ego takes the place of that subject and is the function of knitting or combining the predicates one
with another； and is the subject holding them fast。 But since the former subject enters into the
determinate constituents themselves； and is their very life； the subject in the second case — viz。 the
knowing subject…finds that the former； which it is supposed to be done with and which it wants to
transcend； in order to return into itself； — is still there in the predicate： and instead of being able to
be the determining agency in the process of resolving the predicate…reflectively deciding whether
this or that predicate should be attached to the former subject — it has really to deal with the self
of the content； is not allowed to be something on its own account （für sich）； but has to exist along
with this content。
What has been said can be expressed in a formal manner by saying that the nature of judgment or
the proposition in general； which involves the distinction of subject and predicate； is subverted and
destroyed by the speculative judgment； and the identical proposition； which the former becomes
＇by uniting subject and predicate＇； implies the rejection and repudiation of the above relation
between subject and predicate。 This conflict between the form of a proposition in general and the
unity of the notion which destroys that form； is similar to what we find between metre and accent
in the case of rhythm。 Rhythm is the result of what hovers between and unites both。 So in the case
of the speculative or philosophical judgment； the identity of subject and predicate is not intended
to destroy their distinction； as expressed in propositional form； their unity is to arise as a harmony
of the elements。 The form of the judgment is the way the specific sense appears； or is made
manifest； the accent which differentiates the meaning it contains： that the predicate expresses the
substance； and the subject itself falls within the universal； is however the unity wherein that accent
dies away。
To explain what has been said by examples let us take the proposition God is Being。 The
predicate is 〃being〃： it has substantive significance； and thus absorbs the meaning of the subject
within it。 Being is meant to be here not predicate but the essential nature。 Thereby； God seems to
cease to be what he was when the proposition was put forward； viz。 a fixed subject。 Thinking ＇i。e。
ordinary reflection＇； instead of getting any farther with the transition from subject to predicate； in
reality finds its activity checked through the loss of the subject； and it is thrown back on the
thought of the subject because it misses this subject。 Or again； since the predicate has itself been
pronounced to be a subject； to be the being； to be the essential reality； which exhausts the nature
of the subject； thinking finds the subject directly present in the predicate too： and now； instead of
having； in the predicate； gone into itself； and preserved the freedom characteristic of ratiocination；
it is absorbed in the content all the while； or； at any rate is required to be so。
Similarly when it is said： 〃the real is the universal〃； the real； qua subject； passes away in its
predicate。 The universal is not only meant to have the significance of a predicate； as if the
proposition stated that the real is universal： the universal is meant to express the essential nature of
the real。 Thinking therefore loses that fixed objective basis which it had in the subject； just as much
as in the predicate it is thrown back on the subject； and therein returns not into itself but into the
subject underlying the content。
This unaccustomed restraint imposed upon thought is for the most part the cause of the complaints
concerning the unintelligibility of philosophical writings； when otherwise the individual has in him the
requisite mental cultivation for understanding them。 In what has been said we see the reason for
the specific charge often made against them； that a good deal has to be read repeatedly before it
can be understood — an accusation which is meant to convey something improper in the extreme；
and one which if granted to be sound admits of no further reply。 It is obvious from the above what
is the state of the case here。 The philosophical proposition； being a proposition； calls up the
accepted view of the usual relation of subject and predicate； and suggests the idea of the
customary procedure which takes place in knowledge。 Its philosophical content destroys this way
of proceeding and the ordinary view taken of this process。 The common view discovers that the
statement is intended in another sense than it is thinking of； and this correction of its opinion
compels knowledge to recur to the proposition and take it now in some other sense。
There is a difficulty which might well be avoided。 It consists in mixing up the methods of procedure
followed by speculation and ratiocination； when what is said of the subject has at one time the
significance of its conceptual principle； and at another time the meaning of its predicate or
accidental quality。 The one mode of thinking invalidates the other； and only that philosophical
exposition can manage to become plastic in character which resolutely sets aside and has nothing
to do with the ordinary way of relating the parts of a proposition。
As a matter of fact； non…speculative thinking has its rights too； which are justifiable； but are
disregarded in the speculative way of stating a proposition。 Abolishing the form of the proposition
must not take place only in an immediate manner； through the mere content of the proposition。 On
the contrary； we must give explicit expression to this cancelling process； it must be not only that
internal restraining and confining of thought within its own substance； this turning of the conception
back into itself has to be expressly brought out and stated。 This process； which constitutes what
formerly had to be accomplished by proof； is the internal dialectical movement of the proposition
itself。 This alone is the concrete speculative element； and only the explicit expression of this is a
speculative systematic exposition。 Qua proposition； the speculative aspect is merely the internal
restriction of thought within its own substance where the return of the essential principle into itself
is not yet brought out。 Hence we often find philosophical expositions referring us to the inner
intuition； and thus dispensing with the systematic statement of the dialectical movement of the
proposition； which is what we wanted all the while。 The proposition ought to express what the
truth is： in its essential nature the truth is subject： being so； it is merely the dialectical movement； this
self…producing course of activity； maintaining； its advance by returning back into itself。 In the case
of knowledge in other spheres this aspect of expressly stating the internal nature of the content is
constituted by proof。 When dialectic； however； has been separated from proof； the idea of
philosophical demonstration as a matter of fact has vanished altogether。
On this point it may be mentioned that the dialectical process likewise consists of parts or elements
which are propositions。 The difficulty indicated seems therefore to recur continually； and seems to
be a difficulty inherent in the nature of the case。 This is like what happens in the ordinary process
of proving anything； the grounds it makes use of need themselves to be based on other grounds
again； and so on ad inflnitum。 This manner of furnishing grounds and conditions； however；
concerns that type of proof from which the dialectical movement is distinct and hence belongs to
the process of external knowledge。 As to what this movement is； its element is the bare concept；
this furnishes a content which is through and through subject impliciter and per se。 There is to be
found； therefore； no sort of content standing in a relation； as it were； to an underlying subject； and
getting its significance by being attached to this as a predicate。 The proposition as it appears is a
mere empty form。
Apart from the sensuously apprehended or ideally presented （vorgestellten） self； it is in the main
the mere name qua name which denotes the subject pure and simple； the empty unit without any
conceptual character。 For this reason it would e。g。 be expedient to avoid the name 〃God〃；
because this word is not in its primary use a conception as well； but the special name of an
underlying subject； its fixed resting…place； while； on the other hand； being or the one； singleness；
subject； etc。； themselves directly indicate conceptions。 Furthermore； if speculative truths are stated
about that subject ＇God＇； even then their content is devoid of the immanent notion； because that
content is merely present in the form of a passive subject； and owing to this the speculative truths
easily take on the character of mere edification。 From this side； too； the obstacle； arising from the
habit of putting the speculative predicate in the form of a proposition； instead of taking it as an
inherent essential conception； is capable of being made greater or less by the mere way
philosophical truths are put forward。 Philosophical exposition； faithfully following its insight into the
nature of speculative truth； must retain the dialectical form； and exclude everything which is not
grasped conceptually and is conception。
Just as much as in the procedure of ratiocination； the study of philosophy finds obstruction； too； in
the unreasoning conceit that builds itself on well…established truths； which the possessor considers
he has no need to return upon and reconsider； but rather takes to be fundamental； and thinks he
can by means thereof propound as well as decide and pass sentence。 In this regard； it is especially
needful to make once again a serious business of philosophy。 In all spheres of science； art； skill；
and handicraft it is never doubted that； in order to master them； a considerable amount of trouble
must be spent in learning and in being trained。 As regards philosophy； on the contrary； there seems
still an assumption prevalent that； though every one with eyes and fingers is not on that account in a