which this science is to be considered。
When logic is taken as the science of thinking in general； it is understood that this thinking
constitutes the mere form of a cognition that logic abstracts from all content and that the
so…called second constituent belonging to cognition； namely its matter； must come from
somewhere else； and that since this matter is absolutely independent of logic； this latter can
provide only the formal conditions of genuine cognition and cannot in its own self contain any real
truth； not even be the pathway to real truth because just that which is essential in truth； its content；
lies outside logic。？
But in the first place； it is quite inept to say that logic abstracts from all content； that it teaches only
the rules of thinking without any reference to what is thought or without being able to consider its
nature。 For as thinking and the rules of thinking are supposed to be the subject matter of logic；
these directly constitute its peculiar content； in them； logic has that second constituent； a matter；
about the nature of which it is concerned。
But secondly； the conceptions on which the Notion of logic has rested hitherto have in part already
been discarded； and for the rest； it is time that they disappeared entirely and that this science were
grasped from a higher standpoint and received a completely changed shape。
Hitherto； the Notion of logic has rested on the separation； presupposed once and for all in the
ordinary consciousness； of the content of cognition and its form； or of truth and certainty。 First；
it is assumed that the material of knowing is present on its own account as a ready…made world
apart from thought； that thinking on its own is empty and comes as an external form to the said
material； fills itself with it and only thus acquires a content and so becomes real knowing。
Further； these two constituents — for they are supposed to be related to each other as
constituents； and cognition is compounded from them in a mechanical or at best chemical fashion
— are appraised as follows： the object is regarded as something complete and finished on its own
account； something which can entirely dispense with thought for its actuality； while thought on the
other hand is regarded as defective because it has to complete itself with a material and moreover；
as a pliable indeterminate form； has to adapt itself to its material。 Truth is the agreement of thought
with the object； and in order to bring about this agreement — for it does not exist on its own
account — thinking is supposed to adapt and accommodate itself to the object。
Thirdly； when the difference of matter and form； of object and thought is not left in that nebulous
indeterminateness but is taken more definitely； then each is regarded as a sphere divorced from the
other。 Thinking therefore in its reception and formation of material does not go outside itself； its
reception of the material and the conforming of itself to it remains a modification of its own self； it
does not result in thought becoming the other of itself； and self…conscious determining moreover
belongs only to thinking。 In its relation to the object； therefore； thinking does I not go out of itself
to the object； this； as a thing…in…itself； remains a sheer beyond of thought。
These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the determinations which
constitute the nature of our ordinary； phenomenal consciousness； but when these prejudices are
carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same relation obtained there； as if this relation were
something true in its own self； then they are errors the — refutation of which throughout every part
of the spiritual and natural universe is philosophy； or rather； as they bar the entrance to
philosophy； must be discarded at its portals。
Ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher conception of thinking than is current today。 For it
based itself on the fact that the knowledge of things obtained through thinking is alone what is
really true in them； that is； things not in their immediacy but as first raised into the form of thought；
as things thought。 Thus this metaphysics believed that thinking （and its determinations） is not
anything alien to the object； but rather is its essential nature； or that things and the thinking of them
— our language too expresses their kinship — are explicitly in full agreement； thinking in its
immanent determinations and the true nature of things forming one and the same content。
But reflective understanding took possession of philosophy。 We must know exactly what is meant
by this expression which moreover is often used as a slogan； in general it stands for the
understanding as abstracting； and hence as separating and remaining fixed in its separations。
Directed against reason； it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests
on sensuous reality； that thoughts are only thoughts； meaning that it is sense perception which first
gives them filling and reality and that reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of
the brain。 In this self…renunciation on the part of reason； the Notion of truth is lost； it is limited to
knowing only subjective truth； only phenomena； appearances； only something to which the nature
of the object itself does not correspond： knowing has lapsed into opinion。
However； this turn taken by cognition； which appears as a loss and a retrograde step； is based on
something more profound on which rests the elevation of reason into the loftier spirit of modern
philosophy。 The basis of that universally held conception is； namely； to be sought in the insight into
the necessary conflict of the determinations of the understanding with themselves。 The reflection
already referred to is this； to transcend the concrete immediate object and to determine it and
separate it。 But equally it must transcend these its separating determinations and straightway
connect them。 It is at the stage of this connecting of the determinations that their conflict emerges。
This connecting activity of reflection belongs in itself to reason and the rising above those
determinations which attains to an insight into their conflict is the great negative step towards the
true Notion of reason。 But the insight； when not thorough…going； commits the mistake of thinking
that it is reason which is in contradiction with itself； it does not recognise that the contradiction is
precisely the rising of reason above the limitations of the understanding and the resolving of them；
Cognition； instead of taking from this stage the final step into the heights； has fled from the
unsatisfactoriness of the categories of the understanding to sensuous existence； imagining that in
this it possesses what is solid and self…consistent。 But on the other hand； since this knowledge is
self…confessedly knowledge only of appearances； the unsatisfactoriness of the latter is admitted；
but at the same time presupposed： as much as to say that admittedly； we have no proper
knowledge of things…in…themselves but we do have a proper knowledge of them within the sphere
of appearances； as if； so to speak； only the kind of objects were different； and one kind； namely
things…in…themselves； did not fall within the scope of our knowledge but the other kind；
phenomena； did。 This is like attributing to someone a correct perception； with the rider that
nevertheless he is incapable of perceiving what is true but only what is false。 Absurd as this would
be； it would not be more so than a true knowledge which did not know the object as it is in itself。
The criticism of the forms of the understanding has had the result already mentioned； that these
forms do not apply to things…in…themselves。 This can have no other meaning than that these forms
are in themselves something untrue。 But then if they are 'allowed to remain valid for subjective
reason and experience； the criticism has not produced any alteration in them： they are left in the
same shape for the subject knower as they formerly possessed for the object。 If； however； they
are inadequate for the thing…in…itself； still less must the understanding to which they are supposed
to belong put up with them and rest content with them。 If they cannot be determinations of the
thing…in…itself； still less can they be determinations of the understanding to which one ought at least
to concede the dignity of a thing…in…itself。 The determinations of finite and infinite conflict in the
same way； whether they are applied to time and space； to the world； or are determinations within
the mind — just as black and white produce grey whether they are mixed on a canvas or on the
palette。 If our conception of the world is dissolved by the transference to it of the determinations
of infinite and finite； still more is spirit itself； which contains both of them； inwardly
self…contradictory and self…dissolving： it is not the nature of the material or the object to which they
are applied or in which they occur that can make a difference for it is only through those
determinations and in accordance with them that the object contains the contradiction。
The forms of objective thinking； therefore； have been removed by this criticism only from the thing；
but they have been left in the subject just as they were originally。 That is to say； this criticism did
not consider these forms on their own merits and according to their own peculiar content； but
simply took them as accepted starting points from subjective logic： so that there was no question
of an immanent deduction of them as forms of subjective logic； still less of a dialectical
consideration of them。
Transcendental idealism in its more consistent development； recognised the nothingness of the
spectral thing…in…itself left over by the Kantian philosophy； this abstract shadow divorced from all
content； and intended to destroy it completely。 This philosophy also made a start at letting reason
itself exhibit its own determinations。 But this attempt； because it proceeded from a subjective
standpoint； could not be brought to a successful conclusion。？ Later this standpoint； and with it too
the attempt to develop the con