the science of right- 第7部分

CH2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。

　　The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。

　　　　　　CHAPTER　II。　The　Mode　of　Acquiring　Anything　External。



　　　　　　　10。　The　General　Principle　of　External　Acquisition。



　　I　acquire　a　thing　when　I　act　（efficio）　so　that　it　becomes　mine。　An

external　thing　is　originally　mine　when　it　is　mine　even　without　the

intervention　of　a　juridical　act。　An　acquisition　is　original　and

primary　when　it　is　not　derived　from　what　another　had　already　made

his　own。

　　There　is　nothing　external　that　is　as　such　originally　mine；　but

anything　external　may　be　originally　acquired　when　it　is　an　object　that

no　other　person　has　yet　made　his。　A　state　in　which　the　mine　and

thine　are　in　common　cannot　be　conceived　as　having　been　at　any　time

original。　Such　a　state　of　things　would　have　to　be　acquired　by　an

external　juridical　act；　although　there　may　be　an　original　and　common

possession　of　an　external　object。　Even　if　we　think　hypothetically　of　a

state　in　which　the　mine　and　thine　would　be　originally　in　common　as　a

communio　mei　et　tui　originaria；　it　would　still　have　to　be

distinguished　from　a　primeval　communion　（communio　primaeva）　with

things　in　common；　sometimes　supposed　to　be　founded　in　the　first　period

of　the　relations　of　right　among　men；　and　which　could　not　be　regarded

as　based　upon　principles　like　the　former；　but　only　upon　history。

Even　under　that　condition　the　historic　communio；　as　a　supposed

primeval　community；　would　always　have　to　be　viewed　as　acquired　and

derivative　（communio　derivativa）。

　　The　principle　of　external　acquisition；　then；　may　be　expressed

thus：　〃Whatever　I　bring　under　my　power　according　to　the　law　of

external　freedom；　of　which　as　an　object　of　my　free　activity　of　will

I　have　the　capability　of　making　use　according　to　the　postulate　of

the　practical　reason；　and　which　I　will　to　become　mine　in　conformity

with　the　idea　of　a　possible　united　common　will；　is　mine。〃

　　The　practical　elements　（momenta　attendenda）　constitutive　of　the

process　of　original　acquisition　are：

　　1。　Prehension　or　seizure　of　an　object　which　belongs　to　no　one；

for；　if　it　belonged　already　to　some　one；　the　act　would　conflict　with

the　freedom　of　others；　that　is；　according　to　universal　laws。　This　is

the　taking　possession　of　an　object　of　my　free　activity　of　will　in

space　and　time；　the　possession；　therefore；　into　which　I　thus　put

myself　is　sensible　or　physical　possession　（possessio　phenomenon）；

　　2。　Declaration　of　the　possession　of　this　object　by　formal

designation　and　the　act　of　my　freewill　in　interdicting　every　other

person　from　using　it　as　his；

　　3。　Appropriation；　as　the　act；　in　idea；　of　an　externally

legislative　common　will；　by　which　all　and　each　are　obliged　to

respect　and　act　in　conformity　with　my　act　of　will。

　　The　validity　of　the　last　element　in　the　process　of　acquisition；　as

that　on　which　the　conclusion　that　〃the　external　object　is　mine〃　rests；

is　what　makes　the　possession　valid　as　a　purely　rational　and

juridical　possession　（possessio　noumenon）。　It　is　founded　upon　the　fact

that；　as　all　these　acts　are　juridical；　they　consequently　proceed

from　the　practical　reason；　and　therefore；　in　the　question　as　to　what

is　right；　abstraction　may　be　made　of　the　empirical　conditions

involved；　and　the　conclusion；　〃the　external　object　is　mine；〃　thus

becomes　a　correct　inference　from　the　external　fact　of　sensible

possession　to　the　internal　right　of　rational　possession。

　　The　original　primary　acquisition　of　an　external　object　of　the　action

of　the　will；　is　called　occupancy。　It　can　only　take　place　in

reference　to　substances　or　corporeal　things。　Now　when　this

occupation　of　an　external　object　does　take　place；　the　act　presupposes；

as　a　condition　of　such　empirical　possession；　its　priority　in　time

before　the　act　of　any　other　who　may　also　be　willing　to　enter　upon

occupation　of　it。　Hence　the　legal　maxim：　〃qui　prior　tempore；　potior

jure。〃　Such　occupation　as　original　or　primary　is；　further；　the

effect　only　of　a　single　or　unilateral　will；　for　were　a　bilateral　or

twofold　will　requisite　for　it；　it　would　be　derived　from　a　contract

of　two　or　more　persons　with　each　other；　and　consequently　it　would　be

based　upon　what　another　or　others　had　already　made　their　own。　It　is

not　easy　to　see　how　such　an　act　of　free…will　as　this　would　be　could

really　form　a　foundation　for　every　one　having　his　own。　However；　the

first　acquisition　of　a　thing　is　on　that　account　not　quite　exactly

the　same　as　the　original　acquisition　of　it。　For　the　acquisition　of　a

public　juridical　state　by　union　of　the　wills　of　all　in　a　universal

legislation　would　be　such　an　original　acquisition；　seeing　that　no

other　of　the　kind　could　precede　it；　and　yet　it　would　be　derived　from

the　particular　wills　of　all　the　individuals；　and　consequently　become

all…sided　or　omnilateral；　for　a　properly　primary　acquisition　can

only　proceed　from　an　individual　or　unilateral　or　unilateral　will。





　　　　DIVISION　OF　THE　SUBJECT　OF　THE　ACQUISITION　OF　THE　EXTERNAL

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　MINE　AND　THINE。



　　I。　In　respect　of　the　matter　of　object　of　acquisition；　I　acquire

either　a　corporeal　thing　（substance）；　or　the　performance　of

something　by　another　（causality）；　or　this　other　as　a　person　in　respect

of　his　state；　so　far　as　I　have　a　right　to　dispose　of　the　same　（in　a

relation　of　reciprocity　with　him）。

　　II。　In　respect　of　the　form　or　mode　of　acquisition；　it　is　either　a

real　right　（jus　reale）；　or　a　personal　right　（jus　personale）；　or　a

real…personal　right　（jus　realiter　personale）；　to　the　possession

although　not　to　the　use；　of　another　person　as　if　he　were　a　thing。

　　III。　In　respect　of　the　ground　of　right　or　the　title　（titulus）　of

acquisition…　which；　properly；　is　not　a　particular　member　of　the

division　of　rights；　but　rather　a　constituent　element　of　the　mode　of

exercising　them…　anything　external　is　acquired　by　a　certain　free

exercise　of　will　that　is　either　unilateral；　as　the　act　of　a　single

will　（facto）；　or　bilateral；　as　the　act　of　two　wills　（pacto）；　or

omnilateral；　as　the　act　of　all　the　wills　of　a　community　together

（lege）。



　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　Principles　of　Real　Right。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　11。　What　is　a　Real　Right？



　　The　usual　definition　of　real　right；　or　〃right　in　a　thing〃　（jus

reale；　jus　in　re）；　is　that　〃it　is　a　right　as　against　every　possessor

of　it。〃　This　is　a　correct　nominal　definition。　But　what　is　it　that

entitles　me　to　claim　an　external　object　from　any　one　who　may　appear　as

its　possessor；　and　to　compel　him；　per　vindicationem；　to　put　me

again；　in　place　of　himself；　into　possession　of　it？　Is　this　external

juridical　relation　of　my　will　a　kind　of　immediate　relation　to　an

external　thing？　If　so；　whoever　might　think　of　his　right　as　referring

not　immediately　to　persons　but　to　things　would　have　to　represent　it；

although　only　in　an　obscure　way；　somewhat　thus。　A　right　on　one　side

has　always　a　duty　corresponding　to　it　on　the　other；　so　that　an

external　thing；　although　away　from　the　hands　of　its　first　possessor；

continues　to　be　still　connected　with　him　by　a　continuing　obligation；

and　thus　it　refuses　to　fall　under　the　claim　of　any　other　possessor；

because　it　is　already　bound　to　another。　In　this　way　my　right；　viewed

as　a　kind　of　good　genius　accompanying　a　thing　and　preserving　it　from

all　external　attack；　would　refer　an　alien　possessor　always　to　me！　It

is；　however；　absurd　to　think　of　an　obligation　of　persons　towards

things；　and　conversely；　although　it　may　be　allowed　in　any　particular

case　to　represent　the　juridical　relation　by　a　sensible　image　of　this

kind；　and　to　express　it　in　this　way。

　　The　real　definition　would　run　thus：　〃Right　in　a　thing　is　a　right

to　the　private　use　of　a　thing；　of　which　I　am　in　possession…　original

or　derivative…　in　common　with　all　others。〃　For　this　is　the　one

condition　under　which　it　is　alone　possible　that　I　can　exclude　every

others　possessor　from　the　private　use　of　the　thing　（jus　contra

quemlibet　hujus　rei　possessorem）。　For；　except　by　presupposing　such　a

common　collective　possession；　it　cannot　be　conceived　how；　when　I　am

not　in　actual　possession　of　a　thing；　I　could　be　injured　or　wronged

by　others　who　are　in　possession　of　it　and　use　it。　By　an　individual　act

of　my　own　will　I　cannot　oblige　any　other　person　to　abstain　from　the

use　of　a　thing　in　respect　of　which　he　would　otherwise　be　under　no

obligation；　and；　accordingly；　such　an　obligation　can　only　arise　from

the　collective　will　of　all　united　in　a　relation　of　common

possession。　Otherwise；　I　would　have　to　think　of　a　right　in　a　thing；　as

if　the　thing　has　an　obligation　towards　me；　and　as　if　the　right　as

against　every　possessor　of　it　had　to　be　derived　from　this　obligation

in　the　thing；　which　is　an　absurd　way　of　representing　the　subject。

　　Further；　by　the　term　real　right　（jus　reale）　is　meant　not　only　the

right　in　a　thing　（jus　in　re）；　but　also　the　constitutive　principle　of

all　the　laws　which　relate　to　the　real　mine　and　thine。　It　is；

however；　evident　that　a　man　entirely　alone　upon　the　earth　could

properly　neither　have　nor　acquire　any　external　thing　as　his　own；

because；　between　him　as　a　person　and　all　external　things　as　material

objects；　there　could　be　no　relations　of　obligation。　There　is

therefore；　literally；　no　direct　right　in　a　thing；　but　only　that

right　is　to　be　properly　called　〃real〃　which　belongs　to　any　one　as

constituted　against　a　person；　who　is　in　common　possession　of　things

with　all　others　in　the　civil　state　of　society。



　　　　　　　　12。　The　First　Acquisition　of　a　Thing　can　only

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　be　that　of　the　Soil。



　　By　the　soil　is　understood　all　habitable　Land。　In　relation　to

everything　that　is　moveable　upon　it；　it　is　to　be　regarded　as　a

substance；　and　the　mode　of　the　existence　of　the　moveables　is　viewed　as

an　inherence　in　it。　And　just　as；　in　the　theoretical　acceptance；

accidents　cannot　exist　apart　from　their　substances；　so；　in　the

practical　relation；　moveables　upon　the　soil　cannot　be　regarded　as

belonging　to　a