liberty- 第9部分

putation。　　　　　IV。　From　these　grounds　it　followes；　that　an　injury　can　be　done　to　no　man　but　him　with　whom　we　enter　Covenant；　or　to　whom　somewhat　is　made　over　by　deed　of　gift；　or　to　whom　somwhat　is　promis'd　by　way　of　bargain。　And　therefore　damaging　and　injuring　are　often　disjoyn'd：　for　if　a　Master　command　his　Servant；　who　hath　promis'd　to　obey　him；　to　pay　a　summe　of　money；　or　carry　some　present　to　a　third　man；　the　Servant；　if　he　doe　it　not；　hath　indeed　damag'd　this　third　party；　but　he　injur'd　his　Master　onely。　So　also　in　a　civill　government；　if　any　man　offend　another；　with　whom　he　hath　made　no　Contract；　he　damages　him　to　whom　the　evill　is　done；　but　he　injures　none　but　him　to　whom　the　power　of　government　belongs：　for　if　he；　who　receives　the　hurt；　should　expostulate　the　mischief。　and　he　that　did　it；　should　answer　thus；　What　art　thou　to　me？　Why　should　I　rather　doe　according　to　yours；　then　mine　owne　will；　since　I　do　not　hinder；　but　you　may　do　your　own；　and　not　my　mind？　In　which　speech；　where　there　hath　no　manner　of　pre…contract　past；　I　see　not；　I　confesse；　what　is　reprehensible。　　　　　Injury　can　be　done　against　no　man＇　The　word　injustice　relates　to　some　Law：　Injury　to　some　Person；　as　well　as　some　Law。　For　what's　unjust；　is　unjust　to　all；　but　there　may　an　injury　be　done；　and　yet　not　against　me；　nor　thee；　but　some　other；　and　sometimes　against　no　private　Person；　but　the　Magistrate　only；　sometimes　also　neither　against　the　Magistrate；　nor　any　private　man；　but　onely　against　God；　for　through　Contract；　and　conveighance　of　Right；　we　say；　that　an　injury　is　done　against　this；　or　that　man。　Hence　it　is　（which　we　see　in　all　kind　of　Government）　that　what　private　men　contract　between　themselves　by　word；　or　writing；　is　releast　againe　at　the　will　of　the　Obliger。　But　those　mischiefes　which　are　done　against　the　Lawes　of　the　Land；　as　theft；　homicide；　and　the　like；　are　punisht　not　as　he　wills；　to　whom　the　hurt　is　done；　but　according　to　the　will　of　the　Magistrate；　that　is；　the　constituted　Lawes。　　　　　V。　These　words　just；　and　unjust；　as　also　justice；　and　injustice；　are　equivocall；　for　they　signifie　one　thing　when　they　are　attributed　to　Persons；　another　when　to　actions：　When　they　are　attributed　to　Actions；　Just　signifies　as　much　as　what's　done　with　Right；　and　unjust；　as　what's　done　with　injury：　he　who　hath　done　some　just　thing　is　not　therefore　said　to　be　a　just　Person；　but　guiltlesse；　and　he　that　hath　done　some　unjust　thing；　we　doe　not　therefore　say　he　is　an　unjust；　but　guilty　man。　But　when　the　words　are　applyed　to　Persons；　to　be　just；　signifies　as　much　as　to　be　delighted　in　just　dealing；　to　study　how　to　doe　righteousnesse；　or　to　indeavour　in　all　things　to　doe　that　which　is　just；　and　to　be　unjust；　is　to　neglect　righteous　dealing；　or　to　think　it　is　to　be　measured　not　according　to　my　contract；　but　some　present　benefit；　so　as　the　justice　or　injustice　of　the　mind；　the　intention；　or　the　man；　is　one　thing；　that　of　an　action；　or　omission；　another；　and　innumerable　actions　of　a　just　man　may　be　unjust；　and　of　an　unjust　man；　just：　But　that　man　is　to　be　accounted　just；　who　doth　just　things　because　the　Law　commands　it；　unjust　things　only　by　reason　of　his　infirmity；　and　he　is　properly　said　to　be　unjust　who　doth　righteousness　for　fear　of　the　punishment　annext　unto　the　Law；　and　unrighteousnesse　by　reason　of　the　iniquity　of　his　mind。　　　　　VI。　The　justice　of　actions　is　commonly　distinguisht　into　two　kinds；　Commutative；　and　Distributive；　the　former　whereof　they　say　consists　in　Arithmeticall；　the　latter　in　Geometricall　proportion：　and　that　is　conversant　in　exchanging；　in　buying；　selling；　borrowing；　lending；　location；　and　conduction；　and　other　acts　whatsoever　belonging　to　Contracters；　where；　if　there　be　an　equall　return　made；　hence　they　say　springs　a　commutative　justice：　But　this　is　busied　about　the　dignity；　and　merits　of　men；　so　as　if　there　be　rendred　to　every　man　kata　pen　axian　more　to　him　who　is　more　worthy；　and　lesse　to　him　that　deserves　lesse；　and　that　proportionably；　hence　they　say　ariseth　distributive　justice：　I　acknowledge　here　some　certaine　distinction　of　equality；　to　wit；　that　one　is　an　equality　simply　so　called；　as　when　two　things　of　equall　value　are　compar'd　together；　as　a　pound　of　silver　with　twelve　ounces　of　the　same　silver；　the　other　is　an　equality；　secundum；　quod　as　when　a　1000　pound　is　to　be　divided　to　an　hundred　men；　600　pounds　are　given　to　60　men；　and　400　to　40　where　there　is　no　equality　between　600　and　400。　But　when　it　happens；　that　there　is　the　same　inequality　in　the　number　of　them　to　whom　it　is　distributed；　every　one　of　them　shall　take　an　equall　part；　whence　it　is　called　an　equall　distribution：　But　such　like　equality　is　the　same　thing　with　Geometricall　proportion。　But　what　is　all　this　to　Justice？　for　neither；　if　I　sell　my　goods　for　as　much　as　I　can　get　for　them；　doe　I　injure　the　buyer；　who　sought；　and　desir'd　them　of　me？　neither　if　I　divide　more　of　what　is　mine　to　him　who　deserves　lesse；　so　long　as　I　give　the　other　what　I　have　agreed　for；　do　I　wrong　to　either？　which　truth　our　Saviour　himself；　being　God；　testifies　in　the　Gospell。　This　therefore　is　no　distinction　of　Justice；　but　of　equality；　yet　perhaps　it　cannot　be　deny'd；　but　that　Justice　is　a　certain　equality；　as　consisting　in　this　onely；　that　since　we　are　all　equall　by　nature；　one　should　not　arrogate　more　Right　to　himselfe；　then　he　grants　to　another；　unlesse　he　have　fairly　gotten　it　by　Compact。　And　let　this　suffice　to　be　spoken　against　this　distinction　of　Justice；　although　now　almost　generally　receiv'd　by　all；　lest　any　man　should　conceive　an　injury　to　be　somewhat　else；　then　the　breach　of　Faith；　or　Contract；　as　hath　been　defin'd　above。　　　　　VII。　It　is　an　old　saying；　Volenti　non　fit　iniuria　（the　willing　man　receives　no　injury）　yet　the　truth　of　it　may　be　deriv'd　from　our　Principles。　For　grant；　that　a　man　be　willing　that　that　should　be　done；　which　he　conceives　to　be　an　injury。　to　him；　why　then　that　is　done　by　his　will；　which　by　Contract　was　not　lawfull　to　be　done；　but　he　being　willing　that　should　be　done；　which　was　not　lawfull　by　Contract；　the　Contract　it　self　（by　the　15。　5　Article　of　the　foregoing　Chapter）　becomes　void：　The　Right　therefore　of　doing　it　returnes；　therefore　it　is　done　by　Right；　wherefore　it　is　no　injury。　　　　　VIII。　The　third　precept　of　the　Naturall　Law；　is；　That　you　suffer　not　him　to　be　the　worse　for　you；　who　out　of　the　confidence　he　had　in　you；　first　did　you　a　good　turn；　or　that　you　accept　not　a　gift；　but　with　a　mind　to　endeavour；　that　the　giver　shall　have　no　just　occasion　to　repent　him　of　his　gift。　For　without　this　he　should　act　without　reason　that　would　conferre　a　benefit　where　he　sees　it　would　be　lost；　and　by　this　meanes　all　beneficence；　and　trust；　together　with　all　kind　of　benevolence　would　be　taken　from　among　men；　neither　would　there　be　ought　of　mutuall　assistance　among　them；　nor　any　commencement　of　gaining　grace　and　favour。　by　reason　whereof　the　state　of　Warre　would　necessarily　remain；　contrary　to　the　fundamentall　Law　of　Nature：　But　because　the　breach　of　this　Law　is　not　a　breach　of　trust；　or　contract；　（for　we　suppose　no　Contracts　to　have　pass'd　among　them）　therefore　is　it　not　usually　termed　an　iniury；　but　because　good　turns　and　thankes　have　a　mutuall　eye　to　each　other；　it　is　called　INGRATITUDE。　　　　　IX。The　fourth　precept　of　Nature；　is；　That　every　man　render　himself　usefull　unto　others：　which；　that　we　may　rightly　understand；　we　must　remember　that　there　is　in　men；　a　diversity　of　dispositions　to　enter　into　society；　arising　from　the　diversity　of　their　affections；　not　unlike　that　which　is　found　in　stones；　brought　together　in　the　Building；　by　reason　of　the　diversity　of　their　matter；　and　figure。　For　as　a　stone；　which　in　regard　of　its　sharp　and　angular　form　takes　up　more　room　from　other　stones　then　it　fils　up　it　selfe；　neither　because　of　the　hardnesse　of　its　matter　cannot　well　be　prest　together；　or　easily　cut；　and　would　hinder　the　building　from　being　fitly　compacted；　is　cast　away；　as　not　fit　for　use：　so　a　man；　who　for　the　harshness　of　his　disposition　in　retaining　superfluities　for　himself；　and　detaining　of　necessaries　from　others；　and　being　incorrigible；　by　reason　of　the　stubbornnesse　of　his　affections；　is　commonly　said　to　be　uselesse；　and　troublesome　unto　others。　Now；　because　each　one　not　by　Right　onely；　but　even　by　naturall　necessity　is　suppos'd；　with　all　his　main　might；　to　intend　the　procurement　of　those　things　which　are　necessary　to　his　own　preservation；　if　any　man　will　contend　on　the　other　side　for　superfluities；　by　his　default　there　will　arise　a　Warre；　because　that　on　him　alone　there　lay　no　necessity　of　contending；　he　therefore　acts　against　the　fundamentall　Law　of　Nature：　Whence　it　followes　（which　wee　were　to　shew）　that　it　is　a　precept　of　nature；　That　every　man　accommodate　himselfe　to　others。　But　he　who　breaks　this　Law　may　be　called　uselesse；　and　troublesome。　Yet　Cicero　opposeth　inhumanity　to　this　usefulnesse；　as　having　regard　to　this　very　Law。　　　　　X。　The　fift　precept　of　the　Law　of　nature　is：　That　we　must　forgive　him　who　repents；　and　asketh　pardon　for　what　is　past；　having　first　taken　caution　for　the　time　to　come。　The　pardon　of　what　is　past；　or　the　remission　of　an　offence；　is　nothing　else　but　the　granting　of　Peace　to　him　that　asketh　it；　after　he　hath　warr'd　against　us；　&　now　is　become　penitent。　But　Peace　granted　to　him　that　repents　not；　that　is；　to　him　that　retains　an　hostile　mind；　or　that　gives　not　caution　for　the　future；　that　is；　seeks　not　Peace；　but　oportunity；　is　not　properly　Peace　but　feare；　and　therefore　is　not　commanded　by　nature。　Now　to　him　that　will　not　pardon　the　penitent；　and　that　gives　future　caution；　peace　it　selfe　it　seems　is　not　pleasing；　which　is　contrary　to　the　naturall　Law。　　　　　XI。　The　sixth　precept　of　the　naturall　Law　is；　That　in　revenge。　and　punishments　we　must　have　our　eye　not　at　the　evill　past；　but　the　future　good。　That　is：　It　is　not　lawfull　to　inflict　punishment　for　any　other　end；　but　that　the　offender　may　be　corrected；　or　that　others　warned　by　his　punishment　may　become　better。　But　this　is　confirmed　chiefly　from　hence；　that　each　man　is　bound　by　the　law　of　nature　to　forgive　one　another；　provided　he　give　caution　for　the　future；　as　hath　been　shewed　in　the　foregoing　Article。　Furthermore；　because　revenge；　if　the　time　past　be　onely　considered；　is　nothing　else　but　a　certain　triumph；　and　glory　of