science of logic- 第41部分

When　treating　of　the　relationship　of　substantiality；　we　showed　that　it　passes　over　into　the　causal
relationship。　But　here　what　is；　no　longer　has　the　determination　of　a　substance；　but　of　an　object；
the　causal　relationship　has　been　superseded　in　the　Notion；　the　originality　of　one　substance　in
relation　to　the　other　has　shown　itself　to　be　illusory；　its　action　to　be　transition　into　the　opposed
substance。　This　relationship　therefore　has　no　objectivity。　Hence　in　so　far　as　the　one　object　is
posited　in　the　form　of　subjective　unity　as　active　cause；　this　no　longer　counts　as　an　original
determination　but　as　something　mediated；　the　active　object　has　this　its　determination　only　by
means　of　another　object。　Mechanism；　since　it　belongs　to　the　sphere　of　the　Notion；　has　that
posited　within　it　which　proved　to　be　the　truth　of　the　causal　relationship；　namely　that　the　cause；
which　is　supposed　to　be　the　original　and　self…subsistent　factor　is　essentially　effect；　positedness；　as
well。　In　mechanism　therefore　the　causality　of　the　object　is　immediately　a　non…originality；　it　is
indifferent　to　this　its　determination；　therefore　its　being　cause　is　for　it　something　contingent。　To　this
extent；　one　might　indeed　say　that　the　causality　of　substances　is　only　a　subjective　conception。　But
this　causality　as　thus　represented　is　precisely　mechanism；　for　mechanism　is　this；　that　causality　as
identical　determinateness　of　different　substances　and　hence　as　the　extinction　of　their
self…subsistence　in　this　identity；　is　a　mere　positedness；　the　objects　are　indifferent　to　this　unity　and
maintain　themselves　in　face　of　it。　But；　no　less　is　this　their　indifferent　self…subsistence　also　a　mere
positedness；　they　are　therefore　capable　of　mixing　and　aggregating　and　of　becoming；　as　an
aggregate；　one　object。　Through　this　indifference　both　to　their　transition　and　to　their
self…subistence；　substances　are　objects。



（a）　The　Formal　Mechanical　Process　

（b）　The　Real　Mechanical　Process　

（c）　The　Product　of　the　Mechanical　Process　



C。　Absolute　Mechanism

（a）　The　Centre

In　the　first　place　then　the　empty　manifoldness　of　objects　is　gathered　into　objective　individuality；
into　the　simple　self…determining　centre。　Secondly；　in　so　far　as　the　object　as　an　immediate　totality
retains　its　indifference　to　determinateness；　the　latter　is　present　in　it　also　as　unessential　or　as　a
mutual　externality　of　many　objects。　The　prior；　the　essential　determinateness；　on　the　other　hand；
constitutes　the　real　middle　term　between　the　many　mechanically　interacting　bodies；　by　which　they
are　united　in　and　for　themselves；　and　is　their　objective　universality。　Universality　exhibited　itself　at
first　in　the　relationship　of　communication　as　present　only　through　positing；　but　as　objective
universality　it　is　the　pervading　immanent　essence　of　the　objects。

In　the　material　world　it　is　the　central　body　that　is　the　genus；　but　it　is　the　individual　universality　of
the　single　objects　and　their　mechanical　process。　The　relationship　in　which　the　unessential　single
bodies　stand　to　one　another　is　one　of　mutual　thrust　and　pressure；　this　kind　of　relationship　does
not　hold　between　the　central　body　and　the　objects　whose　essence　it　is；　for　their　externality　no
longer　constitutes　their　basic　determination。　Their　identity　with　the　central　body　is；　therefore；　rather
rest；　namely；　the　being　in　their　centre；　this　unity　is　their　absolute　Notion。　It　remains；　however；
merely　an　ought…to…be；　since　the　externality　of　the　objects　which　is　still　also　posited　does　not
correspond　to　that　unity。　Their　consequent　striving　towards　the　centre　is　their　absolute
universality；　not　a　universality　posited　by　communication；　it　constitutes　the　true　rest　that　is　itself
concrete　and　not　posited　from　outside；　into　which　the　process　of　the　non…self…subsistent　bodies
must　return。　That　is　why　it　is　an　empty　abstraction　to　assume　in　mechanics　that　a　body　set　in
motion　would　continue　to　move　in　a　straight　line　to　infinity　if　external　resistance　did　not　rob　it　of　its
motion。　Friction；　or　whatever　other　form　resistance　takes；　is　only　the　manifestation　of　centrality；
for　it　is　centrality　that　in　an　absolute　manner　brings　the　body　back　to　itself；　for　the　thing　in　contact
with　which　the　moving　body　meets　friction　has　the　power　of　resistance　solely　through　its　union　with
the　centre。　In　the　spiritual　sphere　the　centre　and　unity　with　the　centre　assume　higher　forms；　but　the
unity　of　the　Notion　and　its　reality　which　here；　to　begin　with；　is　mechanical　centrality；　must　there　too
constitute　the　basic　determination。

Thus　the　central　body　has　ceased　to　be　a　mere　object；　for　in　the　latter　the　determinateness　is　an
unessential　element；　for　the　central　body　no　longer　possesses　the　objective　totality　only　implicitly
but　also　explicitly。　It　can　therefore　be　regarded　as　an　individual。　Its　determinateness　is
essentially　different　from　a　mere　order　or　arrangement　and　external　connection　of　parts；　as
determinateness　in　and　for　itself　it　is　an　immanent　form；　a　self…determining　principle　in　which　the
objects　inhere　and　by　which　they　are　bound　together　into　a　genuine　One。

But　this　central　individual　is　thus　at　first　only　a　middle　term　which　as　yet　has　no　true　extremes；　but
as　negative　unity　of　the　total　Notion　it　sunders　itself　into　such。　Or　in　other　words　the　previously
non…self…subsistent；　self…external　objects　are　likewise　by　the　regress　of　the　Notion　determined　into
individuals；　the　identity　of　the　central　body　with　itself　which　is　still　a　striving；　is　infected　with
externality　which；　being　taken　up　into　the　centra　body's　objective　individuality；　has　this　latter
determination　communicated　to　it。　Through　this　centrality　of　their　own；　these　individuals　placed
outside　that　first　centre；　are　themselves　centres　for　the　non…self…subsistent　objects。　These　second
centres　and　the　non…self…subsistent　objects　are　brought　into　unity　by　the　above　absolute　middle
term。

But　the　relative　individual　centres　themselves　also　constitute　the　middle　term　of　a　second
syllogism；　a　middle　term　that　on　the　one　hand　is　subsumed　under　a　higher　extreme；　namely　the
objective　universality　and　power　of　the　absolute　centre；　and　on　the　other　hand　subsumes　under
itself　the　non…self…subsistent　objects　whose　superficial　or　formal　individualisation　is　supported　by　it。
Again；　these　non…self…subsistent　objects　are　the　middle　term　of　a　third；　the　formal　syllogism；　in
that　they　are　the　link　between　the　absolute　and　the　relative　central　individuality　to　the　extent　that
the　latter　has　in　them　its　externality　by　virtue　of　which　the　relation…to…self　is　at　the　same　time　a
striving　towards　an　absolute　centre。　The　formal　objects　have　for　their　essence　the　identical
gravity　of　their　immediate　central　body　in　which　they　inhere　as　in　their　subject　and　the　extreme　of
individuality；　through　the　externality　which　they　constitute；　that　body　is　subsumed　under　the
absolute　central　body；　they　are；　therefore；　the　formal　middle　term　of　particularity。　But　the
absolute　individual　is　the　objectively　universal　middle　term　which　brings　into　unity　and　holds　fast
the　being…within…self　or　inwardness　of　the　relative　individual　and　its　externality。　Similarly；　too；　the
government；　the　individual　citizens　and　the　needs　or　external　life　of　the　individuals；　are　three
terms；　each　of　which　is　the　middle　of　the　other　two。　The　government　is　the　absolute　centre　in
which　the　extreme　of　the　individuals　is　united　with　their　external　existence；　similarly；　the
individuals　are　the　middle　term　that　activate　that　universal　individual　into　external　concrete
existence　and　translate　their　moral　essence　into　the　extreme　of　actuality。　The　third　syllogism　is　the
formal　syllogism；　that　of　an　illusory　show；　in　which　the　individuals　purport　to　be　linked　to　this
universal　absolute　individuality　by　their　needs　and　external　existence；　a　syllogism　which；　as　merely
subjective；　passes　over　into　the　others　and　in　them　has　its　truth。

This　totality；　whose　moments　are　themselves　the　complete　relationships　of　the　Notion；　the
syllogisms　in　which　each　of　the　three　different　objects　runs　through　the　determination　of　middle
term　and　of　extremes；　constitutes　free　mechanism。　In　it　the　different　objects　have　for　their　basic
determination　the　objective　universality；　the　pervasive　gravity　that　maintains　its　identity　in　the
particularisation。　The　relations　of　pressure；　thrust；　attraction　and　the　like；　as　also
aggregations　or　mixtures；　belong　to　the　relationship　of　externality　which　forms　the　basis　of　the
third　of　this　group　of　syllogisms。　Order；　which　is　the　merely　external　determinateness　of　objects；
has　passed　over　into　the　determination　that　is　immanent　and　objective；　this　is　Law。

（b）　Law

In　law；　the　more　specific　difference　between　the　ideal　reality　of　objectivity　and　its　external
reality　is　made　prominent。　The　object；　as　immediate　totality　of　the　Notion；　does　not　yet　possess
externality　as　distinct　from　the　Notion　which　is　not　yet　posited　for　itself。　The　object；　being
withdrawn　into　itself　through　the　process；　there　has　arisen　the　opposition　of　simple　centrality
against　an　externality　which　is　now　determined　as　externality；　that　is；　is　posited　as　that　which　is
not　in　and　for　itself。　That　identical　or　ideal　aspect　of　individuality　is；　on　account　of　the　relation　to
externality；　an　ought…to…be；　it　is　that　unity　of　the　Notion；　absolutely　determined　and
self…determining；　to　which　that　external　reality　does　not　correspond；　and　therefore　gets　no　further
than　a　striving　towards　it。　But　individuality　is　in　and　for　itself　the　concrete　principle　of　negative
unity；　and　as　such　itself　totality；　a　unity　that　sunders　itself　into　the　specific　differences　of　the
Notion　and　abides　within　its　self…identical　universality；　it　s　thus　the　centre　expanded　within　its　pure
ideality　by　difference。

This　reality　which　corresponds　to　the　Notion　is　the　ideal　reality　that　is　distinct　from　the　reality　that
was　merely　a　striving；　it　is　the　difference；　not　as　in　the　first　instance　a　plurality　of　objects；　but
difference　in　its　essential　nature　and　taken　up　into　pure　universality。　This　real　ideality　is　the　soul　of
the　previously　developed　objective　totality；　the　absolutely　determined　identity　of　the　system。

The　objective　being…in…