t would be for him if he were an eagle。 Now it is a universally observed fact that the two evil dispositions in question； the disposition to prefer a man's selfish interests to those which he shares with other people； and his immediate and direct interests to those which are indirect and remote； are characteristics most especially called forth and fostered by the possession of power。 The moment a man； or a class of men； find themselves with power in their hands； the man's individual interest； or the class's separate interest； acquires an entirely new degree of importance in their eyes。 Finding themselves worshipped by others； they become worshippers of themselves； and think themselves entitled to be counted at a hundred times the value of other people； while the facility they acquire of doing as they like without regard to consequences insensibly weakens the habits which make men look forward even to such consequences as affect themselves。 This is the meaning of the universal tradition； grounded on universal experience； of men's being corrupted by power。 Every one knows how absurd it would be to infer from what a man is or does when in a private station； that he will be and do exactly the like when a despot on a throne； where the bad parts of his human nature； instead of being restrained and kept in subordination by every circumstance of his life and by every person surrounding him； are courted by all persons； and ministered to by all circumstances。 It would be quite as absurd to entertain a similar expectation in regard to a class of men； the Demos； or any other。 Let them be ever so modest and amenable to reason while there is a power over them stronger than they； we ought to expect a total change in this respect when they themselves become the strongest power。 Governments must be made for human beings as they are； or as they are capable of speedily becoming： and in any state of cultivation which mankind； or any class among them； have yet attained； or are likely soon to attain； the interests by which they will be led； when they are thinking only of self…interest； will be almost exclusively those which are obvious at first sight； and which operate on their present condition。 It is only a disinterested regard for others； and especially for what comes after them； for the idea of posterity； of their country； or of mankind； whether grounded on sympathy or on a conscientious feeling； which ever directs the minds and purposes of classes or bodies of men towards distant or unobvious interests。 And it cannot be maintained that any form of government would be rational which required as a condition that these exalted principles of action should be the guiding and master motives in the conduct of average human beings。 A certain amount of conscience； and； of disinterested public spirit； may fairly be calculated on in the citizens of any community ripe for representative government。 But it would be ridiculous to expect such a degree of it； combined with such intellectual discernment； as would be proof against any plausible fallacy tending to make that which was for their class interest appear the dictate of justice and of the general good。 We all know what specious fallacies may be urged in defence of every act of injustice yet proposed for the imaginary benefit of the mass。 We know how many； not otherwise fools or bad men； have thought it justifiable to repudiate the national debt。 We know how many； not destitute of ability； and of considerable popular influence； think it fair to throw the whole burthen of taxation upon savings； under the name of realised property； allowing those whose progenitors and themselves have always spent all they received to remain； as a reward for such exemplary conduct； wholly untaxed。 We know what powerful arguments； the more dangerous because there is a portion of truth in them； may be brought against all inheritance； against the power of bequest； against every advantage which one person seems to have over another。 We know how easily the uselessness of almost every branch of knowledge may be proved； to the complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it。 How many； not altogether stupid men； think the scientific study of languages useless； think ancient literature useless； all erudition useless； logic and metaphysics useless； poetry and the fine arts idle and frivolous； political economy purely mischievous？ Even history has been pronounced useless and mischievous by able men。 Nothing but that acquaintance with external nature； empirically acquired； which serves directly for the production of objects necessary to existence or agreeable to the senses； would get its utility recognised if people had the least encouragement to disbelieve it。 Is it reasonable to think that even much more cultivated minds than those of the numerical majority can be expected to be will have so delicate a conscience； and so just an appreciation of what is against their own apparent interest； that they will reject these and the innumerable other fallacies which will press in upon them from all quarters as soon as they come into power； to induce them to follow their own selfish inclinations and short…sighted notions of their own good； in opposition to justice； at the expense of all other classes and of posterity？ One of the greatest dangers； therefore； of democracy； as of all other forms of government； lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power： it is the danger of class legislation； of government intended for （whether really effecting it or not） the immediate benefit of the dominant class； to the lasting detriment of the whole。 And one of the most important questions demanding consideration； in determining the best constitution of a representative government； is how to provide efficacious securities against this evil。 If we consider as a class； politically speaking； any number of persons who have the same sinister interest… that is； whose direct and apparent interest points towards the same description of bad measures； the desirable object would be that no class； and no combination of classes likely to combine； should be able to exercise a preponderant influence in the government。 A modern community； not divided within itself by strong antipathies of race； language； or nationality； may be considered as in the main divisible into two sections； which； in spite of partial variations； correspond on the whole with two divergent directions of apparent interest。 Let us call them （in brief general terms） labourers on the one hand； employers of labour on the other： including however along with employers of labour； not only retired capitalists； and the possessors of inherited wealth； but all that highly paid description of labourers （such as the professions） whose education and way of life assimilate them with the rich； and whose prospect and ambition it is to raise themselves into that class。 With the labourers； on the other hand； may be ranked those smaller employers of labour； who by interests； habits； and educational impressions are assimilated in wishes； tastes； and objects to the labouring classes； comprehending a large proportion of petty tradesmen。 In a state of society thus composed； if the representative system could be made ideally perfect； and if it were possible to maintain it in that state； its organisation must be such that these two classes； manual labourers and their affinities on one side； employers of labour and their affinities on the other； should be； in the arrangement of the representative system； equally balanced； each influencing about an equal number of votes in Parliament： since； assuming that the majority of each class； in any difference between them； would be mainly governed by their class interests； there would be a minority of each in whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason； justice； and the good of the whole； and this minority of either； joining with the whole of the other； would turn the scale against any demands of their own majority which were not such as ought to prevail。 The reason why； in any tolerable constituted society； justice and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point； is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost always divided； some are interested in what is wrong； but some； also； have their private interest on the side of what is right： and those who are governed by higher considerations； though too few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others； usually after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough to turn the balance in favour of the body of private interests which is on the same side with them。 The representative system ought to be so constituted as to maintain this state of things： it ought not to allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth and justice and the other sectional interests combined。 There ought always to be such a balance preserved among personal interests as may render any one of them dependent for its successes on carrying with it at least a large proportion of those who act on higher motives and more comprehensive and distant views。 Chapter 7 Of True and False Democracy； Representation of All； and Representation of the Majority only。
IT HAS been seen that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds： danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body； and in the popular opinion which controls it； and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority； these being all composed of the same class。 We have next to consider how far it is possible so to organise the democracy as； without interfering materially with the characteristic benefits of democratic government； to do away with these two great evils； or at least to abate them； in the utmost degree attainable by human contrivance。 The common mode of attempting this is by limiting the democratic character of the representation； through a more or less restricted suffrage。 But there is a previous consideration which； duly kept in view； considerably modifies the circumstances which are supposed to render such a restriction necessary。 A completely equal democracy； in a nation in which a single c