maintenance of himself and family； and no less ensure the possibility of his being serviceable to his
neighbours and of doing good to those standing in need。 The individual is aware that this is a duty；
for this content is directly contained in the certainty he has of himself。 He perceives； further； that he
fulfils this particular duty in this particular case。 Other people possibly consider the specific way he
adopts as fraud： they hold by other sides of the concrete case presented； while he holds firmly to
this particular side of it by the fact of his being conscious that the increase of property is a pure
and absolute duty。
In the same way there is fulfilled by the individual； as a duty； what other people call violence and
wrong…doing — the duty of asserting one's independence against others： and； again； the duty of
preserving one's life； and the possibility of being useful to one's neighbours。 Others call this
cowardice； but what they call courage really violates both these duties。 But cowardice must not be
so stupid and clumsy as not to know that the maintenance of life and the possibility of being useful
to others are duties — so inept as not to be convinced of the dutifulness of its action； and not to
know that dutifulness consists in knowledge。 Otherwise it would commit the stupidity of being
immoral。 Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled one's duty； this will not be
lacking when the action is what is called cowardice any more than when it is what is called
courage。 As the abstraction called 〃duty〃 is capable of every content； it is quite equal to that of
cowardice。 The agent knows what he does to be duty； and since he knows this； and conviction as
to duty is just dutifulness； he is thus recognized and acknowledged by others。 The act thereby
becomes accepted as valid and has actual existence。
（1） The Universality of Conscience
It is of no avail to object to this freedom — which puts any and every kind of content into this
universal inert receptacle of pure duty and pure knowledge — by asserting that another content
ought to have been put there。 For whatever the content be； each content has upon it the stain of
determinateness from which pure knowledge is free； which pure knowledge can despise just as
readily as it can take up every determinateness in turn。 Every content； through its being
determinate； stands on the same footing with every other； even though it seems to have precisely
the character that the particularity in the content is cancelled。 It may well seem — since in concrete
cases duty breaks regularly into opposition； and； by doing so； sunders the opposites individuality
and universality — that the duty； whose content is the universal as such； contains on that account；
ipso facto； the nature of pure duty； and that thus form and content are here entirely in accord。 On
this view； it might seem that； e。g。 acting for the universal good； for what is the best for all； is to be
preferred to acting for what is the best for the individual。 But this universal duty is precisely what is
present as self…contained actual substance； in the form of ＇established＇ law and right； and holds
good independently of the individual's knowledge and conviction as well as of his immediate
interest。 It is thus precisely that against the form of which morality as a whole is directed。 As
regards its content； however； this too is determinate in character； in so far as the 〃universally best〃
is opposed to the 〃individual best〃。 Consequently； its law is one from which conscience knows
itself to be absolutely free； and it gives itself the absolute privilege to add and pare； to neglect as
well as fulfil it。
Then； again； the above distinction of duty towards the individual and duty towards the universal is
not something fixed and final； when we look at the nature of the opposition in question。 On the
contrary； what the individual does for himself is to the advantage of the universal as well。 The more
he looks after his own good； not only is there the greater possibility of his usefulness to others： his
very reality consists merely in his living and existing in connexion with others。 His individual
enjoyment means ultimately and essentially putting what is his own at the disposal of others； and
helping them to secure their enjoyment。 In fulfilling duty to individuals； and hence duty to self； duty
to the general thus also gets fulfilled。 Weighing； considering； comparing duties； should this appear
here； would take the line of calculating the advantage which the general would get from any given
action。 But there can be no such process； partly because morality would thereby be handed over
to the inevitable contingency characteristic of mere 〃insight〃； partly because it is precisely the
nature of conscience to have done with all this calculating and weighing of duties； and to decide
directly from itself without any such reasons。
In this way； then； conscience acts and maintains itself in the unity of its essential being and its
objective existence for itself； in the unity of pure thought and individuality： it is spirit certain of itself；
which inherently possesses its own truth； within itself； in its knowledge； a knowledge in the sense
of knowledge of its duty。 It maintains its being therein by the fact that the positive element in the
act； the content as well as form of duty and the knowledge of duty； belong to the self； to the
certainty of itself。 What； however； seeks to come before the self with an inherent being of its own
is held to be not truly real； merely a transcended element； only a moment。 Consequently； it is not
universal knowledge in general that has a value； but what is known of the circumstances。 It puts
into duty； which is the universal immanent essence； the content which it derives from its natural
individuality； for the content is one that is present in its own being。 This content； in virtue of the
universal medium wherein it exists； becomes the duty which it carries out； and empty pure duty is；
through this very fact； affirmed to be something transcended； a moment。 This content is its
emptiness； transcended and cancelled； i。e。 is the fulfilling of pure duty。
But at the same time conscience is detached from every possible content。 It absolves itself from
every specific duty； which would try to pass for a law。 In the strength of its certainty of itself； it has
the majesty of absolute self…sufficiency； of absolute a rpkla to bind or to loose。 This
self…determination is at once； therefore； absolute conformity to duty。 Duty is the knowledge itself；
this pure and simple selfhood； however； is the immanent principle and essence； for this inherent
principle is pure self…identity； and self…identity lies in this consciousness。
This pure knowledge is immediately objective； is existence…for…another； for； qua pure self…identity；
it is immediacy； it is objective being。 This being； however； is at the same time pure universality； the
selfhood of all： in other words； action is acknowledged； and hence actual。 This being forms the
element by which conscience directly stands on a footing of equality with every self…consciousness；
and this relation means not an abstract impersonal law； but the self of conscience。
In that this right which conscience does is at the same time； however； a fact for others； a disparity
seems to affect conscience。 The duty which it fulfils is a determinate content； that content is； no
doubt； the self of consciousness； and so its knowledge of itself； its identity with its self。 But when
fulfilled； when planted in the general element of existence； this identity is no longer knowledge； no
longer this process of distinction which directly and at the same time does away with its
distinctions。 Rather； in the sphere of he distinction is set up as subsistent； and the act is a
determinate specific one； not identical with the element of everybody's self…consciousness； and
hence not necessarily acknowledged and recognized。 Both aspects； conscience qua acting； and
the general consciousness acknowledging this act to be duty； stand equally loose from the specific
character belonging to this deed。 On account of this freedom and detachment； the relation of the
two within the common medium of their connexion is rather a relationship of complete disparity —
as a result of which； the consciousness； which is aware of the act； finds itself in complete
uncertainty regarding the spirit which does the act and is 〃certain of itself〃。 This spirit acts and
places in existence a determinate characteristic； others hold to this existence； as its truth； and are
therein certain of this spirit； it has therein expressed what it takes to be its duty。 But it is detached
and free from any specific duty； it has； therefore； left the point where other people think it actually
to be； and this very medium of existence and duty as inherently existing are held by it to be merely
transitory moments。 What it thus places before them； it also 〃displaces〃 again； or rather has； eo
ipso； immediately 〃displaced〃。 For its reality is； for it； not the duty and determinate content thus put
forward； but rather is the reality which it has in its absolute certainty of itself。
The other self…consciousnesses do not know； then； whether this particular conscience is morally
good or is wicked； or； rather； not merely can they not know this conscience； but they must take it
to be also wicked。 For just as it stands loose to the determinate content of duty； and detached
from duty as inherently existing； so do they likewise。 What it places before them； they themselves
know how to 〃displace〃 or dissemble： it is something expressing merely the self of another
individual； not their own： they do not merely know themselves to be detached and free from it； but
have to resolve and analyse it within their own consciousness； reduce it to nothingness by
judgments and explanations in order to preserve their own self。
But the act of conscience is not merely this determination of existence； a determinate content
forsaken by the pure self。 What is to be binding and to be recognized as duty； only is so through
knowledge and conviction as to its being