possesses in the specific difference； which makes it the determinate species it is and is the basis
of its disjunction from the remaining species。
Definition； in thus reducing the subject matter to its Notion； strips it of its externalities which are
requisite for its concrete existence； it abstracts from what accrues to the Notion in its realisation；
whereby it emerges first into Idea； and secondly into external existence。 Description is for
representation； and takes in this further content that belongs to reality。 But definition reduces this
wealth of the manifold determinations of intuited existence to the simplest moments； the form of
these simple elements； and how they are determined relatively to one another； is contained in the
Notion。 The subject matter is thus； as we have stated； grasped as a universal that is at the same
time essentially determinate。 The subject matter itself is the third factor； the individual； in which the
genus and the particularisation are posited in one； it is an immediate that is posited outside the
Notion； since the latter is not yet self…determining。
In the said moments； which are the form…difference of definition； the Notion finds itself and has in
them the reality correspondent to it。 But the reflection of the Notion…moments into themselves；
which is individuality； is not yet contained in this reality； and therefore the object； in so far as it is in
cognition； is not yet determined as subjective。 Whereas； cognition on the contrary is subjective and
has an external starting point； or it is subjective by reason of its external starting point in the
individual。 The content of the Notion is therefore a datum and contingent。 Consequently； the
concrete Notion itself is contingent in a twofold aspect： first it is contingent in respect of its content
as such； secondly it is contingent which determinations of the content from among the manifold
qualities that the object possesses in external existence are to be selected for the Notion and are
to constitute its moments。
The latter point requires closer consideration。 For since individuality； which is determined in and
for itself； lies outside the Notion…determination peculiar to synthetic cognition there is no principle
available for determining which sides of the subject matter are to be regarded as belonging to its
Notion…determination and which merely to the external reality。 This constitutes a difficulty in the
case of definitions； a difficulty that for synthetic cognition cannot be overcome。 Yet here a
distinction must be made。 In the first place； the definition of products of self…conscious
purposiveness is easily discovered； for the end that they are to serve is a determination created out
of the subjective resolve and constituting the essential particularisation； the form of the concrete
existent thing； which is here the sole concern。 Apart from this； the nature of its material and its
other external properties； in so far as they correspond to the end； are contained in its
determination； the rest are unessential for it。
Secondly； geometrical objects are abstract determinations of space； the underlying abstraction；
so…called absolute space； has lost all further concrete determinations and now too possesses only
such shapes and configurations as are posited in it。 These objects therefore are only what they are
meant to be； their Notion determination in general； and more precisely the specific difference；
possesses in them its simple unhindered reality。 To this extent； they resemble the products of
external purposiveness； and they also agree with the subject matter of arithmetic in which likewise
the underlying determination is only that which has been posited in it。 True； space has still further
determinations： its three…dimensionality； its continuity and divisibility； which are not first posited in
it by external determination。 But these belong to the accepted material and are immediate
presuppositions； it is only the combination and entanglement of the former subjective
determinations with this peculiar nature of the domain into which they have been imported that
produces synthetic relationships and laws。 In the case of numerical determinations； since they are
based on the simple principle of the One； their combination and any further determination is simply
and solely a positedness； on the other hand； determinations in space； which is explicitly a
continuous mutual externality； run a further course of their own and possess a reality distinct
from their Notion； but this no longer belongs to the immediate definition。
But； thirdly； in the case of definitions of concrete objects of Nature as well as of spirit； the position
is quite different。 In general such objects are； for representation； things of many properties。
Here； what we have to do in the first instance is to apprehend what is their proximate genus； and
then； what is their specific difference。 We have therefore to determine which of the many
properties belong to the object as genus； and which as species； and further which among these
properties is the essential one； this last point involves the necessity of ascertaining their
interrelationship； whether one is already posited with the other。 But for this purpose there is so far
no other criterion to hand than existence itself。 The essentiality of the property for the purpose of
the definition； in which it is to be posited as a simple； undeveloped determinateness； is its
universality。 But in existence universality is merely empirical。 It may be universality in time…whether
the property in question is lasting； while the others show themselves transitory in the subsistence of
the whole； or it may be a universality resulting from comparison with other concrete wholes and in
that case it goes no further than community。 Now if comparison indicates as the common basis the
total habitue as empirically presented； reflection has to bring this together into a simple thought
determination and to grasp the simple character of such a totality。 But the only possible attestation
that a thought determination； or a single one of the immediate properties； constitutes the simple and
specific essence of the object； is the derivation of such a determination from the concrete
properties of the subject matter。 But this would demand an analysis transforming the immediate
properties into thoughts and reducing what is concrete to something simple。 Such an analysis；
however； would be higher than the one already considered； for it could not be abstractive； but
would have to preserve in the universal what is specific in the concrete； unify it and show it to be
dependent on the simple thought determination。
The relations of the manifold determinations of immediate existence to the simple Notion would
however be theorems requiring proof。 But definition is the first； still undeveloped Notion；
therefore； when it has to apprehend the simple determinateness of the subject matter； which
apprehension has to be something immediate； it can only employ for the purpose one of its
immediate so…called properties…a determination of sensuous existence or representation。 The
isolation； then； of this property by abstraction； constitutes simplicity； and for universality and
essentiality the Notion has to fall back onto empirical universality； the persistence in altered
circumstances； and the reflection that seeks the Notion…determination in external existence and in
picture thinking； that is； seeks it where it is not to be found。 Definition； therefore； automatically
renounces the Notion…determinations proper； which would be essentially principles of the subject
matter； and contents itself with marks； that is； determinations in which essentiality for the object
itself is a matter of indifference； and which are intended merely to be distinguishing marks for an
external reflection。 A single； external determinateness of this kind is too inadequate to the concrete
totality and to the nature of its Notion； to justify its selection for its own sake； nor could it be taken
for the true expression and determination of a concrete whole。 According to Blumenbach's'
observation； for example； the lobe of the ear is absent in all other animals； and therefore in the
usual phraseology of common and distinguishing marks it could quite properly be used as the
distinctive characteristic in the definition of physical man。 But how inadequate such a completely
external determination at once appears when compared with the conception of the total habitue of
physical man； and with the demand that the Notion determination shall be something essential！ It is
quite contingent whether the； marks adopted in the definition are pure makeshifts like this； or on
the other hand approximate more to the nature of a principle。 It is also to be observed that； on
account of their externality； they have not been the starting point in the cognition of the Notion of
the object； on the contrary； an obscure feeling； an indefinite but deeper sense； an inkling of what is
essential； has preceded the discovery of the genera in nature and in spirit； and only afterwards has
a specific externality been sought to satisfy the understanding。 In existence the Notion has entered
into externality and is accordingly explicated into its differences and cannot be attached simply to a
single one of such properties。 The properties； as the externality of the thing； are external to
themselves； that is why； as we pointed ' out in the sphere of Appearance when dealing with the
thing of many properties； properties essentially become even self…subsistent matters； spirit；
regarded from the same standpoint of Appearance； becomes an aggregate of a number of
self…subsistent forces。 Through this standpoint； the single property or force； even where it is
posited as indifferent to the others； ceases to be a characterising principle； with the result that the
determinateness； as determinateness of the Notion； vanishes altogether。
Into concrete things； along with the diversity of the properties among themselves； there enters also
the difference between the Notion and its actualisation。 The Notion in nature and in spirit has an
external presentation in which its