which passes hither and thither through all its moments； seeing in them that otherness which is
sublated in the process of grasping it； in the other case it is the imperturbable unity certain of its
own truth。 That restless activity constitutes the 〃other〃 for this unity； while this unity is the 〃other for
that activity； and within these reciprocally determining opposites consciousness and object
alternate。 Consciousness thus at one time finds itself seeking about hither and thither； and its object
is what absolutely exists per se； and is the essentially real； at another time consciousness is aware
of being the category bare and simple； and the object is the movement of the different elements。
Consciousness； however； qua essential reality； is the whole of this process of passing out of itself
qua simple category into individuality and the object； and of viewing this process in the object；
cancelling it as distinct； appropriating it as its own； and declaring itself as this certainty of being all
reality； of being both itself and its object。
Its first declaration is merely this abstract； empty phrase that everything is its own。 For the
certainty of being all reality is to begin with the pure category。 Reason knowing itself in this sense
in its object is what finds expression in abstract empty idealism； （6） it merely takes reason as
reason appears at first； and by its pointing out that in all being there is this bare consciousness of a
〃mine〃； and by expressing things as sensations or ideas； it fancies it has shown that abstract mine〃
of consciousness to be complete reality。 It is bound； therefore； to be at the same time absolute
Empiricism； because； for the filling of this empty 〃mine〃 ； i。e。 for the element of distinction and all
the further development and embodiment of it； its reason needs an impact （Anstoss） operating
from without； in which lies the fons et origo of the multiplicity of sensations or ideas。 This kind of
idealism is thus just such a self…contradictory equivocation as scepticism； only； while the latter
expresses itself negatively； the f ormer does so in a positive way。 But it fails just as completely as
scepticism to link up its contradictory statements about pure consciousness being all reality； while
all the time the alien impact； or sense…impressions and ideas； are equally reality。 It oscillates hither
and thither from one to the other and tumbles into the false； or the sensuous； infinite。 （7） Since
reason is all reality in the sense of the abstract 〃mine〃； and the 〃other〃 is an externality indifferent to
it； there is here affirmed just that sort of knowledge of an 〃other〃 on the part of reason； which we
met with before in the form of 〃intending〃 or meaning〃 （Meinen）； （8） 〃perceiving〃； and
〃understanding〃； which grasps what is 〃meant〃 and what is 〃perceived〃。 Such a kind of knowledge
is at the same time asserted by the very principle of this idealism itself not to be true knowledge；
for only the unity of apperception is the real truth of knowledge。 Pure reason as conceived by this
idealism； if it is to get at this 〃other〃 which is essential to it； i。e。 really is per se； but which it does
not possess in itself — is thus thrown back on that knowledge which is not a knowledge of the real
truth。 It thus condemns itself knowingly and voluntarily to being an untrue kind of knowledge； and
cannot get away from 〃meaning〃 and 〃perceiving〃； which for it have no truth at all。 It falls into a
direct contradiction； it asserts that the real has a twofold nature； consists of elements in sheer
opposition； is the unity of apperception and a 〃thing〃 as well； whether a thing is called an alien
impact； or an empirical entity； or sensibility； or the 〃thing in itself〃； it remains in principle precisely
the same； viz。 something external and foreign to that unity。
This idealism falls into such a contradiction because it asserts the abstract notion of reason to be
the truth。 Consequently reality comes directly before it just as much in a form which is not strictly
the reality of reason at all； whereas reason all the while is intended to be all reality。 Reason
remains； in this case； a restless search； which in its very process of seeking declares that it is utterly
impossible to have the satisfaction of finding。 But actual concrete reason is not so inconsequent as
this。 Being at first merely the certainty that it is all reality； it is in this notion well aware that qua
certainty qua ego it is not yet in truth all reality； and thus reason is driven on to raise its formal
certainty into actual truth； and give concrete filling to the empty 〃mine〃。
1。 Cp。 Hegel's Hist。 Of Philos。； pt。 2； § 3； Introd。 And C： pt。 3； Introd。 Philos。 Of Hist。； pt。 4； §
3； c。 3 ad fin。
2。 Cp。 Naturphilos。； W。W。； vii。 1。 § 246； Logik； W。W。； v。
3。 Cp。 Fichte； Grundlage d。 Gesam。 Wissenschaftslehre。
4。 V。 sup。 P。 154 ff。
5。 This refers to Kant's 〃discovery〃 of his 〃table of categories〃。
6。 Fichte； Berkeley。
7。 Cp。 Wiss。 D。 Logik； Pt。 I； p。 253 ff。
8。 V。 sup。 P。 154 ff。
A
Observation as a Process of Reason
THIS consciousness； which takes being to mean what is its own； now seems； indeed； to adopt
once again the attitude of 〃meaning〃 （1） and 〃perceiving〃； but not in the sense that it is certain of
what is a mere 〃other〃 ； but in the sense that it is certain of this 〃other〃 being itself。 Formerly；
consciousness merely happened to perceive various elements in the 〃thing〃； and had a certain
experience in so doing。 But here it itself settles the observations to be made and the experience to
be had。 〃Meaning〃 and 〃perceiving〃； which formerly were superseded so far as we were
concerned （für uns）； are now superseded by consciousness in its own behalf （für es）。 Reason
sets out to know the truth； to find in the form of a notion what； for 〃meaning〃 and 〃perceiving〃； is a
〃thing〃； i。e。 it seeks in thinghood to have merely the consciousness of its own self。 Reason has；
therefore； now a universal interest in the world； because it is certain of its presence in the world； or
is certain that the actual present is rational。 It seeks its 〃other〃； while knowing that it there
possesses nothing else but itself： it seeks merely its own infinitude。
While； at first； merely surmising that it is in the world of reality； or knowing this only in a general
way to be its own； it goes forward on this understanding and appropriates everywhere and at all
points its own assured possession。 It plants the symbol of its sovereignty on the heights and in the
depths of reality。 But this superficial 〃mine〃 is not its final and supreme interest。 The joy of universal
appropriation finds still in its property the alien other which abstract reason does not contain within
itself。 Reason has the presentiment of being a deeper reality than pure ego is； and must demand
that difference； the manifold diversity of being； should itself become its very own； that the ego
should look at and see itself as concrete reality； and find itself present in objectively embodied
form and in the shape of a 〃thing〃。 But if reason probes and gropes through the inmost recesses of
the life of things； and opens their every vein so that reason itself may gush out of them； then it will
not achieve this desired result； it must； for its purpose； have first brought about in itself its own
completion in order to be able after that to experience what its completion means。
Consciousness 〃observes〃； i。e。 reason wants to find and to have itself in the form of existent
object； to be； in concrete sensuously…present form。 The consciousness thus observing fancies
（meint）； and； indeed； says that it wants to discover not itself； but； on the contrary； the inner being
of things qua things。 That this consciousness 〃means〃 this and says so； lies in the fact that it is
reason； but reason as such is for it not as yet object。
If it were to know reason to be equally and at once the essence of things and of itself； and knew
that reason can only be actually present in consciousness in the form and shape peculiarly
appropriate to reason； then it would descend into the depths of its own being； and seek reason
there rather than in things。 If it had found reason there； it would again turn from that and be
directed upon concrete reality； in order to see therein its own sensuous expression； but would； at
the same time； take that sensuous form to be essentially a notion。
Reason； as it immediately appears in the form of conscious certainty of being all reality； takes its
reality in the sense of immediacy of being； and also takes the unity of ego with this objective
existence in the sense of an immediate unity； a unity in which it （reason） has not yet separated and
then again united the moment of being and ego； or； in other words； a unity which reason has not
yet come to understand。 It； therefore； when appearing as conscious observation； turns to things
with the idea that it is really taking them as sensuous things opposed to the ego。 But its actual
procedure contradicts this idea； for it knows things； it transforms their sensuous character into
conceptions； i。e。 just into a kind of being which at the same time is ego； it transforms thought into
an existent thought； or being into a thought…constituted being； and； in fact； asserts that things have
truth merely as conceptions。 In this process； it is only what the things are that consciousness in
observation becomes aware of； we； however ＇who are tracing the nature of this experience＇；
become aware of what conscious observation itself is。 The outcome of its process； however； will
be that this consciousness becomes aware of being for itself what it is in itself ＇i。e。 becomes aware
of being to itself what； in the meantime； it is to us＇。
We have to consider the operation of this observational phase of reason in all the various moments
of its activity。 It takes up this attitude towards Nature； Mind； and finally towards the relation of
both in the form of sense…existence； and in all these it seeks to find itself as a definitely existing
concrete actuality。
1。 v。 p。 154 ff。