state of despair about it altogether； and in dealing with them he partly himself brings about the
nothingness of those things； partly he sees these bring about their own nothingness。 Even animals
are not shut off from this wisdom； but show they are deeply initiated into it。 For they do not stand
stock still before things of sense as if these were things per se； with being in themselves： they
despair of this reality altogether； and in complete assurance of the nothingness of things they fall…to
without more ado and eat them up。 And all nature proclaims； as animals do； these open secrets；
these mysteries revealed to all； which teach what the truth of things of sense is。
Those who put forward such assertions really themselves say； if we bear in mind what we
remarked before； the direct opposite of what they mean： a fact which is perhaps best able to bring
them to reflect on the nature of the certainty of sense…experience。 They speak of the 〃existence〃 of
external objects； which can be more precisely characterized as actual； absolutely particular； wholly
personal； individual things； each of them not like anything or anyone else； this is the existence
which they say has absolute certainty and truty。 They 〃mean〃 this bit of paper I am writing on； or
rather have written on： but they do not say what they 〃mean〃。 If they really wanted to say this bit
of paper which they 〃mean〃； and they wanted to say so； that is impossible； because the This of
sense； which is 〃meant〃； cannot be reached by language； which belongs to consciousness； i。e。 to
what is inherently universal。 In the very attempt to say it； it would； therefore； crumble in their
hands； those who have begun to describe it would not be able to finish doing so： they would have
to hand it over to others； who would themselves in the last resort have to confess to speaking
about a thing that has no being。 They mean； then； doubtless this bit of paper here； which is quite
different from that bit over there； but they speak of actual things； external or sensible objects；
absolutely individual； real； and so on； that is； they say about them what is simply universal。
Consequently what is called unspeakable is nothing else than what is untrue； irrational； something
barely and simply meant。
If nothing is said of a thing except that it is an actual thing； an external object； this only makes it the
most universal of all possible things； and thereby we express its likeness； its identity； with
everything； rather than its difference from everything else。 When I say 〃an individual thing〃； I at
once state it to be really quite a universal； for everything is an individual thing： and in the same way
〃this thing〃 is everything and anything we like。 More precisely； as this bit of paper； each and every
paper is a 〃this bit of paper〃； and I have thus said all the while what is universal。 If I want；
however； to help out speech…which has the divine nature of directly turning the mere 〃meaning〃
right round about； making it into something else； and so not letting it ever come the length of words
at all…by pointing out this bit of paper； then I get the experience of what is； in point of fact； the real
truth of sense…certainty。 I point it out as a Here； which is a Here of other Heres； or is in itself
simply many Heres together； i。e。 is a universal。 I take it up then； as in truth it is； and instead of
knowing something immediate； I 〃take〃 something 〃truly〃； I per…ceive （wahrnehme； per…cipio）。
1。 In addition to the works mentioned on p。 40 （note）； the reader may be referred to the analysis
of Sensation and Perception in Plato's Theaetetus； and to Bradley's Appearance and Reality；
Chaps。 II； V； VIII and XIX。
2。 Ie。 For the purposes of philosophical analysis。
3。 I。e。 the na？ve consciousness here analyzed。
4。 Cf。 Encyclo。 § 250。
5。 Cf。 Analysis of Desire； p。 220 ff。
II。 Perception
Or Things and their Deceptiveness （1）
Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own； for its truth is something universal； whereas
certainty wants to deal with the This。 Perception； on the other hand； takes what exists for it to be a
universal。 Universality being its principle in general； its moments immediately distinguished within it
are also universal； I is a universal； and the object is a universal。 That principle has arisen and
come into being for us who are tracing the course of experience； and our process of apprehending
what perception is； therefore； is no longer a contingent series of acts of apprehension； as is the
case with the apprehension of sense…certainty； it is a logically necessitated process。 With the
origination of the principle； both the moments； which as they appear merely fall apart as
happenings； have at once together come into being： the one； the process of pointing out and
indicating； the other the same process； but as a simple fact…the former the process of perceiving；
the latter the object perceived。 The object is in its essential nature the same as the process； the
latter is the unfolding and distinguishing of the elements involved； the object is these same elements
taken and held together as a single totality。 For us （tracing the process） or in itself； （2） the
universal； qua principle； is the essence of perception； and as against this abstraction； both the
moments distinguished…that which perceives and that which is perceived…are what is non…essential。
But in point of fact； because both are themselves the universal； or the essence； they are both
essential： but since they are related as opposites； only one can in the relation （constituting
perception） be the essential moment； and the distinction of essential and non…essential has to be
shared between them。 The one characterized as the simple fact； the object； is the essence； quite
indifferent as to whether it is perceived or not： perceiving； on the other hand； being the process； is
the insubstantial； the inconstant factor； which can be as well as not be； is the non…essential
moment。
This object we have now to determine more precisely； and to develop this determinate character
from the result arrived at： the more detailed development does not fall in place here。 Since its
principle； the universal； is in its simplicity a mediated principle； the object must express this
explicitly as its own inherent nature。 The object shows itself by so doing to be the thing with
many properties。 The wealth of sense…knowledge belongs to perception； not to immediate
certainty； where all that wealth was merely something alongside and by the way； for it is only
perception that has negation； distinction； multiplicity in its very nature。
1。 The Notion of a “Thing”
The This； then； is established as not This； or as superseded； and yet not nothing （simpliciter）； but
a determinate nothing； a nothing with a certain content； viz。 the This。 The sense…element is in this
way itself still present； but not in the form of some particular that is 〃meant〃…as had to be the case
in meediate certainty…but as a universal； as that which will have the character of the property。
Cancelling； superseding； brings out and lays bare its true twofold meaning which we found
contained in the negative： to supersede （aufheben） is at once to negate and to preserve。 The
nothing being a negation of the This； preserves immediacy and is itself sensuous； but a universal
immediacy。 Being； however； is a universal by its having in it mediation or negation。 When it brings
this explicitly out as a factor in its immediacy； it is a specifically distinct determinate property。 As
a result； there are many such properties set up at once； one the negation of the other。 Since they
are expressed in the simple form of the universal； these determinate characters…which； strictly
speaking； become properties only by a further additional characteristic…are self…related； are
indifferent to each other； each is by itself； free from the rest。 The simple self…identical universality；
however； is itself again distinct and detached from these determinate characteristics it has。 It is
pure self…relation； the 〃medium〃 wherin all these characteristics exist： in it； as in a bare； simple
unity； they interpenetrate without affecting one another； for just by participating in this universality
they are indifferent to each other； each by itself。
This abstract universal medium； which we can call 〃Thinghood〃 in general or pure essential reality；
is nothing else than the Here and Now as this on analysis turned out to be； viz。 a simple
togetherness of many Heres and Nows。 But the many （in the present case） are in their
determinateness themselves simply universals。 This salt is a simple Here and at the same time
manifold： it is white； and also pungent； also cubical in shape； also of a specific weight； and so on。
All these many properties exist in a simple Here； where they interpenetrate each other。 None of
these has a different Here from the others； each is everywhere in the same Here where the others
are。 And at the same time； without being divided by different Heres； they do not affect each other
in their interpenetration； its being white does not affect or alter the cubical shape it has；
and neither affects its tart taste； and so on： on the contrary； since each is simple relation to self； it
leaves the others alone and is related to these merely by being also along with them； a relation of
mere indifference。 This 〃Also〃 is thus the pure universal itself； the 〃medium〃； the 〃Thinghood〃
keeping them together。
In this relation； which has emerged； it is merely the character of positive universality that is first
noticed and developed。 But there is still a side presented to view which must also be taken into
account。 It is this。 If the many determinate properties were utterly indifferent to each other； and
were entirely related to themselves alone； they would not be determinate； for they are so； merely in
so far as they are distinguished and related to others as their opposites。 In view of this
opposition； however； they cannot exist together in the bare and simple unity of their 〃medium〃；
which unity is just as essential to them as negation。 The process of distin