of the understanding which lies at the
basis of these ideas； contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous
（presupposed in every quantity… in its position as well as in its
division） or of the heterogeneous； which is the case in the
dynamical synthesis of cause and effect； as well as of the necessary
and the contingent。
Thus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no
other than a sensuous condition is admissible… a condition which is
itself a member of the series； while the dynamical series of
sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous condition； which is not a
member of the series； but； as purely intelligible； lies out of and
beyond it。 And thus reason is satisfied； and an unconditioned placed
at the head of the series of phenomena； without introducing
confusion into or discontinuing it； contrary to the principles of
the understanding。
Now； from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of
phenomena which does not form a part of the series of phenomena；
arises a result which we should not have expected from an antinomy。 In
former cases； the result was that both contradictory dialectical
statements were declared to be false。 In the present case； we find the
conditioned in the dynamical series connected with an empirically
unconditioned； but non…sensuous condition； and thus satisfaction is
done to the understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the
other。* While； moreover； the dialectical arguments for unconditioned
totality in mere phenomena fall to the ground； both propositions of
reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification。 This
could not happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which
demanded a mathematically unconditioned unity； for no condition
could be placed at the head of the series of phenomena； except one
which was itself a phenomenon and consequently a member of the series。
*For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition
which is itself empirically unconditioned。 But if it is possible to
cogitate an intelligible condition… one which is not a member of the
series of phenomena… for a conditioned phenomenon； without breaking
the series of empirical conditions； such a condition may be admissible
as empirically unconditioned； and the empirical regress continue
regular； unceasing； and intact。
III。 Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of
the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes。
There are only two modes of causality cogitable… the causality of
nature or of freedom。 The first is the conjunction of a particular
state with another preceding it in the world of sense； the former
following the latter by virtue of a law。 Now； as the causality of
phenomena is subject to conditions of time； and the preceding state；
if it had always existed； could not have produced an effect which
would make its first appearance at a particular time； the causality of
a cause must itself be an effect… must itself have begun to be； and
therefore； according to the principle of the understanding； itself
requires a cause。
We must understand； on the contrary； by the term freedom； in the
cosmological sense； a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a
state； the causality of which； therefore； is not subordinated to
another cause determining it in time。 Freedom is in this sense a
pure transcendental idea； which； in the first place； contains no
empirical element； the object of which； in the second place； cannot be
given or determined in any experience； because it is a universal law
of the very possibility of experience； that everything which happens
must have a cause； that consequently the causality of a cause； being
itself something that has happened； must also have a cause。 In this
view of the case； the whole field of experience； how far soever it may
extend； contains nothing that is not subject to the laws of nature。
But； as we cannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of
conditions in reference to the series of causes and effects； reason
creates the idea of a spontaneity； which can begin to act of itself；
and without any external cause determining it to action； according
to the natural law of causality。
It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom
is based upon the transcendental idea； and that the question of the
possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the
consideration of the truth of the latter。 Freedom； in the practical
sense； is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous
impulses。 A will is sensuous； in so far as it is pathologically
affected （by sensuous impulses）； it is termed animal （arbitrium
brutum）； when it is pathologically necessitated。 The human will is
certainly an arbitrium sensitivum； not brutum； but liberum； because
sensuousness does not necessitate its action； a faculty existing in
man of self…determination； independently of all sensuous coercion。
It is plain that； if all causality in the world of sense were
natural… and natural only… every event would be determined by
another according to necessary laws； and that； consequently；
phenomena； in so far as they determine the will； must necessitate
every action as a natural effect from themselves； and thus all
practical freedom would fall to the ground with the transcendental
idea。 For the latter presupposes that although a certain thing has not
happened； it ought to have happened； and that； consequently； its
phenomenal cause was not so powerful and determinative as to exclude
the causality of our will… a causality capable of producing effects
independently of and even in opposition to the power of natural
causes； and capable； consequently； of spontaneously originating a
series of events。
Here； too； we find it to be the case； as we generally found in the
self…contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass
the bounds of possible experience； that the problem is properly not
physiological； but transcendental。 The question of the possibility
of freedom does indeed concern psychology； but； as it rests upon
dialectical arguments of pure reason； its solution must engage the
attention of transcendental philosophy。 Before attempting this
solution； a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline； it
will be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the
settlement of the question。
If phenomena were things in themselves； and time and space forms
of the existence of things； condition and conditioned would always
be members of the same series； and thus would arise in the present
case the antinomy mon to all transcendental ideas… that their
series is either too great or too small for the understanding。 The
dynamical ideas； which we are about to discuss in this and the
following section； possess the peculiarity of relating to an object；
not considered as a quantity； but as an existence； and thus； in the
discussion of the present question； we may make abstraction of the
quantity of the series of conditions； and consider merely the
dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned。 The
question； then； suggests itself； whether freedom is possible； and；
if it is； whether it can consist with the universality of the
natural law of causality； and； consequently； whether we enounce a
proper disjunctive proposition when we say： 〃Every effect must have
its origin either in nature or in freedom；〃 or whether both cannot
exist together in the same event in different relations。 The principle
of an unbroken connection between all events in the phenomenal
world； in accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature； is a
well…established principle of transcendental analytic which admits
of no exception。 The question； therefore； is： 〃Whether an effect；
determined according to the laws of nature； can at the same time be
produced by a free agent； or whether freedom and nature mutually
exclude each other？〃 And here； the mon but fallacious hypothesis of
the absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious influence in
embarrassing the procedure of reason。 For if phenomena are things in
themselves； freedom is impossible。 In this case； nature is the
plete and all…sufficient cause of every event； and condition and
conditioned； cause and effect are contained in the same series； and
necessitated by the same law。 If； on the contrary； phenomena are
held to be； as they are in fact； nothing more than mere
representations； connected with each other in accordance with
empirical laws； they must have a ground which is not phenomenal。 But
the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or
determinable by phenomena； although its effects； as phenomena； must be
determined by other phenomenal existences。 This cause and its
causality exist therefore out of and apart from the series of
phenomena； while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the
series of empirical conditions。 Such an effect may therefore be
considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause； and
necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary
consequence… a distinction which； stated in this perfectly general and
abstract manner； must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure。
The sequel will explain。 It is sufficient； at present； to remark that；
as the plete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an unalterable
law of nature； freedom is impossible… on the supposition that
phenomena are absolutely real。 Hence those philosophers who adhere
to the mon opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling
the ideas of nature and freedom。
Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law
of Natural Necessity。
That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous； I
may be allo