the science of right- 第30部分

under　the　relation　of　a　superior　（imperantis）　to　a　subject　（subditum）；

and　this　is　not　the　relation　of　the　states　to　one　another。　Neither　can

an　international　war　be　〃a　war　of　extermination〃　（bellum

internicinum）；　nor　even　〃a　war　of　subjugation〃　（bellum　subjugatorium）；

for　this　would　issue　in　the　moral　extinction　of　a　state　by　its

people　being　either　fused　into　one　mass　with　the　conquering　state；

or　being　reduced　to　slavery。　Not　that　this　necessary　means　of

attaining　to　a　condition　of　peace　is　itself　contradictory　to　the　right

of　a　state；　but　because　the　idea　of　the　right　of　nations　includes

merely　the　conception　of　an　antagonism　that　is　in　accordance　with

principles　of　external　freedom；　in　order　that　the　state　may　maintain

what　is　properly　its　own；　but　not　that　it　may　acquire　a　condition

which；　from　the　aggrandizement　of　its　power；　might　become

threatening　to　other　states。

　　Defensive　measures　and　means　of　all　kinds　are　allowable　to　a　state

that　is　forced　to　war；　except　such　as　by　their　use　would　make　the

subjects　using　them　unfit　to　be　citizens；　for　the　state　would　thus

make　itself　unfit　to　be　regarded　as　a　person　capable　of

participating　in　equal　rights　in　the　international　relations　according

to　the　right　of　nations。　Among　these　forbidden　means　are　to　be

reckoned　the　appointment　of　subjects　to　act　as　spies；　or　engaging

subjects　or　even　strangers　to　act　as　assassins；　or　poisoners　（in　which

class　might　well　be　included　the　so　called　sharpshooters　who　lurk　in

ambush　for　individuals）；　or　even　employing　agents　to　spread　false

news。　In　a　word；　it　is　forbidden　to　use　any　such　malignant　and

perfidious　means　as　would　destroy　the　confidence　which　would　be

requisite　to　establish　a　lasting　peace　thereafter。

　　It　is　permissible　in　war　to　impose　exactions　and　contributions

upon　a　conquered　enemy；　but　it　is　not　legitimate　to　plunder　the　people

in　the　way　of　forcibly　depriving　individuals　of　their　property。　For

this　would　be　robbery；　seeing　it　was　not　the　conquered　people　but

the　state　under　whose　government　they　were　placed　that　carried　on

the　war　by　means　of　them。　All　exactions　should　be　raised　by　regular

requisition；　and　receipts　ought　to　be　given　for　them；　in　order　that

when　peace　is　restored　the　burden　imposed　on　the　country　or　the

province　may　be　proportionately　borne。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　58。　Right　after　War。



　　The　right　that　follows　after　war；　begins　at　the　moment　of　the　treaty

of　peace　and　refers　to　the　consequences　of　the　war。　The　conqueror　lays

down　the　conditions　under　which　he　will　agree　with　the　conquered　power

to　form　the　conclusion　of　peace。　Treaties　are　drawn　up；　not　indeed

according　to　any　right　that　it　pertains　to　him　to　protect；　on

account　of　an　alleged　lesion　by　his　opponent；　but　as　taking　this

question　upon　himself；　he　bases　the　right　to　decide　it　upon　his　own

power。　Hence　the　conqueror　may　not　demand　restitution　of　the　cost　of

the　war；　because　he　would　then　have　to　declare　the　war　of　his　opponent

to　be　unjust。　And　even　although　he　should　adopt　such　an　argument；　he

is　not　entitled　to　apply　it；　because　he　would　have　to　declare　the

war　to　be　punitive；　and　he　would　thus　in　turn　inflict　an　injury。　To

this　right　belongs　also　the　exchange　of　prisoners；　which　is　to　be

carried　out　without　ransom　and　without　regard　to　equality　of　numbers。

　　Neither　the　conquered　state　nor　its　subjects　lose　their　political

liberty　by　conquest　of　the　country；　so　as　that　the　former　should　be

degraded　to　a　colony；　or　the　latter　to　slaves；　for　otherwise　it

would　have　been　a　penal　war；　which　is　contradictory　in　itself。　A

colony　or　a　province　is　constituted　by　a　people　which　has　its　own

constitution；　legislation；　and　territory；　where　persons　belonging　to

another　state　are　merely　strangers；　but　which　is　nevertheless

subject　to　the　supreme　executive　power　of　another　state。　This　other

state　is　called　the　mother…country。　It　is　ruled　as　a　daughter；　but　has

at　the　same　time　its　own　form　of　government；　as　in　a　separate

parliament　under　the　presidency　of　a　viceroy　（civitas　hybrida）。　Such

was　Athens　in　relation　to　different　islands；　and　such　is　at　present

（1796）　the　relation　of　Great　Britain　to　Ireland。

　　Still　less　can　slavery　be　deduced　as　a　rightful　institution；　from

the　conquest　of　a　people　in　war；　for　this　would　assume　that　the　war

was　of　a　punitive　nature。　And　least　of　all　can　a　basis　be　found　in　war

for　a　hereditary　slavery；　which　is　absurd　in　itself；　since　guilt

cannot　be　inherited　from　the　criminality　of　another。

　　Further；　that　an　amnesty　is　involved　in　the　conclusion　of　a　treaty

of　peace　is　already　implied　in　the　very　idea　of　a　peace。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　59。　The　Rights　of　Peace。



　　The　rights　of　peace　are：

　　1。　The　right　to　be　in　peace　when　war　is　in　the　neighbourhood；　or　the

right　of　neutrality。

　　2。　The　right　to　have　peace　secured　so　that　it　may　continue　when　it

has　been　concluded；　that　is；　the　right　of　guarantee。

　　3。　The　right　of　the　several　states　to　enter　into　a　mutual

alliance；　so　as　to　defend　themselves　in　common　against　all　external　or

even　internal　attacks。　This　right　of　federation；　however；　does　not

extend　to　the　formation　of　any　league　for　external　aggression　or

internal　aggrandizement。



　　　　　　　　　　　60。　Right　as　against　an　Unjust　Enemy。



　　The　right　of　a　state　against　an　unjust　enemy　has　no　limits；　at　least

in　respect　of　quality　as　distinguished　from　quantity　or　degree。　In

other　words；　the　injured　state　may　use…　not；　indeed　any　means；　but

yet…　all　those　means　that　are　permissible　and　in　reasonable　measure　in

so　far　as　they　are　in　its　power；　in　order　to　assert　its　right　to

what　is　its　own。　But　what　then　is　an　unjust　enemy　according　to　the

conceptions　of　the　right　of　nations；　when；　as　holds　generally　of　the

state　of　nature；　every　state　is　judge　in　its　own　cause？　It　is　one

whose　publicly　expressed　will；　whether　in　word　or　deed；　betrays　a

maxim　which；　if　it　were　taken　as　a　universal　rule；　would　make　a

state　of　peace　among　the　nations　impossible；　and　would　necessarily

perpetuate　the　state　of　nature。　Such　is　the　violation　of　public

treaties；　with　regard　to　which　it　may　be　assumed　that　any　such

violation　concerns　all　nations　by　threatening　their　freedom；　and

that　they　are　thus　summoned　to　unite　against　such　a　wrong　and　to

take　away　the　power　of　committing　it。　But　this　does　not　include　the

right　to　partition　and　appropriate　the　country；　so　as　to　make　a

state　as　it　were　disappear　from　the　earth；　for　this　would　be　an

injustice　to　the　people　of　that　state；　who　cannot　lose　their

original　right　to　unite　into　a　commonwealth；　and　to　adopt　such　a　new

constitution　as　by　its　nature　would　be　unfavourable　to　the　inclination

for　war。

　　Further；　it　may　be　said　that　the　expression　〃an　unjust　enemy　in

the　state　of　nature〃　is　pleonastic；　for　the　state　of　nature　is

itself　a　state　of　injustice。　A　just　enemy　would　be　one　to　whom　I　would

do　wrong　in　offering　resistance；　but　such　a　one　would　really　not　be　my

enemy。



　　　　　　61。　Perpetual　Peace　and　a　Permanent　Congress　of　Nations。



　　The　natural　state　of　nations　as　well　as　of　individual　men　is　a　state

which　it　is　a　duty　to　pass　out　of；　in　order　to　enter　into　a　legal

state。　Hence；　before　this　transition　occurs；　all　the　right　of

nations　and　all　the　external　property　of　states　acquirable　or

maintainable　by　war　are　merely　provisory；　and　they　can　only　become

peremptory　in　a　universal　union　of　states　analogous　to　that　by　which　a

nation　becomes　a　state。　It　is　thus　only　that　a　real　state　of　peace

could　be　established。　But　with　the　too　great　extension　of　such　a　union

of　states　over　vast　regions；　any　government　of　it；　and　consequently

the　protection　of　its　individual　members；　must　at　last　become

impossible；　and　thus　a　multitude　of　such　corporations　would　again

bring　round　a　state　of　war。　Hence　the　perpetual　peace；　which　is　the

ultimate　end　of　all　the　right　of　nations；　becomes　in　fact　an

impracticable　idea。　The　political　principles；　however；　which　aim　at

such　an　end；　and　which　enjoin　the　formation　of　such　unions　among　the

states　as　may　promote　a　continuous　approximation　to　a　perpetual　peace；

are　not　impracticable；　they　are　as　practicable　as　this　approximation

itself；　which　is　a　practical　problem　involving　a　duty；　and　founded

upon　the　right　of　individual　men　and　states。

　　Such　a　union　of　states；　in　order　to　maintain　peace；　may　be　called

a　permanent　congress　of　nations；　and　it　is　free　to　every

neighbouring　state　to　join　in　it。　A　union　of　this　kind；　so　far　at

least　as　regards　the　formalities　of　the　right　of　nations　in　respect　of

the　preservation　of　peace；　was　presented　in　the　first　half　of　this

century；　in　the　Assembly　of　the　States…General　at　the　Hague。　In　this

Assembly　most　of　the　European　courts；　and　even　the　smallest　republics；

brought　forward　their　complaints　about　the　hostilities　which　were

carried　on　by　the　one　against　the　other。　Thus　the　whole　of　Europe

appeared　like　a　single　federated　state；　accepted　as　umpire　by　the

several　nations　in　their　public　differences。　But　in　place　of　this

agreement；　the　right　of　nations　afterwards　survived　only　in　books；

it　disappeared　from　the　cabinets；　or；　after　force　had　been　already

used；　it　was　relegated　in　the　form　of　theoretical　deductions　to　the

obscurity　of　archives。

　　By　such　a　congress　is　here　meant　only　a　voluntary　combination　of

different　states　that　would　be　dissoluble　at　any　time；　and　not　such

a　union　as　is　embodied　in　the　United　States　of　America；　founded　upon　a

political　constitution；　and　therefore　indissoluble。　It　is　only　by　a

congress　of　this　kind　that　the　idea　of　a　public　right　of　nations　can

be　established；　and　that　the　settlement　of　their　differences　by　the

mode　of　a　civil　process；　and　not　by　the　barbarous　means　of　war；　can　be

realized。



　　　　　　　　　　　　III。　The　Universal　Right　of　Mankind。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Jus　Cosmopoliticum）

　　　　　　62。　Nature　and　Conditions　of　Cosmopolitical　Right。



　　The　rational　id