liberty- 第7部分

ve　Right：　As　for　example；　if　any　man　shall　sell；　or　give　away　a　Farme；　he　utterly　deprives　himself　only　from　all　Right　to　this　Farme；　but　he　does　not　so　from　others　also。　　　　　V。　But　in　the　conveyance　of　Right　the　will　is　requisite　not　onely　of　him　that　conveys；　but　of　him　also　that　accepts　it。　If　either　be　wanting；　the　Right　remaines：　for　if　I　would　have　given　what　was　mine；　to　one　who　refus'd　to　accept　of　it；　I　have　not　therefore　either　simply　renounc'd　my　Right；　or　convey'd　it　to　any　man；　for　the　cause　which　mov'd　me　to　part　with　it　to　this　Man　was　in　him　onely；　not　in　others　too。　　　　　VI。　But　if　there　be　no　other　Token　extant　of　our　will　either　to　quit；　or　convey　our　Right；　but　onely　Words；　those　words　must　either　relate　to　the　present；　or　time　past；　for　if　they　be　of　the　future　onely；　they　convey　nothing：　for　example；　he　that　speaks　thus　of　the　time　to　come；　I　will　give　to　morrow；　declares　openly　that　yet　he　hath　not　given　it；　so　that　all　this　day　his　right　remains；　and　abides　to　morrow　too；　unlesse　in　the　interim　he　actually　bestowes　it：　for　what　is　mine；　remains　mine　till　I　have　parted　with　it。　But　if　I　shall　speak　of　the　time　present；　suppose　thus；　I　doe　give；　or　have　given　you　this　to　be　received　to　morrow；　by　these　words　is　signified　that　I　have　already　given　it；　and　that　his　Right　to　receive　it　to　morrow；　is　conveyed　to　him　by　me　to　day。　　　　　VII。　Neverthelesse；　although　words　alone　are　not　sufficient　tokens　to　declare　the　Will；　if　yet　to　words　relating　to　the　future；　there　shall　some　other　signes　be　added；　they　may　become　as　valid；　as　if　they　had　been　spoken　of　the　present：　If　therefore；　as　by　reason　of　those　other　signes；　it　appear；　that　he　that　speaks　of　the　future；　intends　those　words　should　be　effectuall　toward　the　perfect　transferring　of　his　Right；　they　ought　to　be　valid；　for　the　conveyance　of　right　depends　not　on　words；　but　（as　hath　been　instanc'd　in　the　4。　Article）　on　the　declaration　of　the　Will。　　　　　VIII。　If　any　man　conveigh　some　part　of　his　right　to　another；　and　doth　not　this　for　some　certain　benefit　received；　or　for　some　compact；　a　conveighance　in　this　kind　is　called　a　Gift；　or　free　Donation。　But　in　free　donation　those　words　onely　oblige　us　which　signifie　the　present；　or　the　time　past；　for　if　they　respect　the　future；　they　oblige　not　as　words；　for　the　reason　given　in　the　foregoing　Article：　It　must　needs　therefore　be；　that　the　Obligation　arise　from　some　other　tokens　of　the　Will：　But；　because　whatsoever　is　voluntarily　done；　is　done　for　some　good　to　him　that　wils　it；　there　can　no　other　token　be　assigned　of　the　Will　to　give　it；　except　some　benefit　either　already　receiv'd；　or　to　be　acquir'd；　but　is　suppos'd；　that　no　such　benefit　is　acquired；　nor　any　compact　in　being；　for　if　so；　it　would　cease　to　be　a　free　gift：　It　remains　therefore；　that　a　mutuall　good　turne　without　agreement　be　expected；　but　no　signe　can　be　given；　that　he；　who　us'　d　future　words　toward　him　who　was　in　no　sort　engag'd　to　return　a　benefit；　should　desire　to　have　his　words　so　understood；　as　to　oblige　himselfe　thereby。　Nor　is　it　suitable　to　Reason；　that　those　who　are　easily　enclined　to　doe　well　to　others；　should　be　oblig'd　by　every　promise；　testifying　their　present　good　affection：　And　for　this　cause；　a　promiser　in　this　kind；　must　be　understood　to　have　time　to　deliberate；　and　power　to　change　that　affection　as　well　as　he　to　whom　he　made　that　promise；　may　alter　his　desert。　But　he　that　deliberates；　is　so　farre　forth　free；　nor　can　be　said　to　have　already　given：　But　if　he　promise　often；　and　yet　give　seldome；　he　ought　to　be　condemn'd　of　levity；　and　be　called　not　a　Donour；　but　Doson。　　　　　IX。　But　the　act　of　two；　or　more；　mutually　conveighing　their　Rights；　is　call'd　a　Contract。　But　in　every　Contract；　either　both　parties　instantly　performe　what　they　contract　for；　insomuch　as　there　is　no　trust　had　from　either　to　other；　or　the　one　performes；　the　other　is　trusted；　or　neither　performe。　Where　both　parties　performe　presently；　there　the　Contract　is　ended；　as　soon　as　'tis　performed；　but　where　there　is　credit　given　either　to　one；　or　both；　there　the　party　trusted　promiseth　after…performance；　and　this　kind　of　promise　is　called　a　COVENANT。　　　　　X。　But　the　Covenant　made　by　the　party　trusted　with　him；　who　hath　already　performed；　although　the　promise　be　made　by　words　pointing　at　the　future；　doth　no　lesse　transfer　the　right　of　future　time；　then　if　it　had　been　made　by　words　signifying　the　present；　or　time　past：　for　the　others　performance　is　a　most　manifest　signe　that　he　so　understood　the　speech　of　him　whom　he　trusted；　as　that　he　would　certainly　make　performance　also　at　the　appointed　time；　and　by　this　signe　the　party　trusted　knew　himselfe　to　be　thus　understood；　which；　because　he　hindred　not；　'twas　an　evident　token　of　his　Will　to　performe。　The　promises　therefore　which　are　made　for　some　benefit　received　（which　are　also　Covenants）　are　Tokens　of　the　Will；　that　is；　（as　in　the　foregoing　Section　hath　been　declared）　of　the　last　act　of　deliberating；　whereby　the　liberty　of　non…performance　is　abolisht；　and　by　consequence　are　obligatory；　for　where　Liberty　ceaseth；　there　beginneth　Obligation。　　　　　XI。　But　the　Covenants；　which　are　made　in　contract　of　mutuall　trust；　neither　party　performing　out　of　hand；　if　there　arise　a　just　suspicion　in　either　of　them；　are　in　the　state　of　nature　invalid：　for　he　that　first　performes　by　reason　of　the　wicked　disposition　of　the　greatest　part　of　men　studying　their　owne　advantage；　either　by　right；　or　wrong；　exposeth　himself　to　the　perverse　will　of　him　with　whom　he　hath　Contracted；　for　it　suites　not　with　reason；　that　any　man　should　performe　first；　if　it　be　not　likely　that　the　other　will　make　good　his　promise　after；　which；　whether　it　be　probable；　or　not；　he　that　doubts　it；　must　be　judge　of；　as　hath　been　shewed　in　the　foregoing　Chapter　in　the　9。　Article。　Thus；　I　say；　things　stand　in　the　state　of　nature；　but　in　a　Civill　State；　when　there　is　a　power　which　can　compell　both　parties；　he　that　hath　contracted　to　perform　first；　must　first　performe；　because；　that　since　the　other　may　be　compell'd；　the　cause　which　made　him　fear　the　others　non…performance；　ceaseth。　　　　　Arise＇　For；　except　there　appear　some　new　cause　of　fear；　either　from　somewhat　done；　or　some　other　token　of　the　till　not　to　performe　from　the　other　part；　it　cannot　be　judg'd　to　be　a　just　fear；　for　the　cause　which　was　not　sufficient　to　keep　him　from　making　Compact；　must　not　suffice　to　authorize　the　breach　of　it；　being　made。　　　　　XII。　But　from　this　reason；　that　in　all　Free…gifts；　and　Compacts；　there　is　an　acceptance　of　the　conveighance　of　Right　required：　it　followes；　that　no　man　can　Compact　with　him　who　doth　not　declare　his　acceptance；　and　therefore　we　cannot　compact　with　Beasts；　neither　can　we　give；　or　take　from　them　any　manner　of　Right；　by　reason　of　their　want　of　speech；　and　understanding；　Neither　can　any　man　Covenant　with　God；　or　be　oblig'd　to　him　by　Vow；　except　so　far　forth　as　it　appeares　to　him　by　Holy　Scriptures；　that　he　hath　substituted　certaine　men　who　have　authority　to　accept　of　such　like　Vowes　and　Covenants；　as　being　in　Gods　stead。　　　　　XIII。　Those　therefore　doe　vow　in　vain；　who　are　in　the　state　of　nature；　where　they　are　not　tyed　by　any　Civill　Law；　（except　by　most　certain　Revelation　the　Will　of　God　to　accept　their　Vow；　or　Pact；　be　made　known　to　them）　for　if　what　they　Vow；　be　contrary　to　the　Law　of　Nature；　they　are　not　tyed　by　their　Vow；　for　no　man　is　tyed　to　perform　an　unlawfull　act；　but　if　what　is　vowed；　be　commanded　by　some　Law　of　nature；　it　is　not　their　Vow；　but　the　Law　it　self　which　ties　them；　but　if　he　were　free　before　his　vow；　either　to　doe　it；　or　not　doe　it；　his　liberty　remaines；　because　that　the　openly　declar'd　Will　of　the　obliger　is　requisite　to　make　an　obligation　by　Vow；　which　in　the　case　propounded　is　suppos'd　not　to　be：　Now　I　call　him　the　Obliger　to　whom　any　one　is　tyed；　and　the　Obliged　him　who　is　tyed。　　　　　XIV。　Covenants　are　made　of　such　things　onely　as　fall　under　our　deliberation；　for　it　can　be　no　Covenant　without　the　Will　of　the　Contractor；　but　the　Will　is　the　last　act　of　him　who　deliberates；　therefore　they　onely　concerne　things　possible；　and　to　come；　no　man　therefore；　by　his　Compact；　obligeth　himself　to　an　impossibility。　But　yet；　though　we　often　Covenant　to　doe　such　things　as　then　seem'　d　possible　when　we　promis'd　them；　which　yet　afterward　appear　to　be　impossible；　are　we　therefore　freed　from　all　obligation？　The　reason　whereof　is；　that　he　who　promiseth　a　future　incertainty　receives　a　present　benefit；　on　condition；　that　he　return　another　for　it：　for　his　Will；　who　performes　the　present　benefit　hath　simply　before　it；　for　its　object；　a　certain　good　valuable　with　the　thing　promised；　but　the　thing　it　selfe　not　simply；　but　with　condition　if　it　could　be　done；　but　if　it　should　so　happen；　that　even　this　should　prove　impossible；　why　then　he　must　perform　as　much　as　he　can。　Covenants　therefore　oblige　us　not　to　perform　just　the　thing　it　selfe　covenanted　for；　but　our　utmost　endeavour。　for　this　onely　is；　the　things　themselves　are　not　in　our　power。　　　　　XV。　We　are　freed　from　Covenants　two　wayes；　either　by　performing；　or　by　being　forgiven：　By　performing；　for　beyond　that　we　oblig'd　not　our　selves。　By　being　for…given；　because　he　whom　we　oblig'd　our　selves　to　by　forgiving；　is　conceiv'd　to　return　us　that　Right　which　we　past　over　to　him；　for；　forgiving；　implies　giving：　that　is；　by　the　fourth　Article　of　this　Chapter；　a　conveyance　of　Right　to　him　to　whom　the　gift　is　made。　　　　　XVI。　Its　an　usuall　question；　Whether　Compacts　extorted　from　us；　through　fear；　do　oblige；　or　not：　For　example；　If　to　redeeme　my　life；　from　the　power　of　a　Robber；　I　promise　to　pay　him　100　l。　next　day；　and　that　I　will　doe　no　act　whereby　to　apprehend；　and　bring　him　to　Justice；　whether　I　am　tyed　to　keep　promise；　or　not？　But　though　such　a　Promise　must　sometimes　be　judged　to　be　of　no　effect；　yet　it　is　not　to　be　accounted　so；　because　it　proceeded　from　fear；　for　then　it　would　follow　that　those　promises　which　reduc'd　men　to　a　civill　life；　and　by　which　Lawes　were　made；　might　likewise　be　of　none　effect；　（for　it　proceeds　from　fear　of　mutuall　slaughter；　that　one　man　submits　himselfe　to　the　Dominion　of　another：）　And　he　should　play　the　fool　finely；　who　should　trust　his　captive　covenanting　with　the　price　of　his　redemption。　It　holds　universally　true；　that　promises　doe　oblige　when　there　i