merely 〃means〃； and its content is merely what is 〃presumed〃 or 〃meant〃。
The so…called 〃laws〃； this kind of science sets out to find； are relations holding between these two
presumed or supposed aspects； and hence can amount to no more than an empty 〃fancying〃
（meinen）。 Again since this presumed knowledge； which takes upon itself to deal with the reality of
mind； finds its object to be just the fact that mind is reflected from sense existence back into self；
and that； for mind； a specific bodily expression is an indifferent accident； it is therefore bound to be
aware at once that by the so…called 〃laws〃 discovered it really says nothing at all； but that； strictly
speaking； this is mere chatter； or merely giving out a 〃fancy〃 or 〃opinion〃 （Meinung） of its own —
（an assertion which has this amount of truth that to state one's 〃opinion〃； one's 〃fancy〃； and not to
convey thereby the fact itself； but merely a 〃fancy of one's own〃； are one and the same thing）。 In
content； however； such observations cannot differ in value from these： 〃It always rains at our
annual fair； says the dealer； 〃And every time； too；〃 says the housewife； 〃when I am drying my
washing。〃
Lichtenberg； who characterizes physiognomic observation in this way； adds this remark： 〃If any
one said； 'You act； certainly； like an honest man； but I can see from your face you are forcing
yourself to do so； and are a rogue at heart；' without a doubt every brave fellow to the end of time
when accosted in that fashion will retort with a box on the ear。〃
This retort is to the point； for the reason that it refutes the fundamental assumption of such a
〃science〃 of conjecture （meinen）； viz。 that the reality of a man is his face； etc。
The true being of a man is； on the contrary； his act； individuality is real in the deed； and a deed it is
which cancels both the aspects of what is 〃meant〃 or 〃presumed〃 to be。 In the one aspect where
what is 〃presumed〃 or 〃imagined〃 takes the form of a passive bodily being； individuality puts itself
forward in action as the negative essence which only is so far as it cancels bring。 Then
furthermore the act does away with the inexpressibleness of what self…conscious individuality really
〃means〃； in regard to such 〃meaning〃； individuality is endlessly determined and determinable。 This
false infinite； this endless determining； is abolished in the completed act。 The act is something
simply determinate； universal； to be grasped as an abstract； distinctive whole； it is murder； theft； a
benefit； a deed of bravery； and so on； and what it is can be said of it。
It is such and such； and its being is not merely a symbol； it is the fact itself。 It is this； and the
individual human being is what the act is。 In the simple fact that the act is； the individual is for
others what he really is and with a certain general nature； and ceases to be merely something that
is 〃meant〃 or 〃presumed〃 to be this or that。 No doubt he is not put there in the form of mind； but
when it is a question of his being qua being； and the twofold being of bodily shape and act are
pitted against one another； each claiming to be his true reality； the deed alone； is to be affirmed as
his genuine being — not his figure or shape； which would express what he 〃means〃 to convey by
his acts； or what any one might 〃conjecture〃 he merely could do。 In the same way； on the other
hand； when his performance and his inner possibility； capacity； or intention are opposed； the
former alone is to be regarded as his true reality； even if he deceives himself on the point and；
after he has turned from his action into himself；。 means to be something else in his 〃inner mind〃 than
what he is in the act。 Individuality； which commits itself to the objective element； when it passes
over into a deed no doubt puts itself to the risk of being altered and perverted。 But what settles the
character of the act is just this — whether the deed is a real thing that holds together； or whether it
is merely a pretended or 〃supposed〃 performance； which is in itself null and void and passes away。
Objectification does not alter the act itself； it merely shows what the deed is； i。e。 whether it is or
whether it is nothing。
The breaking up of this real being into intentions； and subtleties of that sort； by which the real man；
i。e。 his deed； is to be reduced again to； and explained in terms of； a 〃conjectured〃 being； as even
the individual himself may produce out of himself particular intentions concerning his reality — all
this must be left to idle 〃fancying and presuming〃 to furnish at its leisure。 If this idle thinking will set
its ineffective wisdom to work； and will deny the agent the character of reason； and use him so
badly as to want to declare his figure and his lineaments to be his real being instead of his act； then
it may expect to get the retort above spoken of； a retort which shows that figure is not the inherent
being； but is on the contrary an object sufficiently on the surface to be roughly handled。
If we look now at the range of relations as a whole in which self…conscious individuality can be
observed standing towards its outer aspect； there will be one left which has still to come before
observation as an object。 In psychology it is the external reality of things which in the life of mind is
to have its counterpart conscious of itself and make the mind intelligible。 In physiognomy； on the
other hand； mind or spirit is to be known in its own proper outer （physical） aspect； a form of being
which may be called the language or utterance of mind — the visible invisibility of its inner nature。
There is still left the further character of the aspect of reality — that individuality expresses its
nature in its immediate actuality； an actuality that is definitely fixed and purely existent。
This last relation ＇of mind to its reality＇ is distinguished from the physiognomic by the fact that this
is the speaking presence of the individual； who in his practical active outer expression brings to
light and manifests at the same time the expression wherein he reflects himself into himself and
contemplates himself； an expression which is itself a movement； passive lineaments which are
themselves essentially a mediated form of existence。 In the character still to be considered；
however； the outer； element is finally an entirely inactive objectivity； which is not in itself a speaking
sign； but presents itself on its own account； separate from the self…conscious process； and has the
form of a bare thing。
In the first place in regard to the relation of the inner to this its outer； it is clear that that relation
seems bound to be understood in the sense of a causal connexion； since the relation of one
immanent and inherent entity to another； qua a necessary relation； is causal connexion。
Now； for spiritual individuality to have an effect on the body it must qua cause be itself corporeal。
The corporeal element； however； wherein it acts as a cause； is the organ； not the organ of action
on external reality； but of the action of the self…conscious being within itself； operating outward
only on its own body。 It is at the same time not easy to see what these organs can be。 If we merely
think of organs in general； the general organ for work would at once occur to us； so； too； the
organ of sex； and so on。 But organs of that sort are to be considered as intruments or parts； which
mind； qua one extreme； possesses as a means for dealing with the other extreme； which is an
outer object。 In the present case； however； an organ is to be understood to be one wherein the
self…conscious individual； as an extreme； maintains himself on his own account and for himself
against his own proper actuality which is opposed to him； the individual not being at the same time
turned upon the outer world； but reflected in his own action； and where； further； his aspect of
existence is not an existence objective for some other individual。 In the case of physiognomy； too；
the organ is no doubt considered as an existence reflected into self and criticizing the action。 But in
this case the existence is objective in character； and the outcome of the physiognomical
observation is that self…consciousness treats precisely this its reality as something indifferent。 This
indifference disappears in the fact that this very state of being reflected into self is itself active upon
the other： thereby that existence occupies and maintains a necessary relation to self…consciousness。
But to operate effectually on that existence it must itself have a being； though not properly
speaking an objective being； and it must be set forth as being this organ。
In ordinary life； anger； e。g。 as an internal action of that sort； is located in the liver。 Plato （7） even
assigns the liver something still higher； something which to many is even the highest function of all；
viz。 prophesying； or the gift of uttering in an irrational manner things sacred and eternal。 But the
process which the individual has in his liver； heart； and so on； cannot be regarded as one wholly
internal to the individual； wholly reflected into his self； rather his process is there （viz。 in the liver；
etc。） as something which has already become bodily and assumes a physical animal existence；
reacting on and towards external reality。
The nervous system； on the other hand； is the immediate stability of the organism in its process of
movement。 The nerves themselves； no doubt； are again organs of that consciousness which from
the first is immersed in its outward impulses。 Brain and spinal cord； however； may be looked at as
the immediate presence of self…consciousness； a presence self…contained； not an object and also
not transient。 In so far as the moment of being； which this organ has； is a being for another； is an
objective existence； it is a being that is dead； and is no longer the presence of self…consciousness。
This self…contained existence； however； is by its very nature a fluent stream； wherein the circles
that are made in it immediately break up and dissolve； and where no distinction is expressed as
permanent or real。 Meanwhile； as mind itself is not an abstractly simple entity； but a system of
processes； wherein it d